第4章
The System: Engineering a Transportation Revolution
As a dock strike threatened East Coast ports in autumn 1956, McLean seized the opportunity to transform six of Waterman's C-2 freighters into pure containerships with revolutionary honeycomb metal cells in their holds to stack 35-foot containers five or six high-an untested concept requiring innovative engineering solutions.
Keith Tantlinger built a 20-foot mock-up of the cell system at Alabama State Docks, using hydraulic jacks to simulate a heeling ship while testing container placement. After hundreds of tests, he determined the optimal cell dimensions, allowing the C-2s to carry 226 containers each, quadrupling the Ideal-X's capacity.
To speed handling operations, Tantlinger developed numerous innovations: sloped-edge trailer chassis that guided containers into place automatically; corner locking systems replacing labor-intensive chains; reinforced container corner posts for stacking; and most critically, the twist lock-a device inserted into corner castings that could quickly secure or release stacked containers. When Skagit Steel & Iron Works delivered enormous electric gantry cranes that could bridge entire ships, the system enabled unprecedented efficiency.
Despite technological success, Pan-Atlantic faced significant obstacles. When attempting to expand to Puerto Rico in 1958, San Juan longshoremen refused to unload containers, forcing the company to accept inefficient 24-man gangs after four months of costly negotiations. Combined with expenses from retiring the tanker fleet, this led to a $4.2 million loss in 1958.
Undeterred, McLean relocated Pan-Atlantic to a converted pineapple warehouse near Newark docks in June 1958, deliberately separating it from Waterman's traditional maritime culture. His sister Clara maintained strict discipline, controlling everything from office decor to time cards, creating a no-nonsense environment focused on efficiency.
While McLean built his container operation through entrepreneurial speed, Matson Navigation Company pursued containerization with methodical deliberation. After commissioning outside studies for two years, Matson created an in-house research department in 1956 under Foster Weldon, a former geophysicist from Johns Hopkins University. His team determined that 20-25 foot containers would be most efficient for Matson's Hawaii trade, calculating containerization would eliminate almost half of Matson's existing costs by automating cargo handling.
Unlike Pan-Atlantic's shipboard cranes, Matson opted for custom-designed land-based cranes that could unload and load containers within five minutes. Leslie Harlander, a naval architect who led the engineering efforts, developed specialized lifting spreaders and conducted extensive testing to determine optimal container specifications. Every feature was evaluated for cost-effectiveness, with Harlander noting that even small additions could significantly impact profitability.
Matson entered containerization on August 31, 1958, when the Hawaiian Merchant sailed from San Francisco with 20 deck containers. By January 1959, the world's first purpose-built container crane began operation in Alameda, loading 40,000-pound boxes every three minutes-achieving 400 tons per hour, 40 times more productive than traditional longshore methods.
Despite growing industry buzz about containerization, few shipping companies were implementing the technology. Grace Line's experience served as a warning-they spent $10 million converting ships and purchasing equipment only to have Venezuelan longshoremen refuse to handle their containers, ultimately selling the ships to Sea-Land at a loss.
Sea-Land itself faced significant challenges in the early years. Its cargo volume at Newark jumped from 228,000 tons in 1957 to 1.1 million in 1959, then stagnated. A 1959 longshore strike caused serious damage, and from 1957-1960, Sea-Land's container business lost $8 million total.
McLean determined the problem was the maritime mindset-Pan-Atlantic's staff didn't know how to sell to industrial traffic managers who cared about schedules and costs, not ships. He recruited aggressive young executives from the trucking industry, many from McLean Trucking. Candidates faced intelligence and personality tests-McLean wanted smart, aggressive entrepreneurs. Education mattered less than drive, and new hires were given substantial responsibilities immediately.
In early 1960, Pan-Atlantic was rechristened Sea-Land Service to emphasize its innovative approach. The culture was demanding and fast-paced-seven-day workweeks, minimal bureaucracy, constant performance measurement, and stock rewards instead of cash bonuses. After a $1.5 million loss in 1960, McLean responded by taking on more debt, buying and "jumboizing" four World War II tankers to create vessels capable of carrying 476 containers-twice the capacity of existing ships.
Puerto Rico proved crucial to Sea-Land's survival. The island's economy was booming under Operation Bootstrap, which attracted hundreds of U.S. manufacturers with tax incentives. When McLean's 1961 attempt to buy dominant carrier Bull Line was blocked by antitrust authorities, he got lucky when Bull's new owner went bankrupt in 1962. Sea-Land seized the opportunity, quickly becoming the dominant carrier with service every two days.
Sea-Land both benefited from and accelerated Puerto Rico's economic transformation. Between 1947-1957, shipping rates to Puerto Rico had risen 50%, effectively taxing the island's consumers. Sea-Land's entry in 1958 disrupted this structure-over the next decade, shipping costs for consumer goods fell 19%, and rates for full truckloads dropped by a third. These lower rates made Puerto Rico more attractive for manufacturing.
第5章
The Battle for New York's Port: Winners and Losers
As containerization arrived, it proved a godsend for the Port Authority but a disaster for New York City, which wasted enormous sums trying to preserve its position in a shipping industry whose technological changes it couldn't accommodate.
In the early 1950s, New York handled one-third of America's seaborne manufactured goods trade, despite significant disadvantages. The city's 283 piers were spread along Manhattan and Brooklyn waterfronts, while railroad connections were across the harbor in New Jersey. Freight required multiple handlings and lighter trips across the harbor. Trucking made these inadequacies worse, with vehicles facing hours of congestion just to enter piers.
The port was vital to New York's economy, employing over 100,000 people in water transportation, trucking, and warehousing in 1951, plus 14,000 in transportation services. Three-fourths of the nation's wholesale trade flowed through New York. Waterfront manufacturing included food processing plants, chemical factories, and shipbuilding. Brooklyn was especially dependent, with 13 percent of all borough jobs located directly on the docks.
Despite its wartime prominence, New York's port was already faltering by the late 1940s. Post-war economic shifts hurt its position as manufacturing grew in the West and South. High land freight rates disadvantaged New York compared to other East Coast ports, with truck deliveries to New York costing $4 more per ton than to Baltimore. Labor turmoil became routine with strikes in 1945, 1947, 1948, 1951, and 1954. The port's physical infrastructure was decrepit, with many piers dating to the 1870s and literally collapsing into the water.
The Port of New York Authority, despite initial rejection by New York City, found success developing New Jersey's waterfront. After rebuilding Newark's failing municipal docks between 1948-1952, they announced a major terminal for Waterman Steamship Company, which would relocate from Brooklyn. The agency continued flexing its waterfront muscle by building terminals for rubber importers and Norton Lilly & Co., both relocating from Brooklyn. Their most aggressive move came in December 1955 with the announcement of Port Elizabeth, a 450-acre development that would become the largest port project ever undertaken in the United States, designed with containerization in mind.
The Port Authority's New Jersey developments alarmed New York City officials. Mayor Robert Wagner responded by dramatically increasing Department of Marine and Aviation spending with an ambitious $130 million six-year port reconstruction plan. However, these investments couldn't address the city's fundamental port problems: uncompetitive costs, geographic disadvantages requiring cross-harbor lightering for rail freight, traffic congestion, and persistent labor issues.
As container traffic surged, New York City's manufacturing sector collapsed. Between 1967 and 1976, the city lost a fourth of its factories and one-third of its manufacturing jobs, with 45 of 47 major industries experiencing double-digit declines.
Though containerization wasn't the sole cause-expressways opening suburban areas, high electricity costs, population shifts southward, and economic downturn all contributed-it fundamentally changed location economics. Containerization eliminated a key advantage of New York manufacturing: ease of shipment. Now companies could replace crowded multi-story Brooklyn plants with modern single-story facilities in New Jersey or Pennsylvania, enjoying lower taxes and electricity costs while shipping containers to Port Elizabeth cheaply.
Brooklyn, once a manufacturing powerhouse, was devastated. The waterfront's transformation combined with the Brooklyn Navy Yard's 1966 closure destroyed the industrial base. Brooklyn's population fell 14% between 1971-1980, and inflation-adjusted personal income dropped for eight consecutive years. New York was merely the first established shipping center whose economy would be transformed in unimaginable ways by the container revolution.
第6章
Union Disunion: Labor's Response to Automation
The container revolution sparked different responses from the two major longshoremen's unions. Teddy Gleason of the ILA (International Longshoremen's Association) and Harry Bridges of the ILWU (International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union) approached automation's threat to dockworkers' jobs with contrasting strategies, though both ultimately secured extraordinary benefits for their members in exchange for allowing containerization.
The International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union on the Pacific coast had a contentious history with employers, gaining recognition only after a bloody coastwide strike in 1934, followed by nearly 1,400 stoppages over the next fourteen years. This conflict produced elaborate work rules that protected jobs but severely limited efficiency. One formal rule prevented workers from being reassigned between hatches on the same ship. An unwritten "hip pocket" rule required truckers to unload pallets so longshoremen could reload them, then break them down again in the hold-making palletization prohibitively expensive.
Despite improved relations, productivity remained dismally low through the early 1950s, with practices like "four-on, four-off" allowing workers to be paid for shifts they only partially worked. A congressional investigation in 1955 left the ILWU politically isolated, already plagued by allegations of Communist ties and expelled from the CIO.
Harry Bridges, aware of his union's vulnerability and the inevitable march of automation, began arguing that the union needed to adapt. "Those guys who think we can go on holding back mechanization are still back in the thirties," he insisted. In March 1956, his negotiating committee urged accepting automation in exchange for higher wages and shorter hours, stating that past efforts to "retard the wheels of industrial mechanization progress" had failed.
After complex negotiations, the ILWU and Pacific Maritime Association signed the landmark Mechanization and Modernization Agreement on October 18, 1960. The agreement eliminated work rules requiring unnecessary men and allowed management to change working methods for all cargo types. In exchange, employers paid $5 million annually to fund retirement benefits and guarantee A-men 35 hours of weekly pay.
The results surprised everyone: productivity soared 41% in five years, with specific cargoes seeing gains of 53-130%. However, these improvements came more from harder physical work than automation, leading the union to demand more mechanization to reduce physical burdens.
Unlike the ILWU, the ILA struggled with fractious politics and divergent economic realities across ports. When the 1962 contract negotiations failed, President Kennedy ordered a cooling-off period and appointed professors to investigate. Their suggestion for a joint labor-management study was rejected, with Gleason insisting "We don't want to sell jobs... The West Coast sold their men out." The union struck again in December 1962.
With containers now handling over 10% of New York's cargo, Gleason unexpectedly proposed "a guaranteed annual wage." The 1964 negotiations eventually yielded the Guaranteed Annual Income program, where employers would pay royalties on containers to guarantee qualified longshoremen 1,600 hours of annual pay even without work. In exchange, gang sizes would reduce to seventeen men by 1967.
The Mechanization and Modernization Agreement on the Pacific coast and the Guaranteed Annual Income in the North Atlantic represented groundbreaking labor arrangements during a time when automation's impact was a major national concern. President Kennedy himself called employment amid automation "the major domestic challenge of the 60s," while AFL-CIO president George Meany described automation as "rapidly becoming a curse to this society."
Beyond economic concerns, containerization fundamentally changed waterfront culture. Traditional skills lost value, family job succession ended, and the camaraderie of established gangs disappeared. As longshoreman Peter Bell lamented, "They're turning this job into a factory job." Despite these social costs, the agreements established an important principle: employers profiting from automation should share benefits with displaced workers-a concept rarely accepted elsewhere in the American economy.
第7章
Vietnam: The War That Made Containerization
The Vietnam War presented the greatest logistical challenge in U.S. military history, creating the conditions for containerization's coming of age. South Vietnam in 1965 was woefully unprepared for modern military operations, with just one deepwater port, a largely inoperative railroad, and mostly unpaved highways. As President Johnson ordered 65,000 troops to Vietnam in April 1965, the supply chain quickly became overwhelmed.
Vietnam's infrastructure was wholly inadequate for supporting modern military operations. The entire 700-mile-long country had just one deepwater port at Saigon. By 1964, U.S. port workers in Saigon were working twelve-hour shifts seven days weekly. Sixteen different logistical systems operated without central cargo tracking. When the troop buildup began, supply challenges became overwhelming-ships anchored offshore required slow cargo transfers to barges or LSTs, with round trips taking 10-30 days at Nha Be and eight days at Qui Nhon.
Saigon's port, Vietnam's only deepwater facility, became a critical bottleneck as tonnage increased 50% during 1965. The port lacked cranes and forklifts, forcing reliance on manual labor. Military, commercial, aid, and food shipments competed for just ten berths, with cargo often sitting on docks for days. Theft was so rampant that U.S. military police escorted trucks from docks to warehouses.
The Joint Chiefs' decision to implement a "push" supply system further complicated logistics. Unlike a "pull" system where field units request needed supplies, the push system relied on U.S.-based supply experts to determine what to send. While successful at quickly increasing supply volume-Army Materiel Command spending nearly doubled from $7.4 billion to $14.3 billion between fiscal years 1965-66-what arrived was often unexpected, unneeded or insufficient.
Supply problems intensified as 17,000 additional U.S. troops landed monthly in Vietnam. By Thanksgiving 1965, 45 ships were being worked in Vietnamese ports while 75 more waited offshore or in the Philippines. The logistical mess became a political embarrassment, with Life magazine publishing photos of Saigon port congestion and congressional criticism mounting.
Under pressure, the South Vietnamese government allowed the U.S. to build Newport, a new deepwater port in Saigon. The Pentagon simplified the supply chain by making the Army responsible for supplying all allied forces. On McNamara's direct orders, the MSTS hired Alaska Barge and Transport Co. to manage coastal shipping, building docks and establishing a barge shuttle service that proved invaluable.
The port logjam wasn't just from excess cargo-everything arrived in breakbulk ships requiring laborious individual unloading. A November 1965 military study recommended "unitized packaging" and more efficient loading procedures. Malcom McLean "got obsessed with the idea of putting containerships into Vietnam" and finally secured General Frank Besson's permission to investigate the situation.
McLean finally gained a foothold in April 1966 when his Equipment Rental division won an army contract to run trucking operations at Saigon piers. In May, Besson arranged for Sea-Land to run three containerships between Oakland and Okinawa. Sea-Land won a $70 million contract in March 1967 to provide seven ships, complete with containers, chassis, trucks, and terminals at a fixed price per ton.
Cam Ranh Bay was transformed into a large containerport with Sea-Land's computer system tracking every container from loading in America to arrival in Vietnam and back. The army declared "the port congestion problem was solved," with MSTS Commander Lawson Ramage estimating the seven Sea-Land containerships moved cargo equivalent to twenty conventional vessels.
Containerization proved dramatically cost-effective. McLean estimated in 1967 that containerized shipping to Vietnam cost half as much as using navy-owned merchant ships, while General Besson later calculated the military could have saved $882 million between 1965-1968 if containerization had been adopted at the buildup's start.
Vietnam contracts transformed Sea-Land's business. From zero military revenue in 1965, the company earned $450 million from Defense Department contracts between 1967 and 1973, with Vietnam-related contracts accounting for 30% of company sales at the peak. Each round trip to Cam Ranh Bay brought over $20,000 daily, far exceeding the $5,000 daily cost to lease breakbulk ships.
McLean brilliantly leveraged the Vietnam operation to enter the Japanese market. With westbound ships full of military cargo but returning nearly empty, he realized adding a Japan stop would create almost pure profit. When Sea-Land announced weekly sailings from Japan in March 1968, McLean partnered with Mitsui companies to build terminals and handle operations. By late 1968, the Japan-West Coast route that had no container service before September 1967 suddenly had seven competing companies, setting the stage for an unexpected flood of cargo.
第8章
Global Transformation: How the Container Reshaped the World Economy
The container didn't just change shipping-it fundamentally transformed the global economy in ways no one anticipated. As freight costs plummeted in the late 1970s and cargo exchange between carriers became routine, manufacturers discovered they could outsource components rather than producing everything themselves. This "disintegrated production" allowed specialized suppliers to achieve economies of scale while taking advantage of the latest technologies.
Barbie exemplifies the modern global supply chain. Originally made in Japan in 1959, by the 1990s her production involved workers in China using American molds and Japanese machines, with Japanese nylon hair, Taiwanese plastic, American pigments, and Chinese cotton clothing. Such complex supply chains became possible only after containerization dramatically reduced shipping costs and improved reliability.
Just-in-time manufacturing, pioneered by Toyota, revolutionized production by eliminating large inventories. Rather than making most components in-house, Toyota contracted with outside suppliers who helped design products, maintained strict quality standards, and delivered small batches within narrow time windows. Initially unknown outside Japan before 1981, just-in-time became a global business phenomenon by the mid-1980s, with 40% of Fortune 500 manufacturers implementing such programs by 1987.
The logistics revolution appears statistically in reduced inventory levels. By 2004, U.S. nonfarm inventories were approximately $1 trillion lower than they would have been at 1980s levels relative to sales, saving businesses $80-90 billion annually in financing costs.
While globalization isn't new-the 19th century saw highly integrated world trade-late 20th century globalization took on a different character. Modern trade is dominated not by raw materials or finished products but by "intermediate goods"-partially processed factory inputs that move through global supply chains. By 1998, fewer than one-third of containers entering Southern California contained consumer goods; most held industrial products like synthetic resins, engine parts, and components.
Containerization's economics shaped global supply chains in peculiar ways. Distance matters but not hugely-doubling shipping distance only raises costs by about 18%. What matters more is volume: places with high container traffic enjoy lower shipping costs per box.
This created winners and losers. Los Angeles thrived as both a factory location and port in the 1970s-80s because it handled high import volumes from Asia. The Pacific Rim became the world's consumer goods workshop partly because large container ports gave it some of the world's lowest shipping costs. Conversely, containerization may have worsened geographical disadvantages for landlocked countries and places with poor infrastructure.
Though containerization's revolutionary days ended by the early 1980s, its aftereffects continued transforming global trade. Container shipping volume quadrupled over the next two decades as freight costs plummeted. Hamburg's general cargo handling jumped from 11 million tons in 1960 to 40 million in 1996, with 88% containerized and half from Asia. Consumer goods prices tumbled as imports flooded Europe, Japan, and North America, helping end three decades of inflation in the late 1990s.
Port efficiency became critical to national economic success. Efficient ports with access to large cargo flows attract frequent service with direct sailings worldwide. The massive ports built in China, Malaysia, and Thailand during the 1990s were strategic investments that gave local manufacturers lower shipping rates and faster transit times, creating significant cost advantages in export markets.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of containerization's history is how consistently experts misjudged its trajectory. While everyone except dockworkers' unions acknowledged McLean's genius in containerizing freight, few foresaw the revolution it would unleash.
The massive increase in long-distance trade following containerization was anticipated by no one. Harvard economist Benjamin Chinitz, studying freight in the New York region in the late 1950s, predicted containerization would benefit local factories by enabling cheaper shipping to the South. The possibility that falling transport costs could decimate U.S. manufacturing by making long-distance shipping practical for almost everything simply didn't occur to him.
Throughout the 1960s, studies projected containerization's growth by assuming existing import/export patterns would continue with cargo gradually shifting to containers. The prospect that containers would enable worldwide economic restructuring and vastly increased trade flows wasn't taken seriously.
Yet the container's logic proved irresistible. Half a century after the Ideal-X, the equivalent of 300 million 20-foot containers crossed the world's oceans annually, with 26% originating in China alone, plus countless more moving cross-border by truck or train.
Containerization's ubiquity brought new social problems. Abandoned containers littered landscapes worldwide. Ship, truck, and train exhaust created massive environmental issues, with port communities suffering congestion, noise, and high cancer rates linked to diesel emissions. Security officials worried that a single container with a radioactive "dirty bomb" could contaminate an entire city and disrupt global commerce. Human smuggling in containers outfitted with mattresses and toilets became routine.
Despite these serious problems, container shipping continued its explosive growth. Ships reached unprecedented sizes, with dozens of vessels able to carry 4,000 40-foot containers by 2006 and even larger ones on order. A theoretical "Malacca-Max" vessel would be a quarter-mile long, 190 feet wide, carrying 18,000 TEUs-enough to fill a 68-mile line of trucks. These enormously costly ships and ports would create even greater economies of scale, further reducing the cost of moving goods globally.
The container's history proves humbling. Planning and analysis provide little guidance when fundamentals change. Flexibility becomes essential, while resistance-or hasty action-can prove disastrous. This simple metal box, a truly disruptive technology, continues affecting our world in unexpected ways.
