第 4 章
America's Promise: "You Will Not Be Forgotten"
Forty-one hours after the earthquake, President Barack Obama delivered a pivotal address from the White House diplomatic reception room, surrounded by his national security team including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates. "I've directed my administration to launch a swift, coordinated, and aggressive effort to save lives and support the recovery in Haiti," he declared. With an initial commitment of $100 million - later expanded to over $3.5 billion in total aid - he solemnly promised the Haitian people: "You will not be forsaken; you will not be forgotten. In this, your hour of greatest need, America stands with you."
The U.S. military's Operation Unified Response emerged as one of the largest humanitarian missions in modern military history, lasting approximately six months. The operation involved over 22,000 military personnel, 33 ships, and more than 300 aircraft. They distributed staggering quantities of aid: 2.6 million water bottles, 4.9 million meals, and 17 million pounds of bulk food, reaching approximately 3 million people. Infrastructure support included providing plastic tarps to 1.1 million people for temporary shelter, clearing 80 city blocks of dangerous rubble, conducting structural assessments of 40,000 buildings, digging critical flood-prevention trenches in nine major camps, and treating nearly 10,000 patients in field hospitals and the USNS Comfort hospital ship.
Military commanders measured success primarily through maintaining civil order - no major riots occurred during their deployment. However, many soldiers, particularly those trained for combat rather than humanitarian assistance, questioned their role and effectiveness. Some noted the disconnect between their military training and the complex humanitarian challenges they faced, including coordinating with hundreds of NGOs and navigating local political dynamics.
The transition from immediate disaster relief to long-term recovery and reconstruction proved exceptionally challenging. While emergency food distributions continued well beyond the initial crisis period, medical operations shifted from treating earthquake-related trauma to addressing chronic health issues and routine medical care. A particularly troubling gap emerged in the treatment of thousands of amputees and severe injury survivors, who received little to no follow-up care as aid groups and military units withdrew without establishing sustainable local medical infrastructure.
The camp situation grew increasingly complex and problematic. Settlement camps multiplied from 107 in January to over 1,500 by July, housing more than 1.5 million people. This explosive growth was partly due to unintended consequences of aid distribution - many Haitians moved to camps to access services, even if their homes were intact, creating new humanitarian challenges and complicating recovery efforts.
Land ownership emerged as perhaps the most significant barrier to reconstruction. The earthquake destroyed the Haitian government's antiquated land registry system - 2,500 bound, decaying, mostly handwritten logs organized chronologically rather than geographically. With less than 5% of the country's land properly documented before the disaster, the land registration agency faced near-impossible challenges in determining property rights, rubble clearance responsibilities, and rebuilding permissions. This paralyzed many reconstruction efforts and left thousands in legal limbo.
In the absence of effective official governance, camps developed their own informal power structures. NGOs' well-intentioned calls for "community participation" inadvertently legitimized self-appointed "camp committees," often dominated by young men who exercised considerable control over aid distribution and camp life, sometimes through intimidation. The top-down approach to aid distribution created stark disparities - wealthy areas like Petionville received disproportionate attention and resources, while poorer regions like Carrefour were largely overlooked, highlighting the failure to meaningfully consult with and involve local communities in recovery planning.
第 5 章
The Broken Aid Machine
Foreign aid rarely went directly to Haiti's government, instead flowing to domestic NGOs and contractors. A growing contingent of academics and disillusioned aid workers argued this approach weakened fragile states, as local officials appeared miserly beside foreigners distributing resources while foreign firms poached talented nationals. By 2005, over 100 countries including the US had signed an aid-reform declaration in Paris pledging to work through "country systems and procedures." Yet in 2009, only 1.7% of US foreign assistance flowed as direct budget support.
After the earthquake, little of the $1.1 billion in US emergency assistance reached Haiti directly-half went to US government agencies and the rest to UN agencies, contractors, and NGOs. As reconstruction planning began, the Haitian government estimated needing $11.5 billion over the next decade, including $350 million in direct budget support. A major donors' conference titled "Towards a New Future for Haiti" was scheduled for March 31, 2010, at UN headquarters in New York.
The UN's cluster system continued despite internal criticism. In a leaked letter, UN humanitarian chief John Holmes blasted the system's "lack of capacity" and failure to develop coherent response plans. Few Haitians could participate in the English-language meetings except rare individuals like Leslie Voltaire, a Cornell-educated architect and presidential advisor. "There were too many meetings for the small quantity of Haitian technicians," Voltaire explained, noting that constant meetings and diplomatic visits prevented officials from doing actual work.
At the donors' conference, representatives from 150 countries gathered at UN headquarters in New York for Haiti's reconstruction. The delegates responded to a fifty-five-page "Action Plan" ostensibly created by the Haitian government but with significant foreign influence. Hillary Clinton delivered a stern speech offering two possible futures for Haiti-either "an engine for progress" or a path of regional and global consequences-while pledging $1.15 billion for reconstruction.
Corruption fears shadowed the donors' conference, with concerns about Haiti's government potentially misusing funds. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index frequently cited Haiti as highly corrupt, though researchers noted this measured perception rather than actual corruption. A 2009 Harvard study found countries with Protestant traditions, high economic production, and British legal origins tended to receive better ratings regardless of actual experience.
The donors ultimately created compromise funding mechanisms, including a World Bank-managed fund and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission-a board with eleven Haitians and twelve international representatives, co-chaired by Prime Minister Bellerive and Bill Clinton.
第 6 章
The Governor: Bill Clinton's Haiti
Bill Clinton brought remarkable attention to detail to his Haiti work, demonstrated during a hospital visit where he thoroughly analyzed a motorcycle accident victim's wound and treatment needs. He identified both immediate solutions (securing antibiotic ointment) and systemic problems (the hospital's unreliable medicine supply). This exemplified Clinton's approach: identifying human-scale problems he could solve by connecting donors with specific needs.
His relentless optimism about Haiti's potential initially confused journalists accustomed to negative narratives, but eventually became a refreshing perspective. Clinton emphasized investment opportunities rather than just aid needs, making some wonder if he might be Haiti's long-awaited savior.
Haitians had mixed reactions to Clinton's involvement. His initial 2009 visit drew cheering crowds, many being Aristide supporters who hoped Clinton might facilitate their leader's return from exile. However, enthusiasm waned as promised donor funds failed to materialize and conditions remained unchanged. Many Haitians were unclear about Clinton's role as UN Special Envoy, questioning how it fit with existing leadership structures. A wry joke spread that Clinton was establishing a new colonial regime, with the Haitian press dubbing him "Le Gouverneur" (The Governor).
Clinton's development vision for Haiti was based on Paul Collier's nineteen-page report "Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security." Collier, an Oxford economist who had never visited Haiti before writing the report after just five days in the country, emphasized job creation as the path to security and growth. The report's centerpiece was expanding Haiti's garment industry, leveraging the country's poverty and "unregulated labor market" to compete with China through low wages.
The garment industry strategy hinged on Haiti's inclusion in the HOPE II trade agreement, allowing duty-free export of Haitian-assembled clothing to the U.S. market. While the industry could scale quickly with minimal training requirements, critics noted its fundamental flaw: factories could easily relocate wherever wages were cheaper, leaving workers with few transferable skills or sustainable livelihoods.
The clash over Haiti's economic future erupted in a battle over minimum wage. In 2009, Haitian lawmaker Steven Benoit introduced legislation to raise the daily minimum from $1.79 to $5. Despite overwhelming parliamentary support, President Preval unexpectedly tabled the bill, triggering protests that filled Port-au-Prince streets. Under pressure from both protesters and the U.S. ambassador, Preval ultimately bypassed constitutional procedure by rewriting the bill himself. His compromise raised most workers' wages to $5 but limited garment workers to $3 daily, with full increases postponed for three years.
第 7 章
The Deadly Gift: Cholera's Arrival
Forty-one-year-old Rosemond Lorime from the small village of Meille in Haiti's central plateau experienced an intense stomach pain while traveling. After his father fell ill with similar symptoms, Rosemond's entire family became sick with severe diarrhea and vomiting. Despite efforts to get medical help, Rosemond died shortly after reaching the hospital in Mirebalais on October 17, 2010.
As news broke of a mysterious outbreak in Saint-Marc with symptoms of vomiting, fever, and severe diarrhea, health experts who had previously dismissed post-earthquake epidemic fears grew concerned. By the weekend's end, about two hundred people had died, and tests confirmed cholera had reached Haiti.
The timing raised questions-why would cholera appear nine months after the earthquake and in the countryside rather than the capital? Research shows disease outbreaks rarely follow natural disasters, and when they do, they're typically diseases already present in the region. Most significantly, cholera hadn't been documented in Haiti for at least a century, with the CDC having stated it was "extremely unlikely to occur" in the Caribbean.
As the epidemic spread, rumors circulated that UN soldiers had emptied latrines into water sources or dumped mysterious substances into the Artibonite River. These rumors reflected long-standing tensions between Haitians and MINUSTAH peacekeepers, whose presence many locals resented as an insult to their sovereignty.
Following these rumors to a UN Nepalese battalion base near Mirebalais, we discovered broken pipes leaking black sewage toward the river. Local resident Jean-Paul Chery showed us open pits where SANCO, the UN's waste contractor, dumped excrement from the base. The waste sometimes overflowed into the river that millions downstream depended on. The timing was suspicious-the unit had rotated in shortly before the epidemic began, and the soldiers had been in Nepal during a cholera outbreak there.
The epidemic spread rapidly through a population with no immunity to the bacteria. Within hours of infection, victims could be bedridden, and within days, dead. Bodies were being piled into mass graves for the second time that year. NGOs established treatment centers, but many Haitians distrusted them, believing foreigners had brought the disease.
After my story broke, the UN stonewalled further inquiries. When pressed about testing, UN spokesman Pugliese admitted the Nepalese soldiers had never been tested for cholera, contradicting earlier claims. The UN's own medical manual didn't even list cholera as a condition precluding service. Meanwhile, officials insisted investigating the outbreak's origin wasn't "important" or a "priority"-despite this being standard epidemiological practice during disease outbreaks.
By early November, cholera reached Port-au-Prince, with the first case confirmed on November 8. The death toll passed four hundred. While many feared the camps would be hardest hit, the NGOs' post-earthquake water provisions actually made them safer than the untouched slums. In Cite Soleil, Doctors Without Borders struggled to accommodate the flood of patients.
第 8 章
Politics Amid Ruins: Haiti's Contentious Election
Haiti's presidential election approached amid stalled reconstruction and a cholera epidemic. President Rene Preval was attempting a rare feat-becoming only the second Haitian leader to complete two full terms and peacefully transfer power. Of Haiti's 49 previous heads of state, 22 were overthrown, two assassinated, one executed, and one committed suicide.
With nineteen candidates on the ballot, Preval's Unity Party and its candidate Jude Celestin remained frontrunners by default, plastering posters across the country and campaigning on stability. Among the challengers was Michel "Sweet Micky" Martelly, who leveraged his fame as a musician to connect with voters disillusioned with politicians. At his massive rally in Croix-des-Bouquets, Martelly energized thousands with his charismatic performance, positioning himself as the candidate of change against Preval's promise of stability.
One week before the November 2010 election, a clean vote seemed impossible. Earthquake damage to the Electoral Council headquarters caused logistical problems nationwide, while thousands of dead remained on voter rolls. Political factions clashed violently, with each campaign reporting assassination attempts and blaming rivals. Despite these issues, international organizations insisted on keeping the November 28 election date, with the EU warning that delays would "jeopardize political stability."
When foreign diplomats spoke of democracy in Haiti, they often meant elections rather than true democratic governance. As anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot observed, observers wrongly reduced Haiti's problems to procedures for accessing political power, assuming free elections would automatically lead to democracy. Instead, Haiti's weak institutions and extreme inequality produced what scholar Robert Fatton called "predatory democracy," where the privileged exploited electoral processes.
Election Sunday descended into chaos. Polls opened late, voter registration problems prevented participation at sites like Camp Corail, and ballot boxes were vandalized in Port-au-Prince. By noon, candidates began gathering at the Karibe Hotel to denounce widespread fraud. In a stunning development, twelve candidates including frontrunners Martelly and Manigat jointly called for the election's annulment. The announcement sparked immediate protests, with thousands pouring into streets chanting "Arrest Preval!"
As the December 7 deadline approached, dread fell over Port-au-Prince. The results were announced at Le Villate social club amid an eerily empty city. Mirlande Manigat received 31.37% of votes, Jude Celestin 22.48%, and Michel Martelly 21.84%-putting Celestin in the runoff and eliminating Martelly by less than 1%. Only 20% of Haiti's population had managed to vote. The announcement immediately triggered protests.
第 9 章
The Unfinished Recovery
One year after the earthquake, Haiti remained in limbo. The political crisis showed no signs of abating as President Preval fumed over the OAS recommendation to drop his chosen successor Celestin from the presidential race in favor of Michel Martelly. On January 16, 2011, shocking news rocked Haiti: Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier was ending twenty-five years of exile to return to Port-au-Prince. The former dictator who had ruled Haiti for fifteen bloody years arrived to a mixed reception-cheers from some, horror from others who remembered the torture and killings during his regime.
The electoral crisis intensified when the Provisional Electoral Council officially rejected the OAS report. The U.S. applied extraordinary pressure, with UN Ambassador Susan Rice demanding implementation of the OAS recommendation and linking billions in promised aid to "a credible process." The State Department revoked U.S. visas of a dozen officials tied to Preval's Unity Party. Finally, Hillary Clinton herself arrived in Port-au-Prince to break the deadlock, meeting with candidates and delivering an ultimatum to Preval: implement the OAS report as is.
The runoff campaign saw Martelly's popularity surge. His crude persona resonated with a traumatized population seeking entertainment rather than political debate. With only one-fifth of the electorate voting, Martelly won decisively with 67.5% of votes. On May 15, during a power outage, he accepted the presidential sash and declared in English: "This is a new Haiti! A new Haiti open for business, now!"
Three years after the earthquake, cholera continues plaguing Haiti, with mounting evidence that UN peacekeepers introduced it. Martelly's presidency has brought political change marked by propaganda, personality politics, and continued tension with parliament. While camps are being cleared from visible areas, most Haitians still live in unsafe buildings. The recovery commission's mandate ended with many projects unfunded, while luxury hotels for foreigners represent the most significant new construction.
The United States remains dominant in Haiti's reconstruction, focusing on the Caracol Industrial Park with its South Korean anchor tenant Sae-A Trading Co. While the project may provide 20,000 jobs and encourage decentralization away from Port-au-Prince, critics note that factory owners pay no taxes to Haiti and can remove all profits from the country. The $5-a-day minimum wage is considered a barrier to the factories' success, and Sae-A's troubled history in Guatemala raises concerns about labor conditions.
When friends ask about disaster relief, the best advice is to give wisely to organizations with local experience and connections, preferably to NGOs from affected countries themselves. But the real work must happen between emergencies-building local institutions that can operate independently and addressing the poverty that makes disasters deadlier. Consumer choices in wealthy nations also impact conditions in places like Haiti, where the garment industry depends on low wages.
Haiti's story offers crucial lessons about disaster response worldwide. We must challenge misconceptions: people rarely riot after disasters; poorly planned interventions can cause harm; and your $20 donation likely didn't reach actual survivors. As Western countries reconsider foreign aid approaches, Haiti's earthquake became a test case for whether building local institutions might better prepare countries for future crises-a test that, thus far, we seem to be failing.
