第 1 章
When Catastrophe Becomes the Great Equalizer
Ever wondered why income inequality seems to be growing everywhere you look? Warren Buffett, one of the world's richest men, admits "there's been class warfare going on for the last 20 years, and my class has won." This stark assessment comes from Walter Scheidel's groundbreaking work "The Great Leveler," which has become required reading for economists and policymakers grappling with our era's widening wealth gap. The book has garnered praise from Nobel laureate Angus Deaton and influenced discussions at Davos and beyond. Its central thesis is both simple and disturbing: throughout human history, only violent catastrophes have effectively reduced economic inequality on a significant scale.
第 2 章
The Four Horsemen of Leveling
For thousands of years, civilization has consistently produced and reinforced economic inequality. Across diverse societies and development levels, from ancient Rome to medieval Europe to modern nations, periods of stability have invariably widened the gap between rich and poor. Scheidel identifies four types of violent ruptures-what he calls the "Four Horsemen of Leveling"-that have consistently compressed wealth and income disparities: mass mobilization warfare, transformative revolution, state failure, and lethal pandemics. Each of these forces operates through distinct mechanisms but shares the common thread of massive societal disruption.
Mass mobilization warfare, particularly the two World Wars, triggered "Great Compressions" through multiple channels. Physical destruction of capital assets, from factories to financial holdings, erased accumulated wealth. Governments imposed unprecedented progressive taxation, with top marginal rates reaching 94% in Britain and the US during WWII. The wars necessitated extensive economic planning and labor mobilization, strengthening workers' bargaining power. In countries like Japan and Germany, post-war reconstruction under foreign occupation included deliberate policies to break up concentrated wealth.
Revolutionary violence, especially communist revolutions in Russia, China, and Eastern Europe, achieved dramatic leveling through systematic expropriation and redistribution. The Bolshevik Revolution eliminated Russia's aristocracy and merchant class, while Mao's revolution collectivized land and eliminated private enterprise. These transformative events not only redistributed existing wealth but fundamentally restructured economic systems to prevent future accumulation of private fortunes.
State collapse, whether through invasion, civil war, or institutional failure, eliminated elite advantages and protective mechanisms. The fall of the Western Roman Empire destroyed complex economic networks that had sustained inequality. Similar effects occurred with the collapse of the Tang Dynasty in China and various Middle Eastern empires. Major pandemics, from the Black Death to the 1918 influenza, made labor scarce relative to capital, raising wages and reducing rents. The Black Death killed about one-third of Europe's population, leading to a century of higher wages and reduced land rents.
What's striking is that no peaceful mechanisms have achieved comparable leveling effects. Land reform programs, even ambitious ones like those in South Korea and Taiwan, produced modest results compared to violent redistribution. Economic crises, including the Great Depression, caused temporary disruptions but not lasting compression. Democracy, education expansion, and economic development have all failed to significantly compress inequality without violent shocks. As these historical levelers have receded-wars ended, revolutions faded, states stabilized, and pandemics controlled-inequality has predictably resurged. Modern societies face the challenge of finding new ways to address inequality without the catastrophic human costs that characterized historical leveling events.
第 3 章
The Origins of Inequality
Our journey into inequality begins with our evolutionary past. While our closest primate relatives-gorillas, chimpanzees, and bonobos-live in deeply hierarchical societies, humans evolved toward greater equality. This shift began around 2 million years ago through several mechanisms: cooperative breeding, coalition-building among lower-status males, and crucially, the development of projectile weapons that privileged skill over brute strength. The ability to kill from a distance meant that even the physically strongest members of a group could be held in check by coalitions of skilled hunters, fundamentally altering social dynamics.
Modern hunter-gatherer groups like the Hadza of Tanzania demonstrate this egalitarian equilibrium through sophisticated social mechanisms. They maintain equality through sharing norms, tolerated scrounging, minimal private possessions, and sanctions against self-aggrandizement. When hunters return with game, strict protocols govern meat distribution, ensuring no individual accumulates too much influence. The !Kung of the Kalahari similarly practice "insulting the meat," where successful hunters are mocked to prevent arrogance. This "moral economy" prevents surplus accumulation, though some prehistoric exceptions exist, like the lavish Sungir burials from 30,000 years ago where three individuals received extraordinary grave goods, including thousands of ivory beads and elaborate weapons.
The foundations of inequality were established through agriculture, property rights, and early state formation. Archaeological evidence shows inequality's gradual development in early agricultural societies, marked by innovations like grain storage, land ownership, and inheritance systems. By 6000-4000 BCE, all elements of structural inequality were firmly established: defensive structures, public buildings, hereditary rank, and craft exchange networks. The Bulgarian Varna cemetery (5th millennium BCE) exemplifies extreme inequality, with one burial containing 990 gold objects while most graves held few or none. Similar patterns emerged independently in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus Valley, where temple complexes and palaces became physical manifestations of social stratification.
Over time, egalitarian land systems gave way to inequality as capital-holders acquired land and political leaders imposed tributary structures. The development of irrigation systems in river valleys created opportunities for elites to control water access and labor. Imperial conquest dramatically intensified inequality by enabling more aggressive predation and wealth accumulation across vast territories. The Roman Empire's latifundia system and Han Dynasty's state monopolies exemplify how political power translated into economic dominance. Material inequality also manifested physically-Egyptian pharaohs and Mycenaean elites were noticeably taller than commoners due to better nutrition, while elites maintained harems and produced numerous offspring, creating lasting genetic legacies. Archaeological evidence from skeletal remains shows marked differences in height, nutrition, and disease patterns between elite and common burials across ancient civilizations.
第 4 章
Empires of Inequality
Large agrarian empires proved particularly effective at generating extreme inequality. The Han and Roman empires, each containing roughly a quarter of the world's population at their height, illustrate how political power intertwined with economic activity to determine material inequality. These empires developed sophisticated systems of taxation, land ownership, and social hierarchies that concentrated wealth among a small elite.
In China, each new dynasty-Sui, Tang, Song, Ming-began with land redistributions that temporarily reduced inequality, but inevitably gave way to renewed concentration of wealth and power. Under the Tang, aristocratic families maintained power for centuries before their eventual downfall, controlling vast estates and monopolizing key government positions. These families often intermarried to preserve their wealth and influence, creating powerful networks that dominated both commerce and politics. The Song dynasty saw rulers creating large estates through gifts, while attempts to provide farmers with affordable loans faltered. Local magistrates, themselves often from wealthy backgrounds, frequently undermined reform efforts by manipulating land registers and tax records to benefit their class.
The Roman Empire's inequality dynamics extended beyond the imperial center to local communities, creating a complex web of economic disparities. Provincial governors extracted vast wealth illicitly-one entered Syria as a pauper and left rich after just two years, demonstrating the scale of corruption possible within the imperial system. Under Nero, six men allegedly owned "half" of Africa province before their properties were seized, highlighting the extreme concentration of land ownership. Archaeological evidence from Pompeii reveals this stratification clearly-about 100-150 elite families (the top 1-2%) occupied grand mansions created by absorbing smaller dwellings. These mansions featured elaborate frescos, private baths, and extensive servant quarters, while the majority lived in modest apartments above shops or in cramped insulae.
The empire's overall inequality was severe and systematically maintained. With 70 million people generating GDP equivalent to 50 million tons of wheat, the top 1.5% of households captured between one-sixth and one-third of total output. This concentration was reinforced through legal structures, inheritance practices, and political appointments. The empire-wide income Gini coefficient was in the low 0.4s-approaching the maximum feasible inequality given the economic development level. This inequality was sustained through various mechanisms, including differential tax burdens, restricted access to political offices, and control over vital trade routes. Urban centers particularly displayed this wealth disparity, with public buildings and elite residences consuming vast resources while most citizens lived in basic conditions.
The persistence of inequality in both empires was reinforced by social structures that limited mobility between classes. Education, military service, and commercial success occasionally allowed individuals to rise socially, but systematic barriers prevented widespread economic advancement for the majority of the population.
第 5 章
The Long Arc of Inequality
Looking at long-term inequality trends, Europe provides the richest evidence for tracking material disparities over millennia. The introduction of farming from 7000 BCE onward initiated a gradual increase in inequality, though with significant short-term variations. The first major inequality peak occurred during the mature Roman Empire (first few centuries CE), with Greece having experienced an earlier peak during the Mycenaean period (13th century BCE) before state collapse reduced disparities.
After Rome's fall in the fifth century CE, Europe experienced a severe compression of income and wealth inequality, most dramatically in post-Roman Britain. This leveling resulted from state failure, further reinforced by the bubonic plague pandemic of the sixth to eighth centuries that raised labor values relative to land.
After the plague abated in the late fifteenth century, European population recovered alongside unprecedented economic development and inequality. The rise of fiscal-military states, overseas colonial empires, and global trade networks transformed tributary states into commercial powers. European wealth inequality followed consistent patterns: large cities showed extreme concentration (Ginis of 0.75-0.89) compared to rural areas (0.5-0.65).
The onset of modern economic growth brought mixed inequality trends across nations. In Britain, wealth concentration intensified steadily from 1700 until 1910s (top 1% share rising from 39% to 69%). France saw steady increases in wealth concentration, while Prussia experienced rising income inequality until 1906 followed by slight moderation. America underwent nearly 250 years of rising inequality (briefly interrupted by the Revolutionary War), with the income Gini reaching 0.51 by 1860.
This trajectory of ever-increasing inequality was dramatically interrupted on June 28, 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, triggering a cascade of events that would transform global inequality patterns.
第 6 章
The Great Compression
World War II and the broader "thirty years war" from 1914-1945 produced a dramatic deconcentration of income and wealth across the developed world. This "Great Compression" followed strikingly similar patterns in multiple countries, with inequality plummeting during the war years and remaining low thereafter.
Japan exemplifies the dramatic leveling effect of total war on inequality. In just seven years (1938-1945), the income share of Japan's top 1% plummeted from 19.9% to 6.4%, with the richest 0.1% experiencing an even more severe collapse from 9.2% to 1.9%. The destruction of elite wealth was even more extreme-the real value of the largest 1% of estates fell by 90% between 1936-1945 and by almost 97% between 1936-1949.
This leveling wasn't the result of progressive reforms but rather the direct consequence of Japan's imperial ambitions and subsequent defeat in World War II. The war effort required extraordinary mobilization, with the military expanding twentyfold from 250,000 to over 5 million troops. This massive mobilization, combined with devastating American bombing campaigns that killed nearly 700,000 civilians, followed by occupation and institutional reforms, completely transformed Japan's economic structure.
Similar patterns emerged across Europe. The Netherlands saw war profits temporarily boost top incomes early in WWI before steep declines continued through the 1920-23 depression. Finland's top 1% income share dropped by half between 1938-1947. Denmark and Norway experienced substantial compression of both income and wealth under German occupation.
Countries that fought in the world wars followed a common pattern of inequality reduction: capital losses through destruction, expropriation, or inflation; declining returns to capital due to tax policies and various controls; and postwar commitment to progressive taxation. Mass mobilization for violence was the engine driving this transnational transformation of wealth distribution.
第 7 章
Revolutionary Violence as a Leveling Force
Revolutionary violence emerges as a powerful force for leveling inequality when it mobilizes resources with sufficient intensity. Unlike most civil wars that exacerbate disparities, communist revolutions in the twentieth century produced dramatic wealth deconcentration through comprehensive restructuring of society.
The Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 unleashed unprecedented economic leveling in Russia. The day after seizing power, Lenin's government passed the "Land Decree" abolishing private property rights without compensation. Banks were nationalized, factories placed under worker control, and private accounts confiscated. The landowning class (500,000 people) and upper bourgeoisie (125,000) were economically destroyed-many killed or forced to emigrate.
"War communism" (1918-1921) intensified leveling through coercion-banning private manufacturing, prohibiting trade, and seizing peasant food surpluses. Stalin's brutal collectivization campaign (1928-1937) renewed violent leveling. Kulaks (better-off peasants) were executed, imprisoned or deported. By 1937, 93% of agriculture was collectivized, though half the livestock and one-seventh of capital stock was destroyed.
China under Mao repeated the Soviet pattern of violent leveling on an even larger scale. After 1945, the party embraced open class struggle. Initial targets were Japanese collaborators, followed by a general anti-landlord campaign in 1946. By October 1947, the "Outline Land Law" abolished all landownership of "landlords" and voided rural debt, mandating equal land division.
Between 500,000 and one million people were killed or driven to suicide during land reform. By 1951, over 10 million landlords had been expropriated and 40% of land redistributed. The resulting equality was striking-in some villages, "middling peasants" constituted 90% of the population and owned 90.8% of the land.
第 8 章
State Collapse and Inequality
State failure and systems collapse have been powerful levelers throughout history. While state failure involves the loss of basic governance functions like security and revenue collection, systems collapse represents a more comprehensive unraveling of social complexity across multiple domains. Both processes disproportionately harm elites who have far more to lose than commoners.
The Tang dynasty's collapse exemplifies how state disintegration destroys elite wealth. After its establishment in 618 CE, the Tang initially implemented land allocation programs to equalize resources, but these gradually gave way to concentrated wealth among a small aristocracy. When rebellion struck in 881 CE, rebel leader Huang Chao's forces specifically targeted the aristocracy, massacring officials and looting their wealth. By the late tenth century, the Tang aristocracy had virtually disappeared from historical records, replaced by entirely new families when the Song dynasty emerged.
The western Roman Empire's collapse offers another compelling case of leveling through state failure. By the early fifth century CE, enormous wealth had concentrated among a tiny ruling class with transregional holdings "scattered across almost the whole Roman world." As imperial control crumbled between the 430s and 470s CE, with Germanic kings taking over territories, the extensive networks of estates owned by Rome-based elites collapsed.
The eastern Mediterranean's powerful interconnected state system collapsed with stunning rapidity after 1200 BCE. Cities across Greece, Anatolia, Syria, and Palestine were destroyed or abandoned. The Hittite empire fell, Ugarit was wiped out, and Greek palaces were systematically destroyed. After waves of destruction around 1200 BCE and again near 1100 BCE, these societies devolved into small villages. Writing disappeared, international trade collapsed, and housing became basic one-room dwellings.
第 9 章
Plague and Economic Leveling
The fourth horseman of leveling is epidemic disease, which differs from the other three in that it involves other species rather than human-on-human violence. In premodern agrarian societies, plagues reduced inequality by altering the land-to-labor ratio, decreasing land values while raising labor values. This made landowners less rich and workers better off, compressing both income and wealth disparities.
The Black Death struck Europe when it was already caught in a Malthusian trap. After three centuries of population growth and expansion, the late thirteenth century saw declining productivity, rising food prices, and falling real incomes as demand outstripped supply. Climate change further deteriorated conditions, causing catastrophic famines in the early fourteenth century.
The plague's massive population reduction dramatically altered economic fundamentals. With infrastructure intact but fewer people, per capita output and incomes rose. Land became abundant relative to labor, causing land rents and interest rates to fall while wages increased. Long-term data series show real wages for both skilled and unskilled workers roughly doubled between the pre-plague period and the mid-fifteenth century across European and Levantine cities.
The plague's impact on inequality followed a clear economic logic. With land and food prices falling while labor costs rose, wealth and income disparities naturally diminished. Evidence of this leveling appears in changing consumption patterns-demand for wheat declined while consumption of formerly elite foodstuffs like meat, cheese, and beer increased among workers.
The nobility faced crisis as agricultural revenues fell and labor costs rose. Landlords had to hire more wage laborers at higher rates, while remaining tenants negotiated longer contracts and lower rents. English rentiers saw land incomes drop 20-30 percent in the first half of the fifteenth century alone. The plague decimated noble families-three-quarters disappeared within two generations.
第 10 章
The Search for Peaceful Alternatives
After extensively examining potential peaceful mechanisms for reducing inequality-including land reform, debt relief, economic crises, democracy, and economic growth-none demonstrate reliable or consistent equalizing effects across different societies and time periods. Land reform, often celebrated as a peaceful solution, has historically depended on violence or its credible threat to achieve meaningful results. The most successful cases occurred under the shadow of potential revolution. In Latin America, fear of communist revolution following Castro's 1959 Cuban Revolution drove significant reforms, with the US-backed "Alliance for Peace" promoting redistribution programs across multiple countries. Similar patterns emerged in Taiwan and South Korea, where land reforms were implemented under American pressure to prevent communist insurgencies.
Economic contractions and financial crises, contrary to popular belief, rarely reduce inequality without accompanying social upheaval or violence. A comprehensive study analyzing 72 banking crises between 1911-2010 revealed that inequality actually increased in more cases than it decreased, challenging the notion that economic downturns naturally level wealth disparities. The Great Depression stands as the notable exception, particularly in America where the wealth share of the top 1% declined from 51.4% to 47% between 1928-1932. However, this reduction occurred alongside significant social unrest and radical political movements that pressured institutional changes.
Democratization's relationship with inequality has proven surprisingly weak and inconsistent across different contexts. The most extensive study to date, analyzing 538 observations across 184 countries over multiple decades, found no statistically significant effect of democracy on income inequality. This finding persists despite clear evidence that democracies typically increase tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and expand social programs. Even mature democracies show widely varying levels of inequality, suggesting that political democracy alone cannot guarantee economic equality.
The relationship between economic development and inequality is equally complex and often misunderstood. Simon Kuznets' influential hypothesis proposed that as economies transition from agrarian to industrial societies, inequality initially rises before eventually declining, creating an inverted U-curve. Despite its theoretical appeal and widespread acceptance, empirical evidence largely fails to support the Kuznets curve across different countries and time periods. Cross-country data showing an inverted U-curve primarily reflects specific regional patterns, particularly in Latin America and southern Africa, rather than a universal development trajectory. Recent evidence from developing economies suggests that inequality can follow multiple paths during economic growth, depending on institutional structures and policy choices.
Modern examples further complicate these relationships. China's rapid economic growth has been accompanied by rising inequality, while some Latin American countries achieved modest inequality reductions through targeted social programs, though these gains often proved fragile. The mixed results from various peaceful approaches suggest that sustainable reductions in inequality typically require a combination of multiple factors, including institutional reform, political will, and social pressure.
第 11 章
Inequality Redux and Future Prospects
The generation that experienced the Great Compression is fading away-95% of American World War II veterans have passed, and with them, the era of massive inequality reduction that began in 1914. For approximately a generation, income disparities have been growing across all developed countries with reliable data. In a sample of twenty-six nations, top income shares grew by half between 1980 and 2010, while market income inequality rose by 6.5 Gini points.
Current debates about rising inequality center on one fundamental question: the relative importance of market forces versus institutions and power relations. Education returns have become a significant factor-between 1981 and 2005, the earnings gap between high school and college graduates in the U.S. doubled from 48% to 97%. Technological change and globalization have created polarization between low-paid manual jobs and high-paid abstract occupations.
Looking ahead, Europe's seemingly moderate inequality masks a fundamental vulnerability-its relatively equitable distribution of disposable incomes depends entirely on massive redistribution. This European model faces two existential demographic challenges: population aging and unprecedented immigration. By 2050, foreign-origin populations will reach 25-33% in many Western European countries, concentrated among working-age groups and children.
For the foreseeable future, the four traditional levelers are gone and unlikely to return. Mass mobilization warfare has run its course, with military technology now favoring quality over quantity. Transformative revolution has gone even further out of fashion than mass warfare. State failure and systems collapse on the scale discussed earlier have become extremely rare, confined mostly to parts of Africa and the Middle East. Even severe epidemics would likely have different effects than historical pandemics due to modern medical intervention.
This casts serious doubt on the feasibility of future leveling. Across recorded history, periodic compressions of inequality through violent disruptions have invariably dwarfed any instances of equalization by peaceful means. As Scheidel concludes, history offers a sobering lesson: be careful what you wish for. The forces that leveled inequality in the past came at an enormous human cost-one that few would willingly pay again.
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