
Freakonomics duo Levitt and Dubner return with mind-bending questions like "when's the best time to rob a bank?" Referenced on TV's "House," these counterintuitive economic insights have influenced business strategies worldwide. Prepare for 131 delightfully warped perspectives that challenge everything you think you know.
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When is the perfect time to rob a bank? According to economic data, Friday mornings yield the highest returns - around $5,180 compared to afternoon heists averaging just $3,705. But with a 35% arrest rate and average haul of only $4,120, bank robbery remains what economists bluntly call "rubbish" as a career choice. This counterintuitive analysis typifies the approach of "When to Rob a Bank," where everyday scenarios reveal surprising economic truths hiding in plain sight. Drawing from a decade of Freakonomics blog posts, this collection delivers the authors' most provocative thoughts in their most casual, unfiltered form - giving us unprecedented access to how these economic minds process the world in real time. What would happen if twenty snipers randomly shot people across America? When Levitt posed this thought experiment about terrorism strategies, readers were outraged, calling him both a moron and a traitor. But his point was profound: terrorists likely already consider these strategies, and their absence suggests either incompetence or different objectives entirely. The real insight? We're largely powerless against low-grade, low-tech terror, and the true damage comes not from casualties but from our fear and costly overreactions.