
Andrew Lo's "Adaptive Markets" revolutionizes finance by merging evolution with economics. Endorsed by the CFA Institute, it challenges efficient market theory with insights from neuroscience and psychology. What if markets evolve like organisms? Discover why top regulators are rethinking financial survival.
Andrew W. Lo, author of Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought, is a renowned financial economist and leading authority on market behavior. Born in Hong Kong and raised in the U.S., Lo combines his role as the Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor of Finance at MIT Sloan School of Management with groundbreaking research bridging finance, technology, and evolutionary biology.
His book challenges traditional economic theories by introducing the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, a framework merging behavioral finance with evolutionary principles—a concept informed by his decades of work on systemic risk, quantitative trading, and financial engineering at MIT’s Laboratory for Financial Engineering.
A prolific scholar, Lo co-authored The Econometrics of Financial Markets and Hedge Funds: An Analytic Perspective, and his insights have shaped global financial policy, including congressional testimony during the 2008 crisis. Recognized as one of TIME’s “100 Most Influential People,” his work has earned accolades such as the PROSE Award and a spot on the Financial Times’ Business Book of the Year shortlist. Adaptive Markets has been translated into multiple languages and cited as essential reading by Bloomberg and CNBC, reflecting its impact on redefining modern finance.
Adaptive Markets presents the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH), which blends the Efficient Market Hypothesis with behavioral finance using evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and psychology. Andrew Lo argues that financial markets evolve through competition, adaptation, and natural selection, explaining behaviors like fear, greed, and irrational decision-making.
This book is ideal for investors, finance professionals, and academics seeking a hybrid perspective on market efficiency. It’s particularly valuable for those interested in behavioral economics, evolutionary theories in finance, or understanding crises like the 2008 financial collapse.
Yes—Lo’s interdisciplinary approach offers fresh insights into market dynamics, combining rigorous research with real-world examples. The 500-page work is praised for making complex concepts accessible without oversimplification, though its length may challenge casual readers.
The AMH posits that markets evolve like biological ecosystems, driven by competition, adaptation, and learning. Unlike the Efficient Market Hypothesis, it acknowledges irrational behaviors (e.g., overreaction) as survival strategies shaped by evolutionary pressures.
While the Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes rational actors and instant information absorption, AMH incorporates behavioral biases and market evolution. Lo argues efficiency depends on context, such as the number of market participants and resource availability.
Lo attributes the crisis to outdated financial models that failed to account for human adaptability and systemic risk. He argues regulators and investors underestimated the speed at which market “species” (e.g., hedge funds) evolve, creating fragility.
Critics argue AMH lacks predictive power compared to traditional models. Others note it’s more descriptive than prescriptive, offering fewer actionable investment strategies. However, it’s widely praised for integrating behavioral and evolutionary concepts.
Lo suggests diversifying strategies, embracing flexibility, and learning from mistakes. For example, during volatility, AMH implies avoiding panic selling by recognizing fear as an evolutionary response, not a rational signal.
With AI and algorithmic trading reshaping markets, AMH’s focus on adaptation remains critical. Lo’s framework helps decode emerging trends like crypto volatility or ESG investing through an evolutionary lens.
As an MIT finance professor and quantitative researcher, Lo bridges academia and practice. His work on hedge funds and financial engineering informs AMH’s data-driven yet human-centric approach.
Lo uses neuroscience to explain how brain function drives financial decisions. For instance, he links fear-driven sell-offs to the amygdala’s survival instincts, illustrating why rational models fail during crises.
著者の声を通じて本を感じる
キーアイデアを瞬時にキャプチャして素早く学習
Markets often display remarkable wisdom.
Markets also periodically exhibit spectacular failures.
Financial markets don't follow physical laws but biological ones.
Our brains simply haven't had time to evolve specialized circuits.
Fear conditioning occurs rapidly, often with just a single event.
何でも質問し、学習スタイルを選び、自分に本当に響くインサイトを一緒に作れます。

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Wall Street, October 2008. As Lehman Brothers collapsed and global markets plunged, investors worldwide found themselves gripped by a primal emotion: fear. This wasn't just any fear-it was the kind that short-circuits rational thinking. The kind that makes your heart race, your palms sweat, and your mind freeze. The same fear response that saved our ancestors from predators was now wreaking havoc in modern financial markets. Andrew Lo's "Adaptive Markets" offers a revolutionary framework that bridges this gap between our ancient emotional wiring and modern financial complexity. As a former MIT professor with a dual background in economics and neuroscience, Lo has become one of the most influential voices challenging traditional market theories. His book has been praised by Nobel laureates and featured in publications from The Economist to The Wall Street Journal, with Bill Gates calling it "the best explanation of how markets work that I've ever read." What makes this work so compelling is that it doesn't just explain why markets fail-it fundamentally reframes how we understand human behavior in financial contexts. By integrating evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and psychology with traditional economics, Lo offers something rare: a theory that explains both market efficiency and irrationality within a single coherent framework. In a world still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis and facing new economic uncertainties, Lo's perspective couldn't be more timely or essential.
Our fear response evolved over hundreds of thousands of years to protect us from physical dangers-predators, hostile tribes, natural disasters. When pilot Robert Thompson walked into a convenience store and suddenly felt an overwhelming urge to leave, his instincts saved him from an armed robbery in progress. His amygdala-the brain's fear center-had detected subtle danger cues his conscious mind hadn't processed. But this same neurological circuitry becomes problematic in financial contexts. When markets crash, our fight-or-flight response offers no advantage. In fact, it often leads to precisely the wrong decisions-panic selling at market bottoms or freezing when action is needed. This mismatch exists because money is evolutionarily novel, having existed for only a few thousand years compared to the hundreds of thousands of years that shaped our survival responses. Our brains simply haven't had time to evolve specialized circuits for financial decision-making. Traditional economic theories ignore this reality. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis assumes investors behave like perfectly rational calculators, always incorporating all available information into prices. This theory spawned the multi-trillion-dollar index fund industry based on the premise that markets are so efficient that trying to beat them is futile. Yet contradictions abound. Investors like Warren Buffett, Peter Lynch, and James Simons have consistently outperformed the market. Simons' Medallion Fund achieved a remarkable 34.4% annual return over eleven years-a result that should be statistically impossible under efficient market theory. The 2008 financial crisis further exposed the limitations of traditional theories, forcing even staunch free-market advocates like Alan Greenspan to acknowledge fundamental errors in their understanding of how markets function. The reality is that financial markets don't follow physical laws but biological ones-the same principles of competition, adaptation, and natural selection that govern all living systems.
Markets often display remarkable wisdom. When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, financial markets identified Morton Thiokol (the company responsible for the faulty O-rings) within minutes through stock price movements-months before the official investigation reached the same conclusion. This phenomenon demonstrates how thousands of motivated experts can combine their knowledge to produce accurate assessments faster than even the brightest investigative minds. Yet markets also periodically exhibit spectacular failures. The 2008 housing collapse, the dot-com bubble, and countless other manias throughout history reveal that markets aren't always rational. This paradox has created an ideological divide among economists: free-market economists who believe in rational actors governed by supply and demand versus behavioral economists who see humans as irrational animals driven by fear and greed. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis became the crown jewel of financial economics in the mid-20th century. Paul Samuelson and Eugene Fama independently developed theories showing that if markets incorporate all available information into prices, future price movements must be unpredictable-following a "random walk." This insight transformed Wall Street, replacing the old boys' network with computer networks and making what you knew more important than who you knew. But cracks in this theory began appearing. In 1986, Andrew Lo and Craig MacKinlay developed a statistical test of the Random Walk Hypothesis and found clear violations. Their research showed that stock returns didn't follow the patterns predicted by random walk theory, with statistical odds against their findings being roughly 3 out of 100 trillion. When they presented these results at a prestigious conference, they faced fierce resistance from economists who had built careers on market efficiency. The evidence against perfect market rationality continued mounting. Daniel Ellsberg demonstrated that people respond differently to risk (quantifiable randomness) versus uncertainty (unquantifiable randomness). Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky documented systematic biases in decision-making, showing that humans place greater weight on losses than on equivalent gains. Professional poker players understand this psychology well, setting strict limits before they play because they know our tendency is to bet more when losing and quit when winning. These seemingly irrational behaviors aren't random but systematic. Many result from our powerful human tendency to forecast and plan ahead-but applied to inappropriate environments. Pattern-seeking and forward-looking behavior made Homo sapiens the dominant species, but these abilities can lead to foolish decisions when used in contexts they weren't evolved for.
To develop a framework that can challenge the elegant theory of Homo economicus, we must examine the actual engine of human behavior-the brain. With its 86 billion interconnected neurons, the brain isn't a single organ but comprises at least 52 unique areas with specific functions. Neuroscience has revealed that the amygdala, an almond-shaped structure deep in the brain, links memories to fear. Unlike computer image recognition, human object recognition inherently includes emotional associations. Fear conditioning occurs rapidly, often with just a single event, and is virtually permanent compared to other forms of learning. Joseph LeDoux discovered the "road map of fear" by tracing how fear-conditioned stimuli are processed, finding that the amygdala receives information directly, bypassing normal pathways. This hardwired "fire alarm" triggers physical responses before conscious awareness, which can be life-saving but also counterproductive in modern contexts like financial decision-making. Our brains process emotional pain remarkably similarly to physical pain. UCLA researchers discovered that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and insula-regions that process physical pain-activated during social exclusion. Even socially complex emotions like envy trigger similar neural responses. The brain's pleasure centers are as crucial to economic decisions as fear and pain. Harvard researchers discovered that financial gains trigger identical brain responses as cocaine or morphine use-activating the hypothalamus, sublenticular extended amygdala, ventral tegmental area, and nucleus accumbens. Stanford researchers further demonstrated that risk-seeking mistakes correlate with nucleus accumbens activation, while risk-averse errors activate the anterior insula-the disgust center. To test whether professional traders truly embodied Homo economicus, Andrew Lo and Dmitry Repin conducted a groundbreaking study measuring real-time physiological responses of traders during actual trading. They found that all traders showed physiological responses to significant market events, but experienced traders showed more controlled emotional reactions than novices. In a follow-up study, they discovered that traders who reported more intense emotional reactions to both gains and losses performed significantly worse than their peers. Similarly, those scoring higher on "internality"-the tendency to attribute events to their own actions rather than chance-also underperformed. Successful traders demonstrated more controlled emotional responses and avoided excessive self-blame or self-congratulation for trading outcomes. Unlike the theoretical Homo economicus who applies consistent discount rates across time, real humans exhibit "hyperbolic discounting"-valuing immediate rewards disproportionately higher than future ones. We typically choose $100 now over $200 in a month, yet prefer $200 in thirteen months over $100 in a year.
Counterintuitively, emotion isn't the enemy of rationality-it's essential to it. Neurologist Antonio Damasio discovered this through a patient called "Elliot" who had portions of his frontal lobes removed due to a brain tumor. Though Elliot's intelligence remained intact, his personality transformed dramatically. Most strikingly, he displayed almost no emotional reactions and simultaneously lost his ability to make rational decisions. Damasio reached a profound conclusion: to be fully rational, we need emotion. Emotions serve as an efficient learning mechanism, forming an internal reward-punishment system that helps the brain select advantageous behaviors and establish standards of value for cost-benefit analysis. Without emotions, everything becomes the same, making rational judgment impossible. Extreme emotional reactions can temporarily short-circuit rational thought through a neurological mechanism-intense amygdala stimulation suppresses activity in the prefrontal cortex where logical reasoning occurs. This makes evolutionary sense as survival often depends on immediate action rather than deliberation. The price discovery process in markets requires participants to engage in cause-and-effect reasoning about others' intentions-what psychologists call "theory of mind." Remarkably, neuroscience has discovered "mirror neurons" that fire both when we perform actions and when we observe others performing them, providing a biological basis for understanding others' intentions. However, humans have biological limits to this capacity. Studies show that normal adults make significant errors at the fifth level of theory of mind. This biological limitation poses a serious challenge to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, as many financial situations require understanding intentions several levels deep. The prefrontal cortex functions as the brain's CEO, creating complex hypothetical narratives that enable extraordinary behaviors. This was demonstrated by Aron Ralston, who amputated his own arm after being trapped by a boulder. By creating an alternate narrative of survival-including a vision of his future son-Ralston's prefrontal cortex overrode his pain-avoidance circuitry. Our brains contain narrative prediction machines that foretell the future, but with a subtle flaw: we unconsciously shape our behavior to make predicted outcomes more likely. Psychologist Robert Rosenthal discovered this through his research on experimenter bias, finding that when teachers held positive expectations for students, those students performed better, creating a self-fulfilling cycle.
Evolution applies broadly to any population where characteristics can be copied generationally. While many evolutionary theories have been proposed, only Darwin's theory of natural selection has endured. In biological populations, individuals naturally vary, with different traits leading to different reproductive success rates. Those better adapted to their environment have more descendants, causing their advantageous traits to become more common. Evolution isn't a directed progression toward some optimal goal, but rather a passive process of elimination through natural selection. As Ernst Mayr explained, it's not truly selection but elimination and differential reproduction-the least adapted individuals are eliminated first, while better adapted ones have greater chances to survive and reproduce. Natural selection may seem cruel, but it's typically mundane-organisms reproduce at similar rates across generations. What drives evolutionary change is variation within species, which comes from mutations. DNA replication is remarkably accurate but imperfect, creating occasional changes. Evolution works through differential reproduction-even a slight reproductive advantage can cause a genetic trait to dominate a population within just a few thousand years. Natural selection can exquisitely fine-tune species to their environments, but this specialization creates fragility. When environments change rapidly, diversity becomes crucial. Mutations provide biological insurance against environmental change. The human brain shows no radically new structures compared to our primate relatives-what changed was size. Our australopithecine ancestors like Lucy had brains of about 400 cubic centimeters (similar to modern chimps). With the emergence of Homo 2 million years ago, brain size doubled to 850cc. Modern Homo sapiens average 1,200cc, with some archaic forms reaching 1,800cc. This expansion wasn't uniform-regions associated with sensory processing, motor control, and "higher" functions grew disproportionately, particularly the prefrontal cortex where executive functions like decision-making, risk management, and future planning reside. What truly distinguishes humans from other species is our capacity to create complex imaginary scenarios-the ability to formulate abstract questions about our own existence. While other animals use tools and some even communicate with limited language, humans alone possess the extraordinary ability to evolve ideas at the speed of thought. Our prefrontal cortex allows us to test concepts mentally before implementation, reshaping them as needed.
After exploring millions of years of evolution and the inner workings of the human brain, we can now formulate a new theory of how markets work. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis fails because Homo sapiens isn't Homo economicus-we're neither entirely rational nor entirely irrational. Market inefficiencies exist and provide clues about how our brains make financial decisions. While economists might dismiss behavioral quirks as mere "bugs" in the program of economic rationality, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis turns this view upside down: we aren't rational actors with a few quirks-our brains are collections of quirks. We're not a system with bugs; we're a system of bugs that sometimes produce "rational" behavior under certain conditions. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis rests on five key principles: 1. We are biological entities shaped by evolution, neither always rational nor irrational 2. We display biases but can learn from experience and revise our heuristics 3. We possess abstract thinking and forward-looking analysis-"evolution at the speed of thought" 4. Financial market dynamics emerge from our interactions as we adapt to each other and our environments 5. Survival is the ultimate driving force behind competition, innovation, and adaptation Under this hypothesis, individuals develop heuristics through trial and error, receiving reinforcement from outcomes. When environments remain stable, these heuristics eventually yield approximately optimal solutions. But when environments change, old heuristics become unsuited to new conditions, producing seemingly "irrational" behavior that's better described as "maladaptive." The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis doesn't just explain apparent market irrationality-it provides a predictive framework for understanding behavioral biases. Take probability matching, that puzzling tendency where people randomize their choices to match environmental probabilities rather than always selecting the highest-probability option. To illustrate why this seemingly irrational behavior might actually be adaptive, Lo developed a "binary choice model" involving hypothetical creatures called "tribbles." These tribbles must choose between nesting in a valley (ideal when sunny) or on a plateau (ideal when rainy). In an environment with 75% sunshine, the "rational" economic choice would be always nesting in the valley, maximizing individual survival chances. But from an evolutionary perspective, something remarkable happens. Tribbles who always choose the valley (the "economist tribbles") get wiped out the first time it rains. Similarly, tribbles who always choose the plateau perish when the sun shines. The only sustainable strategies involve randomizing-some tribbles choosing valley, others plateau. Most surprisingly, the population that grows fastest over generations is the one that matches the environmental probability exactly-choosing the valley 75% of the time and the plateau 25% of the time. This probability-matching behavior optimizes the growth rate of the entire group rather than maximizing individual success.
The Galapagos Islands formed about 5 million years ago from volcanic activity hundreds of miles off South America's coast. Only organisms that could survive the harsh journey and adapt to the islands' hostile environment thrived there. Darwin's finches exemplify this adaptive radiation-fourteen distinct species evolved from a single ancestor, each developing specialized features like different beak shapes to exploit unique ecological niches. This natural laboratory of evolution provides the perfect metaphor for understanding hedge funds: just as isolated environments drive rapid adaptation in species, the financial marketplace drives rapid innovation in investment strategies. Each hedge fund adapts to exploit specific market inefficiencies, with some thriving while others go extinct, all evolving at the speed of thought rather than biological time. The hedge fund's evolutionary history mirrors biological adaptation-from near non-existence eighty years ago to thousands of diverse funds today. Alfred Winslow Jones created the first modern "hedged fund" in 1949 with $100,000 after writing for Fortune magazine. His fund realized annualized returns over 20% for twenty years using primitive measurements corresponding to modern concepts of alpha, beta, and sigma. The quantitative revolution in finance began almost by accident when Gerry Bamberger, a computer science graduate hired as technical support at Morgan Stanley, noticed patterns in block trades. He observed that large block trades created temporary market ripples while smaller hedge trades didn't, revealing profitable opportunities in pairs trading. David Shaw joined Morgan Stanley by "random chance" when a headhunter noticed him while he was unsuccessfully seeking venture capital for a parallel supercomputer project. Despite knowing almost nothing about finance, Shaw was fascinated by Tartaglia's APT group, which had discovered exploitable market anomalies contradicting the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. In 1988, Shaw founded D.E. Shaw & Co. with $28 million in startup capital. Rather than hiring finance professionals, Shaw recruited brilliant mathematicians and scientists, modeling his hedge fund after an academic research organization-a key evolutionary innovation. The firm was profitable immediately, advancing so far beyond contemporary academic research on market anomalies that they could often identify flaws in trading strategies pitched to them just by examining simulated returns.
The traditional investment paradigm consists of five fundamental principles: First, the risk/reward trade-off states that higher returns require accepting higher risk. Second, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework divides risk into "idiosyncratic" (unique to individual assets) and "systematic" (market-wide) components, with only systematic risk commanding a premium. Third, portfolio optimization suggests constructing diversified, passive portfolios based on these metrics. Fourth, asset allocation (how much to invest in broad asset classes) matters more than selecting individual securities. Fifth, stocks are considered the best long-term investment vehicle. From the mid-1930s to the mid-2000s, a period Lo calls the "Great Modulation," U.S. financial markets experienced remarkable stability. During these seven decades, the stock market provided steady, reliable returns with relatively low volatility. This stable environment made the traditional investment paradigm's assumptions of stationarity and rationality reasonable approximations, explaining why passive buy-and-hold strategies and simple asset allocation rules worked so effectively during this period. Today's financial environment differs dramatically from the Great Modulation era. The fourth quarter of 2008 saw the highest stock market volatility since the Great Depression. Multiple indicators-trading volume, market capitalization, execution speeds, and the number of market participants-all suggest we're in genuinely unusual financial times. One of the traditional investment paradigm's core principles-that riskier assets earn higher average returns-may no longer hold in our new financial environment. While historical data spanning 90 years shows small-cap stocks outperforming large-caps by about 2% annually with correspondingly higher volatility, this relationship breaks down over shorter timeframes. When examining rolling five-year periods, the correlation between risk and return is actually negative (-58%), suggesting investors are sometimes punished rather than rewarded for taking risk. The traditional link between active investing/active risk management and passive investing/passive risk management can now be severed using modern technology. A dynamic index fund with no alpha can be actively risk-managed to a target volatility level-similar to setting cruise control in a car. This approach requires active risk management through trading futures or forwards to scale index exposure, but the benefits are significant.
The financial system isn't a physical or mechanical system, but an ecosystem where interdependent species struggle for survival in an ever-changing environment. Studying it requires taking inventory of participants, identifying energy and nutrient sources, and understanding how they flow through the system. In the 1990s, mortgage brokers beyond traditional banks began underwriting home loans and selling them to government-sponsored enterprises or investment banks, which transformed them into complex financial products like asset-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. This ecological shift occurred amid political encouragement of broader home ownership across partisan lines. The mortgage ecosystem expanded dramatically-from $480 billion in mortgage-related securities issued in 1996 to over $3 trillion by 2003. As economist Paul Krugman noted near the 2006 housing peak, "Americans make a living selling each other houses, paid for with money borrowed from the Chinese." This financial ecosystem expansion wasn't accidental. Mortgage brokers had financial incentives to originate loans, causing a housing boom that nearly doubled U.S. residential real estate values between 1996-2006. The system functioned while interest rates remained low, but when the Fed raised rates seventeen times between 2004-2006, and housing prices peaked and began falling, homeowners with adjustable-rate mortgages began defaulting. Even if we had perfect foresight about the 2008 financial crisis, preventing it would have been nearly impossible. Despite numerous accurate warnings from experts, the system remained deaf to these alarms. Robert Shiller, the leading authority on housing prices, clearly identified the housing bubble in January 2005, yet prices climbed another 15% before peaking. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis explains why the financial crisis warnings went unheeded: greed overwhelmed fear. As Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince infamously said in summer 2007, "As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." Just months later, Prince retired after Citigroup reported massive losses on mortgage-backed securities. Financial disasters share a common trait: they create new connections between previously unrelated assets, producing what Yale sociologist Charles Perrow called "tight coupling." When systems become both complex (with many nonlinear relationships) and tightly coupled (where each component must perform flawlessly), disasters become inevitable.
John Maynard Keynes envisioned a future where economic necessity would be removed for large groups of people-a Star Trek-like "age of leisure and abundance." He also hoped economists would become "humble, competent people on a level with dentists." This humble financial dentistry is exemplified by index funds, but we can go further with dynamic financial indexes that operate automatically without human intervention. The collective intelligence of global financial markets forms a human supercomputer that could solve intractable problems like cancer. While scientific breakthroughs in genomics and gene editing are accelerating exponentially, funding challenges have created a "valley of death" preventing translation into treatments. The solution? Financial engineering through diversification-by investing in 150 projects simultaneously, the probability of at least three successes rises to 98%, potentially generating $37 billion. Such a "CancerCures megafund" could be financed through bond markets and other financial instruments, creating cancer bonds similar to WWII war bonds that Americans could invest in alongside pension funds and insurance companies seeking longevity risk hedges. In Star Trek's vision of the future, poverty is eliminated-a seemingly utopian concept that may actually be within our reach. Research shows poverty creates physiological stress responses that lead to poor financial decisions-a vicious cycle that can be broken. Studies demonstrate that simply receiving money unconditionally lowers stress hormones like cortisol and improves decision-making capacity. The future's uncertainty can be tamed through financial innovation. As economist Frank Knight taught us, risk is measurable while uncertainty represents the unknown unknowns. Modern financial economics has pushed back against uncertainty, converting it into manageable risk. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis suggests that as we transform uncertainty into risk, investors adapt and capital follows. With proper financial structures, almost anything becomes possible-from curing cancer to developing new energy sources to moderating climate change. We stand at an evolutionary inflection point with the capacity to either save ourselves or face dystopian outcomes. Finance isn't about greed being good-the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis shows profit-taking alone doesn't explain market success. We're motivated by fear, greed, fairness, and imagination. Finance is "the facilitator of the possible," changing what's within our political grasp. More than any other species, humans formulate expectations and respond to vision-with the right expectations, financing, and vision, we can accomplish amazing things.