Capítulo 4
The Long Turn: Steel Workers' Brutal Battle Against Sleep
At the turn of the twentieth century, American steelworkers endured a brutal system of long hours that guaranteed sleep deprivation. In mills operating 24/7/365, workers faced twelve-hour days and seven-day weeks, totaling 84 hours weekly. Most punishing was the "long turn" - a 24-hour double shift workers endured every other weekend when rotating from day to night shifts. This schedule, combined with uncomfortable sleeping quarters, produced widespread shift work sleep disorder and workplace injuries.
The system emerged from dramatic power imbalances between labor and capital. Technological advances like the Bessemer process and open-hearth technology had devalued traditional ironworking skills, creating numerous unskilled positions filled largely by Eastern European immigrants. Andrew Carnegie's crushing defeat of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers at Homestead in 1892 eliminated the only real countervailing power in the industry.
Before 1892, eight-hour shifts had existed in some plants. Carnegie himself had once advocated three eight-hour shifts for continuous operations, and his superintendent Bill Jones had praised shorter hours for allowing workers "sixteen hours to rest." But Carnegie reversed course in 1887, locking out employees at the Edgar Thomson Works and imposing twelve-hour shifts. After Homestead, the twelve-hour day became standard across the industry.
The seven-day schedule, once limited to blast furnaces where shutdowns would damage equipment, expanded after 1892 to roughly a quarter of all production workers by 1910. Despite U.S. Steel's 1907 declaration of intent to abolish seven-day schedules, implementation remained inconsistent, especially during World War I's labor shortages.
Most devastating was the weekly rotation between day and night shifts. Rather than allowing workers to adjust over longer periods, most mills flipped shifts every week, with some using biweekly changes. The transition from days to nights required the infamous "long turn" - a twenty-four hour shift beginning Sunday morning. After twelve hours off Monday, workers returned at 6 PM for a week of night work. The novelist Thomas Bell described the second twelve hours of a long turn as a state where "exhaustion slowly numbed his body, mercifully fogged his mind; he ceased to be a human being."
Steel executives refused to acknowledge sleep deprivation as a problem, instead boasting of their own supposed stamina. Andrew Carnegie spoke of "problems which tax the minds of business men during the dark hours of the night, when their employees are asleep." William Field, a U.S. Steel superintendent, claimed he once worked seventy-two sleepless hours troubleshooting a problem. Chairman Elbert Gary "could not comprehend why any other man should be unwilling to work as long and as hard as he had."
The sleep deprivation was severe. Workers on night shifts often managed only three to five hours of sleep per day. Even this meager rest was frequently interrupted - what researcher Margaret Byington called "broken sleep." Daytime sleepers contended with crying babies, playing children, and household noise. In Thomas Bell's novel, an exhausted laborer tried to sleep during an August day but "sprawled on a bed that grew sticky with his sweat, gasped for air and in wakeful sleep kept confusing the buzzing of flies with sounds from the mill" while his baby "whimpered endlessly in the kitchen."
Housing conditions exacerbated sleep problems. Low pay and housing shortages forced many workers to share beds with multiple people, exposing them to snoring, coughing, and restless movements. Some workers combined simultaneous and sequential bed-sharing, with four men using one bed in rotation. Overcrowding was extreme - Pittsburgh's South Side had eighty-four residents per acre by 1890, with buildings subdivided into tiny rooms. Half of Slavic immigrant families had someone sleeping in the kitchen.
The worst overcrowding occurred in boarding houses run by immigrant families who took in single laborers. Margaret Byington discovered one Bulgarian family of four sharing their modest Homestead home with twenty boarders, fitting twenty-four people into just two rooms. During winter, everyone slept in the kitchen - the only warm place.
Workers developed coping strategies to minimize sleep deprivation. Many simply collapsed from exhaustion after shifts, falling asleep on streetcars while commuting home. As one worker recalled, "When I got home in the evening all I would do is go to sleep. I couldn't even pick up a piece of bread, my fingers were so racked up." Some workers became "slumber camels," storing up sleep before long turns. Many sacrificed rare free Sundays to catch up on lost sleep rather than socialize or attend church.
Some workers managed to nap during shifts. Engine operators dozed in their cabs between trips, and blast furnace workers napped during downtime. Night shifts offered the best opportunities for on-site slumber, with one open-hearth laborer noting that at 4 AM, "sleeping [was] pretty general, including boss." Some foremen explicitly permitted napping, announcing at shift start that everyone would get at least an hour to sleep.
Many workers turned to alcohol to secure sleep at home. The "whiskey-beer" ritual - downing a shot of whiskey followed by a beer - was common practice after shifts. Workers drank "for the purpose of making sure that they would get a better day's sleep through all the day-time noises," and to counteract the coffee they consumed to stay awake during shifts.
The toll of sleeplessness manifested in workplace injuries. Crystal Eastman's study of occupational accidents in Allegheny County documented two fatalities involving sleeping workers - a 15-year-old who dozed in a wheelbarrow during his 13-hour night shift and was struck by a ladle arm, and an 18-year-old who fell asleep in a buggy and was crushed by an iron bucket.
Reform efforts began in earnest with the Pittsburgh Survey of 1907-8, a monumental investigation funded by the Russell Sage Foundation and led by Paul Kellogg. Their findings highlighted the unrested predicament of mill workers. After completing his work on the Pittsburgh Survey, John Fitch made steel hours his personal crusade, publishing his findings in the Survey magazine and testifying in congressional hearings.
The end of World War I brought no reduction in working time. In 1919, about half of U.S. Steel's workforce still worked twelve-hour shifts, and industry-wide hours were longer than in 1910. This frustration fueled a massive organizing drive launched in fall 1918. On July 20, 1919, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers and its partners issued twelve demands, prominently featuring the eight-hour day, weekly rest, double pay for overtime and holidays, and abolition of the twenty-four-hour long turn.
After failed federal mediation, the National Committee called an industry-wide strike for September 22, 1919, declaring "now is the time to insist upon our rights as human beings." Initially, about half the industry's 500,000 workers joined the strike. However, the well-prepared employers unleashed a devastating counterattack using private security forces, loyal employees, imported strikebreakers, and sympathetic media. On January 8, 1920, the National Committee conceded defeat, winning no concessions.
Despite this defeat, the strike advanced hours reform by drawing attention to workers' plight. The Interchurch World Movement of North America's July 1920 report received extensive publicity, redirecting conversation from alleged immigrant radicalism to substantive issues like working hours. The report condemned the long turn as "inhuman" and called for abolishing both the twelve-hour day and seven-day week.
President Warren Harding, a conservative Republican, urged steelmakers to abandon the exceptionally long day. In 1922, the Federated American Engineering Societies published a lengthy assessment from economic and technical perspectives. Harding's foreword emphatically portrayed long hours as archaic: "The old order of the twelve-hour day must give way to a better and wiser form of organization of the productive forces of the nation."
After continued pressure, steel industry leader Elbert Gary and his colleagues finally agreed to discontinue the twelve-hour day in mid-1923. Beyond external pressure, the industrialists had seen evidence that shorter hours were economically feasible and could increase efficiency and productivity.
The end of the twelve-hour day and twenty-four-hour long turn substantially improved steelworkers' chances for adequate sleep. Average weekly hours for blast-furnace employees fell from seventy-two in 1922 to sixty in 1924, with similar declines in open-hearth departments. Unfortunately, weekly or biweekly rotation schemes remained in place, continuing to disrupt workers' circadian rhythms for decades to come.
Capítulo 5
Asleep and Awake at the Same Time: Pullman Porters' Fight for Rest
During 1915 hearings by the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, railway sleeping-car porter G.H. Sylvester revealed the impossible sleep situation facing Pullman Company employees. When asked about opportunities to rest on his overnight run from New York to Chicago on the Twentieth Century Limited, the twenty-year veteran stated bluntly: "You ain't supposed to get any sleep." Porters were expected to prepare berths for passengers and meet their needs for comfortable rest while being denied that same basic necessity themselves.
Like steelworkers, Pullman porters endured extremely long hours and unnatural schedules. Their situation was distinguished by very frequent departures from barely regular schedules and management's expectation that they attempt to sleep in public spaces. This combination virtually guaranteed injurious sleep deprivation.
African American sleeping-car employees and their union leaders developed a keen awareness of the health risks posed by inadequate and disrupted rest - well before sleep science existed as an established field. The Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) framed the issue as one of sleep denial, making clear that management decisions were the primary cause of porters' deficient rest. This forceful advocacy helped undermine the Pullman Company's image of benevolent paternalism and established rest as a legitimate health concern.
Prior to unionization, porters worked extraordinarily long hours - approximately 400 hours monthly with no specified limits. Unlike train operating crews, they weren't covered by the Hours of Service Act of 1907. Their work was calculated based on miles traveled (11,000 per month) rather than hours, leaving them unpaid for substantial preparation time. On long runs like the Chicago-to-Oakland route, porters might work 48-60 hours without rest, sometimes fainting from exhaustion. Management frequently engaged in "doubling back" - ordering porters to immediately take another trip after completing their scheduled run.
Pullman's policies regarding onboard sleep actually regressed after 1900. Rules from 1874 granting porters rest from 10 PM to 3 AM were gradually eroded and eventually eliminated. Porters were required to maintain night watches to guard against thieves, sitting on uncomfortable stools nicknamed "broncos." A 1920s study found only 23 percent of porters sleeping more than three hours daily, with 16 percent getting no regular sleep on the rails. Those caught sleeping on duty faced suspensions and loss of bonuses.
In 1925, dissident porters formed the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) and selected A. Philip Randolph as their leader. The union immediately elevated sleep deprivation as a central organizing issue. Despite their gains, porters remained frustrated by sleep deductions and doubled workloads that left them "utterly exhausted" with little family time. T. Walter Jones observed after interviewing 150 colleagues that their wives and children complained about lack of companionship because "the men are so utterly exhausted that rest and sleep are imperative."
The spatial aspects of rest presented ongoing challenges. The BSCP concentrated on improving onboard accommodations, targeting the smoking-room couch and men's washroom couch where porters slept in contaminated environments separated from passengers only by curtains. These spaces also increased safety hazards during accidents, with derailments sending porters "flying into peril." In 1944, Jacksonville porters complained that noise and disturbances left workers sleepless for three or four consecutive nights.
Pullman resisted eliminating the smoking-room sofa until 1953, when the BSCP finally secured a contract ending this practice. By its thirtieth anniversary in 1955, the union celebrated this abolition as one of its major accomplishments.
The BSCP's achievements were remarkable considering the racism that hindered advances. The prevailing racial order assumed black jobs should be bad jobs. White rail brotherhoods rejected industry-wide solidarity that would have included sleeping-car workers. Porters also lacked biomedical validation for their sleep-related illnesses in an era of health-care segregation, while Pullman promoted victim-blaming rather than addressing complaints.
Beyond concrete gains, the BSCP contributed by highlighting previously underrecognized problems. Their critique emphasized holistic well-being rather than specific physical ailments, perhaps to counter racial stereotypes. This approach challenged employer paternalism by demonstrating that workers couldn't devote boundless energy without serious consequences. The sleep-denial critique resonated with porters because it tapped into their desire for workplace respect and highlighted the paradoxical indignity that they ensured comfortable sleep for others while being denied it themselves.
Capítulo 6
Six Days on the Road: Truckers' Dangerous Dance with Drowsiness
Unlike most workers, long-haul truckers face potential death from falling asleep while working. Since the 1920s, these drivers have endured chronic sleep deprivation regardless of industry regulation status. The trucking profession developed as a distinctly masculine domain - a reaction to women's increasing presence behind automobile wheels. By 2000, women comprised only 4% of truckers, mostly in short-haul positions.
Highway settings became stages for public performances of masculine endurance. Sociologist Kenneth Ouellet observed how drivers developed their identity through interactions with roadside audiences, with fellow truckers deriding as weaklings those who worked "only" twelve-hour days or took breaks after four hours driving.
The independence of trucking has always attracted workers. Owner-operators epitomize this pursuit of freedom, occupying a unique position between working class and small business owner. This independence, celebrated in popular culture like the 1940 film "They Drive by Night," has undermined organized attempts to establish reasonable work limits and safeguard adequate sleep.
Long-distance freight trucking emerged significantly after World War I. Military training gave working-class men vehicle operation skills, while wartime agricultural demand led farmers to invest in hauling equipment. Truck production doubled between 1918 and 1925, reaching half a million vehicles annually. The federal government responded to poor road conditions with massive highway construction, creating a 226,000-mile national network by 1935.
The Great Depression transformed trucking into a desperate gamble for many. One-man, one-truck operations proliferated, with over 80% of trucking enterprises operating just one vehicle by the Depression's depths. This hypercompetitive market generated brutal overwork. Independent trucker Bert Glupker exemplified this reality, delivering farm products across the Midwest while sleeping mainly in his truck seat and once making a four-night round-trip without any sleep, using cold water splashes to stay awake.
The New Deal's attempt to bring stability to trucking aligned with its broader economic goals. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 launched a corporatist scheme for industry self-regulation, with most industries adopting forty-hour workweeks. Trucking, however, proved exceptional.
The hastily formed American Trucking Associations faced off against the Teamsters, who pressed for forty-hour weeks with premium pay beyond eight hours daily and a ten-hour daily maximum. The NRA's February 1934 rules heavily favored employers, allowing truckers to work 108 hours over two weeks with minimal overtime premiums. Implementation proved spotty, with many firms ignoring registration requirements and exploiting loopholes.
Even as the NRA faltered, plans developed to place trucking under Interstate Commerce Commission oversight. ICC commissioner Joseph Eastman, appointed federal transportation coordinator by Roosevelt, documented the industry's chaotic conditions and recommended federal regulation. The Motor Carrier Act of August 1935 authorized the ICC to regulate market entry and interstate freight rates, while deferring the contentious issue of working time limits to future ICC rulemaking.
Eastman's investigation revealed alarming patterns: a third of truckers worked over sixty hours weekly, a quarter of driving shifts lasted at least sixteen hours, and some independent operators made sixty-hour nonstop runs. Sleep deprivation was endemic, especially among owner-operators desperate to avoid truck repossession. One Michigan operator got just fourteen hours sleep across five days, while another received only twenty-two hours' sleep during a 137-hour workweek.
The consequences included hallucinations, drivers nodding off during conversations, and numerous collisions. Despite clear evidence linking long hours to accidents, Eastman hesitated to impose strict limits without more definitive scientific data on fatigue thresholds.
When the ICC finally issued its Hours of Service Regulations in December 1937 (effective July 1938), it explicitly distinguished between "mere drowsiness" and more severe fatigue requiring recovery periods. This distinction effectively normalized drowsy driving, with regulators claiming insufficient evidence linking specific work durations to unsafe driving within their proposed limits. The ICC adopted weak standards requiring drivers to log their time but providing minimal protection. The regulations were immediately revised, first limiting consecutive driving to ten hours with eight hours rest (which could be split in sleeper cabs), then allowing twelve straight hours of driving in emergency conditions. These weak standards would remain essentially unchanged for over sixty years.
The ICC's promise of a "comprehensive, scientific study" of driver fatigue offered hope for stronger regulations. By June 1938, Eastman arranged for the U.S. Public Health Service to investigate, though Surgeon General Thomas Parran cautioned they might not produce definitive guidelines.
Led by R.R. Sayers, PHS researchers failed to focus on the critical relationship between working time and accidents. Instead, they pursued the elusive goal of measuring driver fatigue objectively. The 1941 report "Fatigue and Hours of Service of Interstate Truck Drivers" confirmed that longer driving periods produced slower reactions and less steadiness. Yet the PHS avoided making specific recommendations about maximum hours or minimum sleep requirements, offering only vague conclusions that "reasonable limitation" of hours would improve safety. This irresolute outcome left the ICC's weak regulations intact.
Despite mounting scientific evidence, federal regulators maintained inadequate hours-of-service rules. In 1989, the NTSB initiated reconsideration of these antiquated regulations, with expert panels criticizing the unnatural eighteen-hour restart cycle that "violates everything known about circadian cycles." Yet the Department of Transportation remained narrowly focused on accident prevention rather than addressing long-term health consequences of sleep deprivation.
The 2003 revised regulations restored twenty-four-hour cycling but retained the sixty/seventy-hour weekly limits and actually increased daily driving time to eleven hours. Progressive advocacy group Public Citizen challenged these weak regulations, noting they existed only because of a 1937 exemption from Fair Labor Standards. A federal court agreed in 2004, with Judge Sentelle observing the FMCSA hadn't considered "drivers' health in the slightest."
The Bush administration reissued essentially identical rules in 2005, dismissively claiming the regulations were "shift-neutral" and posed "no greater risk to driver health" than previous versions. After further legal challenges, even the Obama administration proposed only modest revisions in 2010, maintaining the sixty/seventy-hour weekly limits while adding requirements for nighttime rest periods.
This regulatory stalemate reflects the industry's structural problems, with owner-operators often opposing stricter regulations due to economic pressures. Without strong union advocacy or regulatory intervention, the nightmare of sleeplessness continues for many drivers.
Capítulo 7
Waking Up to the Crisis: Finding Solutions for America's Sleep Debt
Flexibility has become the defining catchword of our era, much as efficiency dominated the early twentieth century. From yoga to "lean" organizations, American culture now celebrates constant adaptation and multitasking. Sleep deprivation has become normalized as essential for survival in a globally competitive 24/7/365 world, with Americans developing stronger ideological justifications than ever for distrusting dormancy.
The proliferation of nonstandard work schedules reflects mounting demands for flexibility, with about 20 percent of the U.S. workforce now challenged by night, weekend, and rotational shifts that disrupt biological rhythms. Despite the rhetoric of "flextime," control over scheduling remains predominantly with managers rather than employees, especially in non-union settings. Only about a quarter of workers exercise significant control over their schedules.
This trend has created a "sleep divide" in American society, with perpetually drowsy workers disproportionately concentrated in low-wage service sectors. Some progress is emerging through workplace napping programs, with companies like Huffington Post offering napping rooms for sleepy staff. As Arianna Huffington argued when defending napping rooms for air traffic controllers: "Shouldn't those making sure planes take off and land safely be given the same option?"
Unions can help by negotiating rest breaks, limiting mandatory overtime, and discouraging nonstandard schedules through premium pay requirements. The AFL-CIO has even launched initiatives using health grievances in organizing campaigns. Beyond immediate possibilities, public policy innovations could address shift work sleep disorder by implementing Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms everyone's right to rest and leisure. The U.S. could join over 90 nations requiring at least one day off weekly and 80 nations setting maximum workweek lengths.
OSHA could potentially construe sleep-denying work arrangements as legitimate workplace hazards, drawing on NIOSH expertise to prevent the damage caused by overwork and sleep disruption. The struggles of steelworkers, Pullman porters, and truckers offer encouragement to those fighting for the right to sleep against employers who treat sleep problems as disciplinary rather than medical matters.
America has reduced average sleep time by 20 percent over the past century, creating a society where millions suffer chronic sleep deprivation due to workplace demands and lifestyle choices. By 2007, 30 percent of American workers slept six hours or less daily, with manufacturing, transportation, and night-shift workers suffering most acutely. Beyond sheer duration, nonstandard work schedules have profoundly disrupted sleep quality, affecting one-fifth of full-time employees.
The historical relationship between sleep and work reveals America's exceptional pattern of overwork - increasing by 160 hours annually while other affluent nations reduced working time. This pattern has severely diminished time for rest, creating a public health crisis that remains largely unaddressed by policymakers.
As we confront this crisis, we must recognize that adequate sleep isn't a luxury or sign of weakness - it's a biological necessity and human right. The question isn't whether we can afford to let people sleep; it's whether we can afford not to.
