第1章
The Freedom Paradox: How Human Progress Depends on Openness
When a mummified man was discovered in the Italian Alps in 1991, scientists were astonished by what they found. Otzi, who lived 5,300 years ago, carried possessions that revealed an extensive trading network spanning the European continent. His copper axe contained metal from Tuscany, 500 miles away, while his clothing and tools incorporated materials from dozens of communities. This frozen wanderer offers profound insight into humanity's fundamental nature: we are natural traders and cooperators, constantly exchanging knowledge and resources to accomplish more than our individual talents would allow.
"Open" by Johan Norberg has become something of a cultural phenomenon since its publication, praised by figures from Bill Gates to Barack Obama for its optimistic yet clear-eyed assessment of human progress. The book has sparked debates in university classrooms and boardrooms alike, offering a compelling explanation for why some societies flourish while others stagnate. As we navigate increasingly polarized times, Norberg's exploration of the tension between our collaborative and tribal instincts provides a timely framework for understanding both our greatest achievements and our most destructive impulses.
第2章
The Trader's Advantage: How Exchange Built Civilization
Trade isn't some foreign imposition on humanity-it's fundamentally who we are. Even schoolchildren naturally develop trading systems, as demonstrated when researchers observed students spontaneously using rice cakes as currency. Archaeological evidence confirms this trading instinct stretches back to our earliest origins. At Olorgesailie in Kenya, 300,000-year-old obsidian tools reveal long-distance trade networks, as the volcanic glass originated 88 kilometers away.
Humans have always cooperated through exchange-not just with family but with unrelated individuals in constantly shifting relationships. We're naturally inclined toward reciprocity, feeling uncomfortable when unable to repay kindness. This trading instinct co-evolved with our species through three mutually reinforcing traits: intelligence, language, and cooperation. Intelligence allowed learning and storing information; language enabled sharing knowledge; cooperation provided incentives for both.
Our social abilities enabled cultural evolution-a process that continues genetic evolution but works much faster. While genetic evolution requires beneficial mutations to spread through reproduction over generations, cultural evolution happens instantly through imitation. When someone invents a better hunting technique or tool, others can immediately adopt it. This explains why humans progress rapidly while other species evolve glacially.
This advantage proved decisive when Homo sapiens encountered Neanderthals in Europe 50,000 years ago. Despite being stronger with larger brains, Neanderthals lived in smaller, isolated groups without long-distance trade networks. Their tools were found only near their origin sites, unlike humans who transported materials over great distances. Neanderthals lacked division of labor-their living spaces showed no functional organization, they focused primarily on large game hunting, and everyone participated in the same activities. Humans, by contrast, had specialized roles, varied diets, and complex living arrangements. This specialization gave humans tremendous advantages: better resource utilization, improved clothing and shelter, safer environments for children, and most importantly, constant innovation through knowledge exchange.
Trade expands within and across societies not just because it creates wealth, but because it transforms behaviors and values to encourage more cooperation. Research across fifteen small-scale communities reveals that market integration correlates with generosity. The more people depend on markets, the more willing they are to make generous offers and punish unfairness at personal cost. Market-integrated societies offered twice the share of the least integrated ones. As former Marxist economist Herbert Gintis concluded, "societies that use markets extensively develop a culture of cooperation, fairness, and respect for the individual."
Though historians once downplayed trade's role in early civilizations, archaeological discoveries reveal commerce as the foundation of human civilization. The first writing wasn't religious or literary but commercial-clay tablets from Sumer around 3000 BC documenting transactions and ownership. Writing itself evolved from clay tokens used to record traded goods between villages speaking different languages. Numbers too developed from trade, initially as specific counters for commodities rather than abstract concepts.
Cities emerged not primarily for defense but as centers of cooperation and exchange. Uruk, with 50,000 inhabitants by 3000 BC, built walls only centuries after its founding. This urban density accelerated innovation-cities twice as large produce workers 5-10% more productive, while cities ten times larger generate seventeen times more innovation.
第3章
Beyond Borders: The Transformative Power of Human Migration
Free immigration may be the most beneficial policy of all, potentially doubling world GDP. Workers in different countries have vastly different productivity levels due to access to complementary workers, infrastructure, and good institutions. Allowing people to move where their labor is most valuable could increase global wealth by $80 trillion annually. While free trade might increase global GDP by a few percentage points, removing barriers to labor mobility could boost it by 60-150%.
Critics of "cultural appropriation" fail to recognize that all cultures are products of borrowing and exchange. The controversy over a Swedish minister's dreadlocks exemplifies this misunderstanding-the hairstyle itself traces back through Rastafari to Jewish Nazirites described in the Bible. Even conventional Western business attire represents centuries of cultural borrowing: suits developed from Eastern European and Muslim models, shirts from the Middle East, and neckties from Croatian mercenaries.
DNA analysis reveals that Europeans are genetic mixtures from multiple migration waves. Even Otzi the iceman had mixed ancestry, with maternal lineage from the Eastern Alps and paternal DNA similar to farmers from Sweden and Bulgaria. The "classic white European" resulted from at least three distinct populations: dark-skinned, blue-eyed hunter-gatherers; Anatolian farmers who migrated northward around 6000 BCE; and the Yamnaya pastoralists from the Russian steppes who arrived around 3000-2500 BCE, bringing horses, wheels, Indo-European languages, and lactose tolerance.
Globalization has always spread both ideas and diseases. Early pandemics devastated populations-the Antonine Plague killed thousands daily in Rome, the Black Death wiped out a third of Eurasia's population, and diseases brought by conquistadores eliminated 90% of Mexico's population within a century of Columbus. Yet counter-intuitively, our constant mobility may make modern pandemics less lethal. Research shows that frequent contact between populations creates widespread immunity as exposure to milder strains provides resistance against deadlier versions.
Cities became "crucibles of thought" precisely because they brought strangers together, creating environments where innovation thrived. As Jane Jacobs noted, great cities differ from towns partly because they're "full of strangers." Progress happens, as Matt Ridley put it, "when ideas have sex with each other"-not from new ingredients but from new combinations: theory and practice, iron and carbon, hardware and software.
Immigrants contribute disproportionately to innovation-making up 47% of science and engineering doctorates while being just 12% of the American workforce, founding 40% of Fortune 500 companies, and being three times more likely to file patents or win Nobel Prizes. Research consistently shows diverse groups solve problems better, as outsiders question assumptions and bring fresh perspectives that prevent groupthink.
第4章
The Strategic Advantage of Diversity
Contrary to white supremacist claims, history's most successful empires thrived precisely because of their diversity and tolerance. The Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Tang Chinese, Mongols, Ottomans, Dutch, British and modern Americans all achieved global dominance through strategic openness to different peoples and ideas. As historian Amy Chua notes, "every single hyperpower in history was extraordinarily pluralistic and tolerant during its rise to pre-eminence."
The Persian Empire, ruling nearly a third of the world's population at its peak, thrived by preserving local social structures and religions while harnessing diverse skills from Phoenician explorers, Greek scientists, Egyptian doctors and Babylonian astronomers. Their strategic tolerance wasn't modern political correctness but pragmatic recognition that diversity brought competitive advantage.
Rome perfected strategic tolerance, embodying Montesquieu's observation that Romans became "masters of the world" because "they always gave up their own practices as soon as they found better ones." Like earlier empires, they incorporated conquered peoples' gods into their pantheon and preserved local authority structures. But Rome went further by making "Roman" a cultural identity rather than an ethnicity. Emperor Claudius championed this openness, arguing that cities like Sparta declined precisely because they always considered the conquered as foreigners.
While Europe descended into religious intolerance after Rome's fall, the Mongols built history's largest land empire through strategic openness. Though Genghis Khan was a ruthless warlord, he practiced religious freedom and ethnic tolerance, promoting competence over tribal loyalty. As anthropologist Jack Weatherford notes, the Mongols "searched for what worked best" and spread effective systems across their territories.
Spain's decline illustrates the cost of closing doors. After reconquering Muslim lands, Spanish rulers initially accepted diversity but gradually embraced the destructive idea that "purity of blood" would bring unity. The Spanish Inquisition targeted converts suspected of secretly practicing Judaism or Islam. Following Granada's fall, Ferdinand and Isabella gave Jews four months to convert or leave, with Muslims soon facing the same ultimatum. By 1609, a quarter-million Moriscos were expelled, devastating Spain's eastern agricultural economy. While Ferdinand acknowledged the "great harm" to Spain's prosperity, he prioritized religious purity. Spain defaulted nine times during the 16th-17th centuries, with GDP per capita actually lower in 1750 than in 1500.
Today's immigration skeptics often praise previous waves of immigrants while claiming current newcomers won't assimilate. Yet historically, each new group faced identical suspicions. Anti-Irish sentiment was once so strong it spawned the briefly successful "Know-Nothing" party in the 1850s. As Irish immigrants integrated, suspicion shifted to Chinese immigrants (targeted by exclusionary laws in the 1870s-80s) and then Eastern European Jews (subject to quotas in the 1920s). This pattern repeats with each wave-previous immigrants good, current immigrants bad-until they too become "previous immigrants."
Despite claims that Muslims can't integrate into Western democracies, evidence shows rapid value adaptation among Muslim immigrants. Young Middle Easterners today hold values similar to Western youth in the late 1960s. Most Muslim immigrants are more open-minded than their peers at home, and integration accelerates this process. American Muslims increasingly believe Islam can be interpreted multiple ways and prioritize justice and environmental protection over strict Koranic adherence.
第5章
The Enlightenment Revolution: How Open Minds Changed Everything
Science began with the criticism of myths, as Karl Popper noted. While humans always created supernatural explanations, it took free minds to reject divine intervention and seek natural causes. This scientific revolution first emerged in ancient Greece's Ionian coast during the sixth century BC, where thinkers like Thales began explaining the world through natural laws rather than gods.
Erwin Schrodinger identified three catalysts for this Ionian enlightenment: small independent city-states offering intellectual freedom; seafaring merchants exchanging ideas between East and West; and the absence of a controlling priestly caste enforcing orthodoxy. This combination of pluralism, trade, and tolerance has fueled every episode of intellectual innovation throughout history.
The narrative of steady progress from Athens to modern Western civilization is false. Science doesn't follow a simple trajectory-it can halt or reverse. After the Greek enlightenment, scientific progress in Europe stagnated for over a millennium as the conditions for intellectual freedom deteriorated. Christianity established a monopoly on thought that punished unorthodoxy, much as any religion can when it controls intellectual life.
Christian zealots actively destroyed classical knowledge. The Bishop of Alexandria led a mob that destroyed the Temple of Serapis and its irreplaceable library. The mathematician Hypatia was brutally murdered in 415 AD, stripped naked and flayed with pottery shards. Emperor Justinian in 529 forced mass baptisms and banned pagan teachers, closing Plato's Academy after 900 years.
While Europe languished in intellectual darkness, the Islamic world became the true heir of classical civilization. Stretching from Spain to India, this cosmopolitan civilization thrived through openness to diverse cultures and traditions. Baghdad's House of Wisdom collected translations from around the world, while Muslim cities established the first centers for higher education.
The Islamic world preserved Greek philosophy when it was forgotten in the West. Beginning in the eighth century, classical texts were translated into Arabic, becoming foundations for advances in astronomy, mathematics, medicine and other sciences. Al-Khwarizmi invented modern algebra, Omar Khayyam measured the year with remarkable precision, and al-Idrisi created the most accurate world map of his time.
By 1700, Europe had emerged from its dark ages but was still not more advanced than Asia, where average incomes, productivity, literacy and education remained higher. However, Europe had become more open than other civilizations-a difference that would change world history.
What made Europe different was that attempts to enforce intellectual orthodoxy ultimately failed, unlike in Asia and the Middle East where similar crackdowns succeeded in stifling innovation. While traditionalists in Europe reacted similarly to those in the Middle East and Asia, they faced unique obstacles: political fragmentation, religious diversity, autonomous universities, and geographical barriers like peninsulas, forests, rivers, and mountains.
Unlike China's vast 14.7 million square kilometer empire, the largest European powers controlled less than 0.7 million square kilometers. With approximately five hundred independent political units in sixteenth-century Europe, even when persecution occurred in one region, innovation could flourish elsewhere. Autonomous cities like Venice and Basel offered refuge to dissidents, while shifting alliances prevented any single power from achieving dominance.
Europe's political fragmentation created what David Hume called "jealous emulation" between neighboring states. When one realm developed innovations that improved its economy or defenses, others quickly imitated them. This competitive environment punished those who persecuted innovators-regions ruled by absolutist leaders saw urban populations decline by 100,000 people per century compared to more liberal areas.
第6章
The Birth of Modern Prosperity
When open minds, open exchange and open doors coalesce for a sustained period, they create a virtuous cycle of discoveries and achievements that facilitate even more discoveries and achievements. If not interrupted by authorities or disasters, this process leads to unprecedented technological advancement and improved living standards.
The Industrial Revolution could easily have happened first in China under the Song dynasty (960-1279). A thousand years ago, when Europe was considered a backwater, China already had the compass, movable type printing, and gunpowder-inventions Marx later credited with ushering in Western capitalism. Historian Stephen Davies notes that Song China was as close to modernity as eighteenth-century Europe.
Despite China's advanced position-with iron output nearly matching Europe's 1700 production and textile machines that could have triggered an industrial revolution 400 years before the West-this progress was derailed. The Ming dynasty, established in 1368, marked the end of China's cosmopolitan era. Humiliated by foreign conquest, the new rulers blamed Song's openness for its downfall. They dismantled checks on power, built walls to keep foreigners out, banned private overseas trade, prohibited foreign languages and customs, and abandoned religious freedom.
China's dramatic reversal during the Age of Discovery perfectly illustrates how Europe surpassed it. After banning private sea trade, Ming emperors transferred maritime activities to government hands. Between 1405-1433, they dispatched seven massive voyages under Muslim eunuch Zheng He, with 250 vessels carrying nearly 30,000 men to South Asia, Arabia and East Africa. Zheng's flagship measured approximately 135 meters-nearly seven times larger than Columbus' Santa Maria.
But China's maritime adventure ended with a single imperial decision in 1433. Three years later, building seagoing ships became illegal. The world's greatest fleet rotted away or was burned, and decades later, voyage records were deliberately destroyed to prevent future inspiration.
European rulers weren't inherently more enlightened than Chinese emperors-Austria-Hungary's Emperor Francis I declared in 1821 that anyone with "new ideas" should leave or be removed. The crucial difference was their inability to effectively suppress innovation.
The final blow against royal absolutism in England came with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when King James II's increasingly despotic rule and Catholic sympathies provoked rebellion. William and Mary could only take the throne after promising to uphold a Bill of Rights and respect Parliament's authority. Britain became a constitutional monarchy with genuine rule of law-judges appointed for life, legal decisions free from royal interference, and courts where even commoners could win against lords.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, this revolution created "the world's first set of inclusive political institutions." Because power was shared among a broad coalition of gentry, merchants and manufacturers from both Whig and Tory factions, constraints needed to apply equally to prevent any single party from undermining the new pluralism.
第7章
The Tribal Dilemma: Our Greatest Strength and Weakness
Our tribal instincts emerge with minimal provocation. In the famous Robbers Cave experiment, twenty-two similar middle-class boys were divided into two groups that quickly developed distinct identities, customs, and fierce rivalries-descending into conflict and violence within just two weeks. This demonstrates how easily humans create tribal divisions, even without natural differences. We're designed for cooperation, but primarily within our own groups, as our moral brains evolved for in-group cohesion rather than universal cooperation.
Henri Tajfel's experiments revealed that humans display in-group loyalty and out-group discrimination based on trivial differences. Even when groups were formed randomly, subjects favored their own group and sought to maximize differences between groups-even at personal cost. This "Vladimir's choice" mentality (preferring to lose one eye if your neighbor loses both) demonstrates how our tribal psychology evolved when beating rival groups was more crucial to survival than gradual progress.
Humans embody a paradox: we can be both extraordinarily peaceful and uniquely violent. As anthropologist Richard Wrangham puts it, "We can be the nastiest of species and also the nicest." We're like bonobos within our groups but chimpanzees between groups. Unlike chimps who fight reactively, humans developed "cold" calculated violence through self-domestication. Evidence suggests early humans executed bullies and despots who abused others, removing reactive aggression from the gene pool while simultaneously developing collaborative violence.
Our tribal tendencies are powerful but remarkably fluid. When groups are based on perceived natural differences like ethnicity or religion, tribalism intensifies, yet these boundaries remain surprisingly malleable. During the Rwandan genocide, a Hutu nun protected Tutsi nuns while condemning other Tutsis to death, showing how we constantly shift between different identity maps. As Amartya Sen notes, we all contain multiple identities-ethnic, professional, national, religious-and can choose which to prioritize.
Our tribal instinct functions like an oversensitive smoke detector-better to have false alarms than miss a genuine threat. Yet successful early humans also needed to recognize opportunities for beneficial exchanges with strangers. We constantly categorize people, often exaggerating differences between groups or manufacturing them entirely. National stereotypes persist across cultures despite personality tests showing minimal actual differences-Canadians and Americans perceive themselves as dramatically different in agreeableness and neuroticism when measurements show they're nearly identical.
How can tribalist humans thrive in an open, cosmopolitan world? Paradoxically, it's precisely because of our tribalism that we need openness. Without regular contact with outsiders, they remain mysterious threats to raid or be raided by-as evidenced by the constant warfare in our pre-cosmopolitan past. In closed worlds, we view others through binoculars; in open ones, we bump into them directly.
第8章
Beyond Zero-Sum: The Economics of Abundance
Zero-sum thinking-the belief that one side can only win if another loses-fundamentally shapes how we view outsiders. When people believe they're in zero-sum relationships with other groups, they make self-destructive choices just to harm rivals. Studies show white students willing to sacrifice millions for their organizations just to prevent minority groups from getting more.
In personal relationships and market exchanges, we seek win-win outcomes, but when thinking as group members competing against others, we'll sacrifice our own welfare to harm outgroups. Harvard economist Benjamin Friedman demonstrates that economic growth periods correlate with increased tolerance and rights, while stagnation breeds discrimination and scapegoating.
Even during recessions, the economy isn't truly zero-sum-it's negative-sum, producing less value than before. The modern economy is explosively non-zero-sum, with a 3000 percent growth over two centuries. In free markets, transactions only occur when both parties believe they'll benefit. Karl Marx's zero-sum prediction that the rich would get richer by exploiting workers until the middle class disappeared was spectacularly mistaken. When Marx died in 1883, the average Englishman was twice as rich as when Marx was born, and extreme poverty had fallen by three-quarters by 1900.
Paul Rubin describes "folk economics"-the untrained person's economic worldview-as fundamentally zero-sum, focusing on wealth allocation rather than production. People see prices and profits as distribution mechanisms rather than incentives for innovation, viewing the economy like a sport where someone must lose for others to win. This zero-sum fallacy underlies countless economic misconceptions: that the rich take from the poor, immigrants deplete resources, automation eliminates jobs, and foreign trade partners gain at our expense.
Our difficulty understanding non-zero-sum relationships stems from our evolutionary past, where for 99.9% of human existence, individual progress was rare and resources were indeed limited-someone's gain typically meant another's loss. Our ancestors practiced "equality matching" trade-sharing resources to manage risk, with those successful in hunting helping those who weren't, knowing roles might reverse later.
Our hunter-gatherer ancestors were justifiably suspicious of innovation-most innovations failed, and failure could mean starvation. Even successful innovations like the Acheulean hand-axe didn't help people understand the value of creativity, as their origins seemed mysterious. Ancient Babylonians attributed all technological progress to a fish-creature named Oannes, believing nothing new had been discovered since.
Though inequality doesn't inherently make economies zero-sum, many perceive it that way. Some wealthy people do exploit privileges, but inequality can also increase when everyone gets richer at different rates. Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus found that entrepreneurs capture only 2.2% of the social value their innovations create-the billions that make headlines on Forbes lists. The remaining 98% benefits society, particularly consumers.
第9章
The Fear Factor: When Openness Feels Threatening
When faced with threats, humans instinctively abandon openness for protection. Philadelphia mayor Frank Rizzo once quipped that "a conservative is a liberal who got mugged the night before," highlighting how danger makes us seek strong government action over individual rights. Even minor insecurity triggers this response-experiments show that something as simple as not washing hands during flu season can increase negative attitudes toward outgroups.
What if we could eliminate our fear of danger? In one study, students who imagined being physically invulnerable suddenly became as open to social change as liberals. This mirrors the Western world's transition over the past century-from poverty and violence to relative wealth and security. With increased life expectancy and safety, our values shifted from survival and conformity toward individualism and openness. But this security remains fragile, vulnerable to disruption when society feels threatened or untidy.
Authoritarianism isn't a stable personality trait but a predisposition-held by roughly a third of Western populations-to prefer oneness over diversity. This remains dormant until threats to social unity trigger explosive intolerance. Research shows that "normative threats" like social division activate this authoritarian impulse more than metaphysical threats. The groupish suddenly demand conformity and obedience when society seems to fracture.
Even perceived disorder can trigger groupishness. Despite violent crime in America halving since the early 1990s, two-thirds of Americans believed it increased each year. Media necessarily focuses on shocking events, exploiting our evolutionary tendency to prioritize negative information. While this vigilance once aided survival, it wasn't designed for 24-hour global news that presents every horror from around the world as immediate and relevant.
Many assume nativism rises from economic hardship, but evidence is surprisingly elusive. Trump won in 2016 during economic recovery with declining unemployment. Only 5% of Brexit supporters cited inequality as their primary concern, and household voting splits suggest values mattered more than economics. Supporting the death penalty better predicted Brexit votes than income, education, or geography.
Disorientation and uncertainty breed nativist, nostalgic revolts. Difficulties suggest we've strayed from tradition, weakened by selfishness, decadence, and foreign influences. This reactionary nostalgia appears in white supremacist movements and religious extremists like ISIS, all oblivious that the glorious pasts they revere were magnificent precisely because they were innovative and open to outside ideas.
Perceived threats intensify our us-versus-them distinctions, making us vulnerable to authoritarian exploitation. In times of trouble, people gravitate toward conspiracy theories and scapegoating-designating some group to carry collective sins. The modern scapegoat can be any sufficiently "different" group: Jews, Muslims, elites, intellectuals, or media.
第10章
The Path Forward: Preserving Openness in an Age of Fear
Karl Popper observed that civilization hasn't fully recovered from the transition from tribal "enclosed society" to the "open society" that unleashes human critical powers-a shock that enables reactionary movements attempting to return to tribalism. Despite popular belief that Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" was vindicated, Fukuyama's insights were more accurate. He didn't literally mean history would cease, but that liberal democratic capitalism had fewer internal contradictions than any alternative system.
A cycle of fear, tribalism and zero-sum thinking has begun. To break it, we must first recognize our own biases rather than just spotting them in others. Studies show we can override automatic bigotry and control disgust reactions that fuel xenophobia, as nurses regularly demonstrate. Research confirms our dual nature: insecurity triggers tribalism, but self-esteem promotes independent judgment and tolerance.
For openness to survive, its support must be broad-based. Global exchange benefits low and middle-income households most, with free trade benefits twenty times larger than costs. However, those costs concentrate painfully on small groups. Governments have mishandled this by removing affected workers from the labor force rather than helping them transition-spending 99 cents of every dollar on removing people from work rather than helping them find new jobs.
We need "safety of wings" policies-wage insurance for those taking lower-paying jobs, assistance for relocation, and replacing welfare traps with negative income tax systems that don't punish work. Technology disruption demands better retraining opportunities, while housing market reforms and occupational licensing overhauls could remove barriers to mobility.
The simplest political action is refusing to support authoritarians who stoke fear and division, even when they offer tax cuts or other benefits. What's worse than bad policies is replacing rational debate with tribal shouting matches. Recent populist revolts should energize discussions about constitutional restraints on government power-liberal democracy isn't about 51% imposing their will on 49%, but protecting individual rights through strong constitutions and independent courts.
The new world became 3000% richer and morally better by replacing the divine right of kings with individual rights. Though often imperfectly honored, these rights unleashed unprecedented talent as societies opened to women, minorities and migrants. This revolution began in northwestern Europe not because its people were superior or rulers wiser, but through historical circumstance.
Europe's triumph paradoxically stemmed from its failures: kings and emperors couldn't unify the continent; Church authorities couldn't impose religious orthodoxy; monopolies and guilds couldn't block innovation. Each time elites failed to control changes in behavior, culture, technology, business and finance, space opened for experiments that produced transformative innovations-the printing press, secular science, steam engines, factories, financial markets, free trade, women's rights, and abolition of serfdom. Europe "failed its way to success."
The disturbing question remains: if these beneficial institutions weren't planned or designed but emerged accidentally and survived because they worked surprisingly well, can they survive long-term? Only once has a promising efflorescence not been cut short by forces opposing openness-at least so far.
