What is *The American War in Afghanistan: A History* about?

*The American War in Afghanistan: A History* provides a comprehensive analysis of the U.S.-led conflict from 2001 to 2021, emphasizing the Taliban’s deep roots in Afghan religious identity and the Afghan government’s struggle to gain legitimacy amid perceptions of American occupation. Carter Malkasian argues that cultural misunderstandings and policy failures led to the Taliban’s resurgence, drawing from his fieldwork in Helmand Province and advisory role to U.S. military leaders.

Who should read *The American War in Afghanistan: A History*?

This book is essential for military strategists, historians, policymakers, and students of counterinsurgency. Its blend of academic rigor and firsthand insights appeals to readers seeking to understand the war’s political complexities, strategic missteps, and the Taliban’s resilience.

Is *The American War in Afghanistan: A History* worth reading?

Yes—it’s hailed as the most thorough account of the conflict to date, praised for balancing historical depth with practitioner experience. While it doesn’t cover the 2021 withdrawal, its analysis of cultural dynamics and military decision-making remains critical for understanding the war’s trajectory.

What are the main themes in *The American War in Afghanistan: A History*?

Key themes include the Taliban’s exploitation of Afghan nationalism, the U.S. failure to align with local values, and the unintended consequences of foreign intervention. Malkasian highlights how Afghan perceptions of American occupation undermined governance efforts, despite military successes like the 2007 surge.

How does Carter Malkasian explain the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan?

Malkasian attributes Taliban resilience to their integration into Afghan religious and social identity. Unlike the U.S.-backed government, the Taliban framed their fight as a defense of Afghan autonomy against foreign occupiers, garnering grassroots support even in contested regions.

What is the “black cloud” operational strategy mentioned in the book?

The “black cloud” strategy combined drones, special operations forces, and intelligence networks to pressure the Taliban. While effective tactically, Malkasian notes it alienated civilians and fueled resentment, illustrating the limits of tech-centric warfare in counterinsurgency.

How does *The American War in Afghanistan* compare to Malkasian’s earlier book *War Comes to Garmser*?

Both books blend micro-historical analysis with broader conflict insights, but *The American War in Afghanistan* adopts a national scope. *War Comes to Garmser* focuses on Helmand’s 30-year strife, while the latter examines U.S. policy failures across two decades.

What criticisms does Malkasian level at U.S. military leadership?

He critiques leaders for overestimating short-term gains (e.g., the 2007 surge) while underestimating Afghan distrust of foreign forces. Decision-makers prioritized tactical victories over long-term stability, exacerbating governance challenges.

アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―

A History

カーター・マルカシアン

4.25(567 Reviews)

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の概要

カーター・マルカシアンによるアメリカ史上最長の戦争に関する決定版とも言えるこの記録は、アフガニスタンにおいていかに国内政治が軍事戦略を凌駕したかを明らかにしています。ダンフォード将軍のアドバイザーとしての経験に基づき、マルカシアンはタリバンの宗教的ナラティブがいかにして最終的にアメリカの1兆ドル規模の軍事力を打ち負かしたのかを暴露しています。

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第1章

America's Long War in Afghanistan: A Nation's Tragedy

In the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, America embarked on what would become its longest war-a conflict that spanned four presidencies and cost trillions of dollars. Carter Malkasian's definitive account offers an unsparing examination of this twenty-year struggle, drawing on his extensive experience as a civilian advisor in southern Afghanistan. The book has earned widespread acclaim from military leaders and foreign policy experts alike, with General David Petraeus calling it "the best single volume on the American war in Afghanistan." Malkasian's unique perspective-combining scholarly rigor with firsthand experience-allows him to trace the war's evolution from initial triumph to ultimate tragedy, revealing how America's well-intentioned intervention became entangled in Afghanistan's complex tribal politics, religious traditions, and centuries-old resistance to foreign occupation.

第2章

A Land Shaped by Resistance

Afghanistan's modern identity was forged through centuries of resistance to foreign invaders, creating a deeply ingrained cultural ethos of independence and defiance. While Western accounts predominantly focus on Afghan victories over British forces in the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-1842, 1878-1880, 1919) and Soviet forces (1979-1989), Afghans trace this tradition of resistance back to Alexander the Great's Macedonian armies and Genghis Khan's Mongol hordes. The celebrated epic poem "Hotaknama" vividly commemorates victories against "infidels," detailing battles and heroic sacrifices that became foundational to Afghan identity. Ahmed Shah Durrani, who founded modern Afghanistan (1747-1773), explicitly warned his son Timur in his testament never to give foreigners "any rights and way" in Afghan territory, predicting it would lead to "destruction of the people" - advice that would prove prophetic through subsequent centuries. This resistance identity became inextricably intertwined with Islam, particularly the concepts of ummah (unity under God) and jihad against nonbelievers. Unlike Western perceptions of jihad as terrorism, Afghans historically viewed it as legitimate defense of their territory, culture, and way of life. These twin pillars - resistance to foreign domination and Islamic devotion - helped unite Afghanistan's diverse ethnic groups, providing common cause between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras during times of external threat. Yet beneath this unifying framework, tribal identity remained a powerful divisive force. Pashtuns organized themselves around complex tribal structures and codes like Pashtunwali, while Tajiks and Hazaras identified more strongly with regional communities and specific leaders. Three major Pashtun tribal confederations dominated political life: the eastern Pashtuns (including the militant Zadran and Mangal tribes), the Ghilzai (including the historically powerful Hotak and Kharoti), and the Durrani (the aristocratic tribes like Barakzai and Popalzai who provided most of Afghanistan's rulers). The Ghilzai-Durrani rivalry shaped centuries of Afghan politics, with Durranis maintaining royal authority until 1978 before Ghilzai leaders emerged dominant in both communist and Taliban regimes. Religious leaders constituted another powerful societal force whose influence transcended tribal boundaries. Unlike the territorially-based tribal system, religious authority operated through networks of mosques, madrasas, and Sufi orders that crossed geographic constraints. Village mullahs served essential community functions - leading prayers, teaching children, resolving disputes, and maintaining moral order. Above them, maulawis (religious scholars) with years of formal Islamic education ran influential madrasas and issued religious rulings. The relationship between religious leaders and political rulers remained perpetually tense, as each claimed independent sources of authority - one divine, one temporal. Women's status in traditional Afghan society was severely restrictive, even by late 20th century standards. In rural areas, particularly among Pashtun tribes, women's freedoms were minimal - they rarely worked outside their homes, received little or no formal education, and were required to wear full-body burkas with male escorts when in public. Urban women, especially in Kabul and other major cities, gradually gained more freedoms by the late 20th century, attending secondary schools and universities, holding government jobs, and dressing less restrictively. However, these urban-rural divisions in women's status became another source of social tension, particularly during periods of modernization attempts.

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の一語一語が音声に合わせてリアルタイムでハイライトされ、自然に読み進められます。

第3章

The Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban emerged from the chaos of Afghanistan's post-Soviet civil war. After the communist government's fall in 1992, mujahideen factions turned against each other in a devastating conflict. Kabul became a war zone contested by rival commanders-Massoud in the center, Hekmatyar in southwestern neighborhoods, Dostum at the airport, and Hazaras in western areas. Indiscriminate rocket fire killed 25,000 civilians, while looting, murder, and rape terrorized the streets. In this environment, the Taliban's founders-religious leaders who had fought against the Soviets-gathered in October 1994 in Maiwand and issued a fatwa establishing their movement. Their goals were clear: institute Islamic law, remove warlords, form a just government according to the Koran, and restore Afghanistan's independence. They selected Mullah Mohammed Omar as military commander, a 35-year-old hardened veteran who had lost an eye fighting Soviets. While the Taliban's founders were experienced mujahideen, most foot soldiers were young religious students who had grown up in Pakistani refugee camps during the Soviet war. The movement's name itself-"Taliban" means "students" in Arabic and Pashto-reflected this composition. Pakistan established early relations with the Taliban through its Kandahar consulate, seeing in them a Pashtun proxy who would protect Pakistani interests and not align with India. The Taliban's first victories came in areas where their founders had the most influence-Maiwand and Zharey-Panjwai districts. From this base, they captured the strategic Spin Boldak border crossing with Pakistan, allowing thousands of refugees and madrasa students to join. When Mullah Naqib, the powerful Alikozai leader, aligned with the Taliban in November as they encircled Kandahar City, their victory was assured. After capturing Kandahar, Omar quickly took neighboring provinces, then moved against Kabul within two months. The Taliban eventually defeated all major warlords except Ahmed Shah Massoud, the charismatic Tajik commander from Panjshir Valley who remained their only undefeated foe until his assassination by al-Qaeda operatives on September 9, 2001-just two days before the attacks that would change Afghanistan's destiny.

第4章

The Taliban Regime

The Taliban regime lasted almost exactly seven years, from November 1994 to December 2001. They called themselves the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," a name they would insist upon for the next quarter century. While their harsh interpretation of Islamic law earned infamy in the West, their reputation in Pashtun Afghanistan was less malevolent-bearable, if far from good government. Their moral authority stemmed from their religious leadership. Many Afghans accepted religious leaders as fair arbiters unconcerned with personal power, a welcome alternative to warlord anarchy. Unlike previous rulers, the Taliban didn't rely on tribal structures. Mullah Omar established a hierarchy where provincial governors had authority over military and civilian affairs and reported directly to him. The Taliban instituted a form of governance where Islam flourished as never before. They enforced Islamic law, mandatory prayer, zakat payment, and opened madrasas for thousands of children. Justice became their hallmark, with Islamic courts administering sharia law in almost every district. Their harsh interpretation mandated veils, forbade music, and imposed severe punishments. Women faced severe oppression under Taliban rule. They were confined to homes, required full covering and escorts when outside, banned from work, and girls prohibited from education. Public executions, including stonings of women in stadiums, defined Taliban cruelty for Westerners, while many Afghans, especially Pashtuns, accepted these practices as extensions of existing gender oppression. Bin Laden first came to Afghanistan in the mid-1980s for charity work with refugees before establishing training camps for Arab fighters against the Soviets. He returned in 1996 with 50 men, establishing a base at Tora Bora. Mullah Omar summoned bin Laden to Kandahar after his "Declaration of Jihad" against America drew unwanted attention. Omar asked bin Laden to stop media statements but, honoring Pashtun hospitality, didn't forbid terrorism activities. After the 1998 embassy bombings, Omar refused US and Saudi demands to surrender bin Laden, citing Islamic law and Pashtunwali obligations to protect guests.

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第5章

America Enters Afghanistan

The September 11, 2001 attacks transformed Afghanistan into America's foremost national security interest overnight. Though Afghans themselves weren't international terrorists, twenty years of disorder had created an environment where extremism flourished. Bin Laden, against his advisors' counsel, deliberately provoked America, hoping to draw it into a long war where it would be defeated like the Soviet Union. Hours after the attacks, Bush's national security team suspected they would need to attack al-Qaeda and possibly overthrow the Taliban. Rather than launching a surprise attack, Bush decided to issue an ultimatum demanding the Taliban surrender bin Laden. Mullah Omar hadn't been informed of the September 11 attacks beforehand, as bin Laden had disregarded instructions to consult on international terrorist actions. Though many Taliban condemned the attacks and a council of religious scholars advised Omar to ask bin Laden to leave Afghanistan, Omar ultimately rejected Bush's ultimatum, claiming bin Laden hadn't committed the attacks and citing the Afghan tradition of protecting guests. Omar greatly underestimated America's resolve, believing there was less than a 10% chance the US would attack. The Taliban leadership shared this overconfidence while bin Laden misjudged that America could be defeated using the same tactics that outlasted the Soviets. With overwhelming public support for military action and hardening opinions on both sides, Bush decided on October 5 that the US would attack on October 7. The US war plan involved deploying CIA paramilitary teams and special forces to work with the Northern Alliance and Pashtun groups, supported by precision air strikes. Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001, quickly destroying Taliban air defenses, communications, and military targets. While the bombing devastated Taliban infrastructure, Taliban fighting forces remained resilient. The focal point of fighting was initially near Kabul, but US leadership directed the main effort toward Mazar-e-Sharif. By November 9, Northern Alliance forces broke through, causing Taliban resistance to collapse across the north.

第6章

The Karzai Regime and Missed Opportunities

With the Taliban defeated and Hamid Karzai selected as interim president, Afghanistan experienced its first relative peace in 20 years. Little opposition existed to the new government, and many Taliban had returned home. This moment presented a unique opportunity for US and Afghan leaders to implement new policies and design a government, but Bush's team was inattentive due to overconfidence. Despite campaigning against nation-building in 2000, Bush claimed 9/11 changed his mind, calling Afghanistan "the ultimate nation-building mission." In April 2002, he unexpectedly called for a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, yet never followed up. Rumsfeld actively disregarded this speech and forbade commanders from pursuing nation-building activities. The administration's approach remained contradictory-rhetorically supporting transformation while limiting actual commitment. The December 2001 Bonn Agreement established Karzai as interim president and placed Tajik leaders from Massoud's faction in ministerial positions, but left much undefined. The June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga assembled 1,500 representatives to confirm a provisional government. With U.S. backing, Karzai secured the presidency over former king Zahir Shah. Taliban were deliberately excluded, with Khalilzad later arguing they would have rejected participation anyway. Despite Powell's arguments for a strong centralized army, Rumsfeld resisted spending resources on Afghanistan's military, claiming the U.S. had already spent billions on the country's freedom. Only in December 2002, a full year after the invasion, did the United States officially commit to building and funding a new army. General Karl Eikenberry, appointed as security coordinator in October 2002, became the "father of the Afghan National Army" and worked with Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani to set a target of 70,000 troops-deemed sufficient with the Taliban considered defeated. Between 2002 and 2004, several senior Taliban delegations reached out to Karzai seeking reconciliation. In January 2002, former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil met with Americans in Kandahar and discussed creating a Taliban group allied with Karzai. The plan reached Vice President Cheney, who immediately rejected it, declaring "all Taliban were bad." In spring 2002, Mullah Omar's aide Tayeb Agha sent Karzai a letter proposing Taliban participation in forming the new state. Karzai wanted to pursue this opportunity, but U.S. officials either ignored or rejected it. The failure to include the Taliban in the political process ranks alongside the failure to build an effective army as one of the major US mistakes in the war. Despite the Taliban's refusal to renounce hosting groups planning attacks on the West, the Bush administration made no known attempts to talk with Taliban leaders until the Obama administration took office.

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の一語一語が音声に合わせてリアルタイムでハイライトされ、自然に読み進められます。

第7章

The Taliban Return

From 2002 to 2005, Afghanistan experienced a deceptive period of relative peace while the Taliban methodically rebounded from near-defeat. Deep-rooted tribal rivalries and poorly executed US military operations, including nighttime raids that often targeted innocent civilians, gradually generated popular support for the Taliban. While appearing dormant, they were systematically reorganizing in Pakistan's tribal areas - meticulously planning operations, recruiting new fighters, establishing training camps, and developing sophisticated fundraising networks through opium trade and foreign donations. US military and intelligence leaders, overconfident from their initial victory and increasingly focused on Iraq, failed to detect or adequately respond to these concerning developments. In February 2003, Mullah Omar published a significant letter calling on all Afghans to wage jihad against the United States, marking a formal resurrection of the movement. Around the same time, he distributed an audio recording naming Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mullah Obaidullah as his principal deputies, establishing a clear chain of command. In June 2003, Omar announced the formation of a new leadership council, the "Quetta Shura," initially comprising ten senior Taliban commanders but later expanding to include regional commanders and religious scholars. This council became the primary decision-making body for the resurgent movement, coordinating military operations and political strategy from safe havens in Pakistan. Mullah Dadullah Lang emerged as the most fearsome and influential field commander who would lead Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan. Coming from the historically marginalized Kakar tribe, Dadullah had been with the Taliban since its inception in the 1990s. Known for his serious demeanor, strict religious piety, and exceptional cruelty toward opponents, Dadullah enforced rigid discipline among his fighters and tolerated no frivolity. He revolutionized Taliban military capabilities by establishing sophisticated training camps for new recruits and forging crucial connections with Iraqi insurgents. These experienced fighters were brought to Pakistani tribal areas to teach the latest guerrilla warfare tactics and technology, including advanced IED construction and cellular communications. Most significantly, Dadullah introduced suicide bombing to Afghanistan - a tactic previously considered un-Islamic and rejected by Afghan culture - which became a devastating weapon in the Taliban arsenal. By early 2009, the Taliban had maintained firm control over most of Helmand province for three years, demonstrating their ability to establish and maintain territorial control. They dominated both the mountainous northern regions and the fertile southern areas extending to the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital. The only exception was portions of Garmser district, which U.S. Marines had managed to recapture in a costly 2008 operation. Most critically, an estimated force of 1,000-2,500 Taliban fighters operated freely in the farming communities of Marjah and Nad Ali, areas strategically located adjacent to the provincial capital. This presence posed a direct threat to Lashkar Gah, effectively surrounding the city and putting the entire province's government control in serious jeopardy. Their control of these agricultural regions also provided crucial revenue through opium production and taxation of local farmers.

第8章

The Obama Surge and Its Aftermath

The dire military situation in Afghanistan brought America to the most controversial decision of the war: the 2009 surge. After years of defeats had washed away early successes, the United States attempted its largest effort to fix Afghanistan through a massive military, political, and economic undertaking. From 2006 to 2009, the US military had implemented counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq under General David Petraeus. This approach emphasized protecting the population over killing insurgents through tactics like patrolling populated areas, embedding advisors with local forces, limiting civilian casualties, and building legitimate governance. Upon arriving in Afghanistan in June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal began implementing counterinsurgency principles. His first major initiative addressed civilian casualties-a strategic problem that had poisoned US-Afghan relations. By 2008, US and allied forces had caused 828 of the 2,118 reported civilian casualties. On July 2, 2009, McChrystal issued a tactical directive restricting airstrikes against homes except in self-defense, forbidding entry into mosques, and recommending that only Afghan forces conduct home searches. After extensive deliberations, Obama decided to send 30,000 additional troops with the goals of denying al-Qaeda safe haven, reversing Taliban momentum, and strengthening Afghan forces. Crucially, he set July 2011 for beginning the drawdown, rejecting "fully resourced counterinsurgency" for a time-limited commitment. The surge campaign focused primarily on southern Afghanistan, where the threat was most dire. The 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade began arriving in May 2009 as part of the surge's first tranche. Brigadier General Larry Nicholson commanded the 10,700-strong force with a determination to make a difference. His operational order emphasized partnering with Afghan forces and the local population to "vigorously pursue the enemy." Operation Moshtarak ("together") began on February 13, 2010, with McChrystal promising a "government in a box" would follow the assault. Approximately 2,250 marines and 940 Afghan soldiers faced 400-2,000 Taliban defenders. Using helicopter insertions to bypass Taliban defenses, marines established positions near central bazaars and key intersections, gradually expanding outward despite fierce resistance.

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第9章

The Long Defeat

The surge had successfully broken Taliban momentum in Kandahar, but at immense cost. As the surge ended, it represented a tactical success but strategic failure. Despite brilliant generals and brave soldiers achieving battlefield victories, they could not overcome Taliban resolve, and the costs proved unsustainable. By 2015, US military presence had dwindled to 9,800 troops at six main bases, with coalition partners contributing about 4,000 more. Under Obama's restrictions, US forces were limited to training, advising, and counterterrorism, with air strikes against Taliban permitted only in "in extremis" situations. This policy denied Afghan forces the air support advantage that had been crucial in 2001. Kunduz became Mansour's primary target in northern Afghanistan. With its large Pashtun population that had long felt oppressed by Tajik and Uzbek warlords, Kunduz was ripe for Taliban influence. In September, during the Eid holiday when many commanders were on leave, Taliban forces launched a coordinated assault from four directions while activating hidden cells within the city. By September 29, Taliban fighters occupied the provincial capital-the first to fall during the war. Donald Trump became president in 2017, deeply skeptical of foreign interventions yet having campaigned on decisive action against terrorism. His Secretary of Defense James Mattis visited Afghanistan and concluded the United States was losing. Despite Trump's instinct to withdraw, intelligence briefings convinced him that leaving would increase terrorist threats. On August 18, he reluctantly approved 3,900 additional troops, bringing the US presence to 14,000. In early 2018, peace talks between the United States, Afghan government, and Taliban gained momentum as the war reached devastating intensity. In September 2018, President Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as peace envoy. Meeting the Taliban in January 2019, Khalilzad offered complete US withdrawal in exchange for a political settlement and ceasefire. The Taliban rejected these terms but proposed renouncing external terrorism with enforcement mechanisms. A seven-day reduction in violence began February 22, 2020, dramatically decreasing attacks. The agreement signing ceremony occurred at Doha's Sheraton hotel on February 29, with thirty countries and organizations attending. The text included a 14-month US withdrawal timeline and Taliban commitments to prevent any group from threatening US security.

第10章

The War's Legacy

As 2021 began, newly-elected President Biden inherited Trump's difficult choice: follow through with the May 1 withdrawal deadline amid stalled peace talks or remain in an escalating war. Though Biden had long opposed the war, he deliberated carefully before deciding to complete the withdrawal, announcing on April 14, 2021 that US forces would leave by September 11. The Afghan War became America's longest at nearly 20 years, claiming 2,488 US lives with 20,722 wounded. Afghan casualties were staggering-conservatively half a million dead and wounded, including 65,000 police and soldiers killed and 135,000 injured. Taliban casualties were likely higher: approximately 100,000 killed and 150,000 injured. Civilians suffered terribly, with over 120,000 killed and wounded, and hundreds of thousands displaced. Despite renewed violence, Afghanistan experienced significant reconstruction during America's war. Foreign assistance paved roads, opened schools and clinics, established a free press, and expanded women's rights. Education improved with children receiving ten years of schooling by 2013 compared to six in 2001, while life expectancy rose from 56 to 65 years. The war transformed America's military from a peacetime force into battle-tested echelons on indefinite combat duty. New capabilities in counterterrorism, surveillance, and advising became ingrained, while special operations forces were lionized. In foreign policy, Afghanistan and Iraq convinced Americans to shun large-scale interventions, with the Afghan surge's disappointment killing enthusiasm for democracy-building and regime change. America accomplished its goals of eliminating bin Laden and preventing homeland terrorist attacks but couldn't defeat the Taliban, becoming trapped in a costly, protracted war that incubated extremism. The Taliban represented what it meant to be Afghan-embracing Islamic rule and resistance to occupation. Government forces, tainted by alignment with foreign "infidels," simply couldn't match Taliban fighters' willingness to sacrifice, even when numerically superior and well-supplied. The greatest tragedy befell the Afghan people. The United States exposed Afghans to prolonged harm to defend Americans from terrorism, inadvertently resuscitating civil war. While the intervention advanced women's rights, education, and free speech, these benefits must be weighed against tens of thousands of deaths and the possibility that these gains may prove temporary. The painful reality is that peace might have come much sooner without foreign intervention, which kept Afghanistan in a state of "semipermanent civil war" while pursuing marginal interests.

★★★★★

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』を最後まで読み終えました

100万人以上の学習者に愛用されています

“23日間、毎日使い続けています。今では日課の一部です。”

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『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の主要テーマ

foreign intervention failure
afghan tribal politics
islamic resistance movements
counterinsurgency strategy
taliban rise to power

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の名言

Afghanistan's modern identity was forged through centuries of resistance.
Afghans historically viewed jihad as legitimate defense.
Tribal identity remained a powerful divisive force.
Justice became their hallmark.
The Taliban didn't rely on tribal structures.

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の登場人物

Carter MalkasianAuthor and former civilian advisor in Afghanistan
Ahmed Shah DurraniFounder of modern Afghanistan (1747-1773)
Mullah Mohammed OmarTaliban military commander and movement founder
David PetraeusGeneral and military leader discussed in the text

著者について

『The American War in Afghanistan: A History』の著者であるカーター・マルカシアン（Carter Malkasian）は、紛争地帯で米軍司令官のアドバイザーを務めた実地経験を持つ、第一線の軍事史家および対反乱作戦の専門家です。海軍大学院（Naval Postgraduate School）の国防分析学部長を務める彼の著作は、厳格な学術研究と、国務省代表としてアフガニスタンのヘルマンド州で約2年間生活した経験から得た洞察を融合させたものです。20年にわたる戦争を包括的に分析した本書は、米国の介入、タリバンの回復力、そしてアフガニスタンの文化的アイデンティティと外国による占領の相互作用といったテーマを検証しています。

マルカシアンの専門性は、オックスフォード大学での博士課程の研究、およびパシュトー語を習得し現地コミュニティに深く入り込んだイラクやアフガニスタンでの現場任務に端を発しています。

過去の著書には、外交問題評議会（CFR）のアーサー・ロス書籍賞を受賞した『War Comes to Garmser』や、イラク戦争後を分析した『Illusions of Victory』などがあります。物語の深みと地政学的分析を融合させたことで高く評価されている『The American War in Afghanistan』は、2022年ピュリッツァー賞（歴史部門）のファイナリストに選ばれ、現代の紛争に関する決定版としての地位を確立しました。

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This course bridges the gap between ancient wisdom and modern survival, offering a deep dive into the mechanics of influence and tactical superiority. It is essential for leaders, entrepreneurs, and strategists who need to navigate high-stakes environments where psychological insight and political acumen are the primary tools for success.

6 h 4 m•4 セクション

学習プラン

Tactics, Treachery, and the Throne

This learning plan provides a deep dive into the intersection of high-stakes politics and military strategy. It is essential for history enthusiasts, aspiring leaders, and strategists who want to understand how psychological warfare and long-term planning shape the course of empires.

1 h 30 m•3 セクション

学習プラン

Study John Kiriakou & CIA Operator Tactics

This plan offers a rare look into the high-stakes world of intelligence, bridging the gap between operational mastery and ethical integrity. It is essential for students of geopolitical history, aspiring intelligence analysts, or anyone interested in the moral dilemmas faced by those operating in the shadows.

6 h 2 m•4 セクション

学習プラン

Modern Warfare: Drones and Cyber

This plan is essential for defense strategists and military leaders navigating the shift toward autonomous and electronic attrition. It provides a roadmap for leveraging cost-effective technology and rapid decision-making to maintain a competitive advantage in modern, multi-domain environments.

1 h•3 セクション

コロンビア大学卒業生がサンフランシスコで開発

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@Matt, YC alum

108

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@Erin, Investment Banking Associate , NYC

254

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@djmikemoore

"BeFreed turned my guilty doomscrolling into something that feels productive and inspiring."

@Pitiful

4.5K

"BeFreed turned my commute into learning time. 20-min podcasts are perfect for finishing books I never had time for."

@SofiaP

"BeFreed replaced my podcast queue. Imagine Spotify for books — that’s it. 🙌"

@Jaded_Falcon

201

"It is great for me to learn something from the book without reading it."

@OojasSalunke

"The themed book list podcasts help me connect ideas across authors—like a guided audio journey."

@Leo, Law Student, UPenn

483

"Makes me feel smarter every time before going to work"

@Cashflowbubu

BeFreedがウェブ上でどのように話題になっているかをもっと見る

コロンビア大学卒業生がサンフランシスコで開発

LOVED BY

1,000,000+ curious minds.

4.7

avg rating

1M+ learners

"Instead of endless scrolling, I just hit play on BeFreed. It saves me so much time."

@Moemenn

"I never knew where to start with nonfiction—BeFreed’s book lists turned into podcasts gave me a clear path."

@Chloe, Solo founder, LA

117

"Perfect balance between learning and entertainment. Finished ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ on my commute this week."

@Raaaaaachelw

"Crazy how much I learned while walking the dog. BeFreed = small habits → big gains."

@Matt, YC alum

108

"Reading used to feel like a chore. Now it’s just part of my lifestyle."

@Erin, Investment Banking Associate , NYC

254

"Feels effortless compared to reading. I’ve finished 6 books this month already."

@djmikemoore

"BeFreed turned my guilty doomscrolling into something that feels productive and inspiring."

@Pitiful

4.5K

"BeFreed turned my commute into learning time. 20-min podcasts are perfect for finishing books I never had time for."

@SofiaP

"BeFreed replaced my podcast queue. Imagine Spotify for books — that’s it. 🙌"

@Jaded_Falcon

201

"It is great for me to learn something from the book without reading it."

@OojasSalunke

"The themed book list podcasts help me connect ideas across authors—like a guided audio journey."

@Leo, Law Student, UPenn

483

"Makes me feel smarter every time before going to work"

@Cashflowbubu

"Instead of endless scrolling, I just hit play on BeFreed. It saves me so much time."

@Moemenn

"I never knew where to start with nonfiction—BeFreed’s book lists turned into podcasts gave me a clear path."

@Chloe, Solo founder, LA

117

"Perfect balance between learning and entertainment. Finished ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ on my commute this week."

@Raaaaaachelw

"Crazy how much I learned while walking the dog. BeFreed = small habits → big gains."

@Matt, YC alum

108

"Reading used to feel like a chore. Now it’s just part of my lifestyle."

@Erin, Investment Banking Associate , NYC

254

"Feels effortless compared to reading. I’ve finished 6 books this month already."

@djmikemoore

"BeFreed turned my guilty doomscrolling into something that feels productive and inspiring."

@Pitiful

4.5K

"BeFreed turned my commute into learning time. 20-min podcasts are perfect for finishing books I never had time for."

@SofiaP

"BeFreed replaced my podcast queue. Imagine Spotify for books — that’s it. 🙌"

@Jaded_Falcon

201

"It is great for me to learn something from the book without reading it."

@OojasSalunke

"The themed book list podcasts help me connect ideas across authors—like a guided audio journey."

@Leo, Law Student, UPenn

483

"Makes me feel smarter every time before going to work"

@Cashflowbubu

"Instead of endless scrolling, I just hit play on BeFreed. It saves me so much time."

@Moemenn

"I never knew where to start with nonfiction—BeFreed’s book lists turned into podcasts gave me a clear path."

@Chloe, Solo founder, LA

117

"Perfect balance between learning and entertainment. Finished ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ on my commute this week."

@Raaaaaachelw

"Crazy how much I learned while walking the dog. BeFreed = small habits → big gains."

@Matt, YC alum

108

"Reading used to feel like a chore. Now it’s just part of my lifestyle."

@Erin, Investment Banking Associate , NYC

254

"Feels effortless compared to reading. I’ve finished 6 books this month already."

@djmikemoore

"BeFreed turned my guilty doomscrolling into something that feels productive and inspiring."

@Pitiful

4.5K

"BeFreed turned my commute into learning time. 20-min podcasts are perfect for finishing books I never had time for."

@SofiaP

"BeFreed replaced my podcast queue. Imagine Spotify for books — that’s it. 🙌"

@Jaded_Falcon

201

"It is great for me to learn something from the book without reading it."

@OojasSalunke

"The themed book list podcasts help me connect ideas across authors—like a guided audio journey."

@Leo, Law Student, UPenn

483

"Makes me feel smarter every time before going to work"

@Cashflowbubu

BeFreedがウェブ上でどのように話題になっているかをもっと見る

今すぐ学習の旅を始めよう

第2章

アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―

概要『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の概要

1冊の本。さまざまな聴き方。

America's Long War in Afghanistan: A Nation's Tragedy

A Land Shaped by Resistance

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

The Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban Regime

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』をもっと深く楽しむ

America Enters Afghanistan

The Karzai Regime and Missed Opportunities

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

The Taliban Return

The Obama Surge and Its Aftermath

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』をもっと深く楽しむ

The Long Defeat

The War's Legacy

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』を最後まで読み終えました

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の主要テーマ

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の名言

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の登場人物

著者について

アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―の要約をダウンロード

他のユーザーのお気に入り

この本に関するよくある質問

What is The American War in Afghanistan: A History about?

Who should read The American War in Afghanistan: A History?

Is The American War in Afghanistan: A History worth reading?

What are the main themes in The American War in Afghanistan: A History?

この学習プランの一部

Abdulahi: US Army in Afghanistan & Iraq

もっと見る

1,000,000+ curious minds.

1,000,000+ curious minds.

1冊の本。さまざまな聴き方。

America's Long War in Afghanistan: A Nation's Tragedy

A Land Shaped by Resistance

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

The Rise of the Taliban

The Taliban Regime

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』をもっと深く楽しむ

America Enters Afghanistan

The Karzai Regime and Missed Opportunities

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

The Taliban Return

The Obama Surge and Its Aftermath

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』をもっと深く楽しむ

The Long Defeat

The War's Legacy

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』を最後まで読み終えました

他のユーザーのお気に入り

この学習プランの一部

Abdulahi: US Army in Afghanistan & Iraq

もっと見る

『アフガニスタン米戦史―米軍はなぜ敗退したのか―』の概要