Chapter 4
From European Leader to Reluctant Partner
The post-war period initially saw Britain take a leading role in European cooperation. Winston Churchill emerged as a prominent advocate for European unity, calling for a "United States of Europe" built around Franco-German partnership in his 1947 Zurich speech. Churchill positioned Britain at the center of "three interlinked circles": the British Commonwealth and Empire, the English-speaking world, and a united Europe. However, his vision remained ambiguous - sometimes suggesting Britain would be a "friend and sponsor" of Europe rather than a full participant, while other times arguing Britain must play its "full part as a member of the European family."
By 1950, Britain appeared well-positioned in Europe's new institutional architecture as a founding member of three major intergovernmental organizations: the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), NATO, and the Council of Europe. However, everything changed when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 1950. Britain declined to join, marking a turning point - until then, Britain had been central to European integration; afterward, it became increasingly peripheral.
When the Messina process began in 1955 to create what would become the European Economic Community (EEC), Britain participated briefly but withdrew after five months due to fundamental differences. Britain preferred a free trade area over a customs union and wanted to work within existing OEEC structures rather than create new institutions. In a free trade area, members eliminate tariffs on each other's goods but maintain independent trade policies with third countries, requiring border controls to enforce rules of origin. A customs union eliminates internal tariffs and establishes a common external tariff, removing the need for internal border controls but requiring members to surrender independent trade policy - something Britain wasn't prepared to do.
The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, established the European Economic Community as not merely a customs union but an ambitious common market. The treaty recognized that dismantling trade barriers required complementary policies in agriculture, competition, and social standards. Importantly, it guaranteed the free movement of workers - not just goods, services, and capital. Contrary to some claims, the free movement of workers was a founding principle of European integration, not a recent invention.
Chapter 5
Britain's Failed Alternatives and Eventual Membership
Having excluded itself from the EEC, Britain faced potential discrimination in European markets and had lost its leadership position in the new Europe. In response, Britain proposed "Plan G" - an OEEC-wide free trade area for industrial goods only, with the future EEC as a member. This plan suited British interests perfectly: it required no sovereignty surrender, preserved imperial preferences, and excluded agriculture to maintain Britain's existing support system. As the Board of Trade confidently noted, "the possibility of U.K. co-operation would be so welcome that we should be able to enter the plan more or less on our own terms."
This confidence proved misplaced. France effectively vetoed the proposal, and Britain instead established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with six other countries in 1960. As a purely intergovernmental organization with only a Council of Ministers and small secretariat, it reflected British preferences. However, EFTA wasn't meant as a permanent EEC alternative but as a temporary bridge.
In 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made a startling reversal, applying for EEC membership. Three economic factors drove this: Britain traded more with the EEC than EFTA; Commonwealth trade was becoming less important as colonies pursued independent policies; and the EEC's economic boom highlighted concerns about British performance. Politically, Britain's international standing had declined, and maintaining the special relationship with the US increasingly required joining the Common Market.
Macmillan's diary reveals his concerns about being caught between an increasingly hostile America and a powerful "Empire of Charlemagne" under French but eventually German control. This dilemma drove his "grim choice" to pursue Common Market membership despite potential sacrifices to British agriculture and Commonwealth relationships.
However, French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain's application in January 1963, worsening Franco-EEC relations while strengthening EFTA. De Gaulle's motives remain debated - politically, he feared diminished French influence and Britain serving as an American "Trojan horse," while economically he worried British entry would complicate favorable Common Agricultural Policy negotiations for France. He vetoed a second application in 1967.
Britain finally joined the European Communities in 1973, along with Ireland and Denmark. Just two years later, a referendum on whether to leave resulted in an overwhelming two-to-one rejection of what we now call Brexit, seemingly settling the matter conclusively. The referendum campaign saw the "Yes" side effectively portray "No" supporters as extremists, noting that the IRA and Soviet Union also opposed membership.
Chapter 6
From Golden Age to Thatcherism and the Single Market
Britain's EC membership began inauspiciously, coinciding with the end of the post-war economic "Golden Age." While the 1973 oil shock triggered immediate difficulties, deeper forces were at work. European growth slowed permanently as catch-up growth opportunities disappeared and management-union cooperation became harder to sustain. Growth approximately halved in European countries after 1973, but the impact was particularly severe in Britain, where inflation averaged 15.4% between 1973-1980 (compared to 4.9% in Germany).
By 1976, Britain required an emergency IMF loan. These economic difficulties helped Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Party sweep to power in 1979, while some Britons blamed their troubles on EC membership. The Labour Party grew increasingly hostile to Europe, adopting an official withdrawal policy in 1980 under Michael Foot's leadership.
Though Margaret Thatcher lacked her predecessor's emotional commitment to Europe, mistrusting Germans and detesting continental political traditions of compromise, she became an enthusiastic supporter of the greatest deepening of European integration since the 1950s - the Single Market programme. Her early European engagement was marked by her famous "I want my money back!" demand challenging Britain's large net budget contribution despite being the seventh poorest member state.
The 1985 Cockfield White Paper identified 297 specific barriers to be eliminated by 1992 - creating what became known as the "Single Market." Abolishing these barriers was an immense political challenge that required replacing the Luxembourg Compromise (which had allowed member states to veto legislation affecting vital national interests) with qualified majority voting for Single Market matters.
Despite this shift toward a more supranational Europe where states might have to implement legislation they opposed, Thatcher's government strongly supported these changes as creating a competitive, freer market - "Thatcherism on a European scale." As Hugo Young noted, "Everyone in the Thatcher Cabinet backed it... storing up trouble for the day when it became an inconvenient memory. For their eyes weren't open, and they couldn't really face the consequences of what they had done."
Chapter 7
The Irish Question: From Partition to Peace
The Irish border question has become central to Brexit despite being largely ignored during the 2016 referendum campaign. British involvement in Ireland began with Norman invasions in the twelfth century, but effective control wasn't established until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Religious divisions following the Reformation complicated matters, as Ireland remained Catholic while Britain became predominantly Protestant. The Crown's expropriation of Irish Catholic lands in Ulster, granted to English and Scottish Protestant settlers, created a society where religious and national divisions coincided.
Following the 1916 Easter Rising and subsequent British executions of its leaders, Irish sentiment radicalized. In the 1918 election, the republican Sinn Fein party won decisively in Ireland, though Ulster Unionists maintained control in the north. Following a guerrilla war, the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 established the Irish Free State with dominion status, while Northern Ireland exercised its right to remain part of the United Kingdom. The border between them became an international frontier on April 1, 1923, when customs posts appeared along the boundary - "an April Fool's joke that would last seventy years."
In Northern Ireland, the Catholic minority faced severe discrimination in employment and housing, with 1971 unemployment rates at 17.3% for Catholics versus 7.6% for Protestants. The 1960s civil rights campaign against anti-Catholic discrimination was brutally suppressed, triggering violence across Northern Ireland in 1969. The Troubles continued until 1998, claiming 3,489 lives - 59% killed by republican terrorists, 29% by loyalist terrorists, and 10% by British security forces.
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement established three institutional strands: a Northern Ireland Assembly with proportional representation and power-sharing executive; a North-South Ministerial Council for cross-border cooperation; and a British-Irish Council. The remaining security checkpoints between North and South were removed, making the Irish border essentially invisible - thanks both to the peace process and the EU's customs union and Single Market.
The European Union didn't solve the Northern Irish conflict alone, but EU membership provided the crucial context. It normalized relationships between the UK and Ireland and eliminated border controls, making it easier for nationalists to accept remaining in the UK. As former Taoiseach John Bruton noted, shared EU membership meant "effectively no border" and reduced the sense of isolation that had fueled aggressive tactics.
Chapter 8
Ireland's European Transformation
EU membership transformed Ireland's economic fortunes by reducing dependence on Britain. To properly evaluate Ireland's performance, we need appropriate benchmarks. Comparing Ireland with other relatively poor economies around the European periphery like Greece, Portugal, and Spain provides useful insights, as these countries faced similar obstacles but shared the same potential for catch-up growth.
Statistical evidence shows that within Western Europe, initially poorer countries grew more rapidly than richer ones during the twentieth century through technological convergence. Ireland's overall 75-year economic performance was exactly what would be expected given its starting position - neither better nor worse. However, the timing of Ireland's growth was highly unusual.
During its first 30 years of independence, Ireland's economic policies and performance were fairly typical for the period. The 25 years following World War II proved deeply disappointing, with Ireland performing well below average during Europe's "Golden Age." Two key factors explain this underperformance: delayed trade liberalization and excessive dependence on the poorly performing British economy.
Ireland's economic fortunes transformed dramatically upon joining the EEC in 1973, immediately halting its decline relative to continental economies like France. Membership boosted Ireland's per capita growth rate by almost two percentage points. The economy diversified rapidly away from UK dependence - Irish exports to Britain fell from 61% in 1972 to just 14% by 2015. The 1992 Single Market represented a second major turning point, making Ireland an extraordinary economic overachiever in the 1990s.
Two crucial factors underpinned Ireland's success: political independence allowing policy flexibility (including low corporate taxes, education investment, and social partnership agreements) and EU membership providing market access. These factors were complementary rather than contradictory - Ireland's independence wouldn't have worked as well without the EU, and its EU membership wouldn't have worked as well without independence.
Chapter 9
The Path to Brexit
By the mid-1990s, British politics had undergone a dramatic reversal regarding European integration. While Labour had once been staunchly anti-European, it had become essentially pro-European, partly influenced by Jacques Delors' emphasis on the "social dimension" of the Single Market. Meanwhile, the Conservative Party shifted in the opposite direction, becoming increasingly Eurosceptic.
David Cameron became Conservative leader in 2005 after the party's third consecutive election defeat. Though he initially hoped to avoid focusing on Europe, acknowledging that Tory divisions on the issue had cost them dearly, Europe would not be avoided. During the Tory wilderness years, the concept of the "Anglosphere" was revived - the idea that Britain's natural allies were English-speaking nations including the United States and former colonies.
The 2004 EU enlargement, which admitted ten new members including eight former Communist countries, had profound consequences. While twelve existing member states postponed opening their labor markets for up to seven years, only Ireland, Sweden, and the UK allowed immediate free movement. This created significant political effects in Britain, particularly in England, as large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe began.
In the 2016 referendum, the Leave campaign operated through two organizations: Vote Leave (the official campaign supported by Eurosceptic MPs) and Leave.EU (associated with UKIP's Nigel Farage). Boris Johnson made a last-minute decision to support Leave, widely assumed to be for careerist reasons. Both Leave campaigns employed questionable tactics - Leave.EU unveiled an infamous poster showing Syrian refugees that was widely denounced as racist, while Vote Leave used the slogan "Take back control" alongside their red bus claiming "We send the EU 350 million a week, let's fund our NHS instead" - a statement that was simply untrue.
On June 23, 2016, despite expectations of a Remain victory, the UK voted to leave the EU by 51.9% to 48.1%. Scotland (62%), Northern Ireland (55.8%), Gibraltar (96%), and London (59.9%) voted Remain, but every other major region of England, plus Wales, voted Leave.
Chapter 10
Understanding the Brexit Vote
What explains Brexit? While the question will occupy academics for years, several explanations emerge. Britain's relationship with Europe was always ambivalent, with the country looking toward its imperial past and America while valuing European economic opportunities but resisting supranational ambitions. Yet Brexit wasn't inevitable - Leave won by just a small margin of 635,000 votes.
The European context of 2015-16 was challenging. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone outside Germany stagnated due to austerity policies implemented after the Greek debt crisis. While the US recovered to pre-crisis levels by 2011 and the UK by 2012, the Eurozone outside Germany only recovered in 2016, eight years later. The 2015 refugee crisis further strained European unity as over a million asylum seekers arrived. Though Britain wasn't directly affected by either crisis, they provided context for the referendum, with Brexiteers exploiting the refugee situation and portraying the EU as incompetent and crisis-ridden.
While globalization has lifted millions out of poverty worldwide, its benefits aren't equally distributed. Standard trade theory acknowledges that trade increases overall incomes but creates winners and losers. Class divisions in globalization are stark - in France's 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty, only 35% of professionals voted against it compared to 79% of blue-collar workers.
These voting patterns reflect economic interests - globalization and European integration have favored skilled workers while threatening the unskilled with competition from Eastern Europe and beyond. Areas with low pay, high unemployment, manufacturing traditions, lower-skilled workers, and recent Eastern European migration were all more likely to vote Leave - consistent with Brexit being partly a response to globalization's stresses.
Government safety nets can mitigate globalization's negative effects, but Cameron and Osborne's radical austerity program deliberately shrank the state when communities needed more support. Comprehensive studies show austerity was more important than immigration in driving the Brexit vote - a modest reduction in austerity might have changed the outcome. The irony is devastating - Conservatives shrank the state believing it would benefit business, but instead caused the greatest catastrophe for British business since WWII.
Chapter 11
The Brexit Negotiations and the Irish Backstop
After the referendum, Theresa May became Prime Minister and quickly signaled a hard Brexit approach, declaring Britain would control immigration and escape ECJ jurisdiction. By January 2017, she explicitly stated Britain would leave both the Single Market and customs union, wanting to end ECJ jurisdiction, stop financial contributions to Brussels, and make free trade deals worldwide.
This created a fundamental contradiction: Britain wanted to restrict EU immigration and escape EU regulations while maintaining frictionless trade and special access for financial services. This "cakeism" - wanting to have your cake and eat it - ignored economic realities facing industries like automotive manufacturing, where companies depended on just-in-time supply chains that would collapse under border controls.
The EU's approach to Brexit has been remarkably consistent from the outset. On June 24, 2016, EU leaders immediately established key principles: Brexit must follow Article 50 procedures, should happen quickly, required the UK to define what relationship it wanted, and any future arrangement must balance "rights and obligations." The EU made clear that "access to the Single Market requires acceptance of all four freedoms" - the UK couldn't cherry-pick only beneficial aspects.
The Irish border presented a uniquely challenging Brexit problem. The 500-kilometer frontier is notoriously irrational, following centuries-old county boundaries rather than natural features. It meanders across the countryside dividing communities, sometimes bisecting individual farms or buildings, with more border crossings than exist between the EU and all countries to its east.
The border's disappearance had transformed life for communities, particularly in healthcare where cross-border medical services now save lives. Security officials warned that reinstating any physical infrastructure would immediately make them targets for dissident republicans. The PSNI chief constable cautioned that such installations would "move away from issues of trade or movement of people to old-fashioned security on a national frontier," reviving a violent past.
The Irish and EU position crystallized in November 2017: they required a "backstop" guarantee that would prevent a hard border regardless of whatever future trade deal might emerge. As Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney explained, the UK had "three ambitions which simply cannot all be delivered" - leaving the Single Market and customs union, keeping all UK parts together, and avoiding a hard Irish border.
The UK eventually conceded in a Joint Report that included a commitment to maintain "full alignment" with EU rules necessary for North-South cooperation if no other solutions emerged. However, the UK cornered itself by adding a promise of no new regulatory barriers between Northern Ireland and Britain. This created an impossible trilemma: the UK could not simultaneously maintain alignment with EU rules, have no barriers with Britain, and leave the customs union and Single Market.
The Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by November 2018 established that Northern Ireland would follow EU regulations for goods while the entire UK would form a "single customs territory" with the EU. Though designed to be temporary, the backstop would apply "unless and until" superseded by a future agreement. This proved politically toxic in Britain - the DUP and many Tories rejected even regulatory barriers between Britain and Northern Ireland, while Brexiteers feared being "trapped" permanently in a customs arrangement that would prevent independent trade deals.
As 2018 ended, the path forward remained entirely uncertain. Brexit had revealed deep contradictions in British politics - a desire to "take back control" while maintaining frictionless trade, to assert sovereignty while avoiding a hard Irish border, to be both European and exceptional. These contradictions, rooted in centuries of history, would not be easily resolved.
