Putinism

Walter Laqueur’s Putinism analyzes Russia’s ideological shift under Vladimir Putin, emphasizing three pillars: Orthodox Church influence, Eurasian "manifest destiny," and fear of foreign threats. The book argues Russia’s post-Soviet policies reflect pre-1917 cultural roots rather than Soviet-style communism, warning against dismissive Cold War comparisons. Laqueur contends Western misreading of Russian motivations risks underestimating its geopolitical ambitions.

This book suits policymakers, historians, and readers interested in Russian-Western relations. It offers depth for those analyzing Putin’s leadership, ideological drivers of Russian foreign policy, or the cultural-historical context behind events like Ukraine’s annexation. Students of geopolitics will value Laqueur’s critique of Western assumptions about Russia’s democratic potential.

Yes, for its timely analysis of Russia’s resurgence as a global challenger. Laqueur’s decades-long expertise provides nuanced insights into Putin’s popularity and the cultural forces shaping anti-Western sentiment. The book’s historical grounding in pre-revolutionary traditions offers a fresh lens for understanding modern conflicts.

Laqueur identifies three pillars:

• Orthodox Church influence: Shapes moral and national identity.
• Eurasian destiny: Fuels expansionist narratives akin to 19th-century imperialism.
• Fear of foreign enemies: Justifies authoritarianism and militarization.

These elements, he argues, resonate more with 1904 Russia than 1954 Soviet policies.

Putinism rejects Marxist ideology but retains authoritarian governance. Unlike Soviet leaders, Putin leverages nationalism, traditionalism, and historical grievances rather than promoting global revolution. Laqueur notes Russia’s elite now romanticizes tsarist-era power, not Leninism.

Laqueur portrays Putin as a pragmatic leader reflecting popular will, not a lone autocrat. Putinism thrives because it aligns with widespread Russian desires for stability, national pride, and resistance to Western liberalism. However, this symbiotic relationship risks aggressive foreign policies to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Laqueur warns that dismissing Russia as a declining power ignores its capacity to destabilize global order. He critiques assumptions that economic sanctions or democratic values will curb Kremlin ambitions, emphasizing Russia’s self-image as a besieged civilizational fortress.

The book links modern Russia to pre-1917 ideologies, particularly 19th-century pan-Slavism and anti-Western conservatism. Laqueur argues post-Soviet chaos revived older traditions of centralized authority and territorial ambition, making democratic reforms unlikely without cultural shifts.

• “Russia has given up attempts to become part of the West” – Highlights cultural divergence.
• “Putinism is approved by the majority as long as it delivers stability” – Explains the leader-populace dynamic.
• “The victory of the Reds [Bolsheviks] was a disaster” – Reflects modern elite disdain for Soviet legacy.

Laqueur frames Ukraine as a case study of Russia’s revanchist strategy, driven by fears of NATO expansion and a belief in historical claims to Eurasian territories. He suggests Ukraine’s crisis stemmed from Western failure to grasp Russia’s non-negotiable red lines.

Unlike journalistic accounts focused on Kremlin intrigue, Putinism emphasizes deep cultural drivers. It complements works like The New Tsar by exploring ideology rather than personal biography. Laqueur’s focus on pre-Soviet roots offers a unique counterpoint to Cold War analogies.

Some scholars argue Laqueur overstates cultural determinism, underestimating economic factors and Putin’s personal agency. Others note the book’s 2015 publication predates newer challenges like cyber warfare, though its ideological framework remains relevant.