What is *You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!* about?

*You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!* explores nine cognitive biases that distort strategic decision-making in business, offering 40 actionable methods to combat them. Drawing on behavioral economics and psychology, Olivier Sibony emphasizes designing organizational processes—not just individual awareness—to reduce errors. The book blends case studies, research, and practical frameworks like "decision hygiene" to help leaders improve choices.

Who should read *You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!*?

Executives, managers, and decision-makers in business will benefit most, along with anyone interested in behavioral science. It’s ideal for leaders seeking systemic solutions to biases in teams or organizations. Sibony’s clear, research-backed approach also appeals to fans of Daniel Kahneman’s *Thinking, Fast and Slow*.

Is *You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!* worth reading?

Yes—it’s praised for translating complex behavioral science into practical organizational strategies. Reviewers highlight its actionable advice on mitigating biases through structured processes rather than individual willpower. The book’s blend of academic rigor and real-world examples makes it a standout in decision-making literature.

What are the key decision-making traps identified in the book?

Sibony outlines nine traps, including confirmation bias, overconfidence, and groupthink. He illustrates how these errors manifest in business contexts, such as mergers or investments, and provides tools like "pre-mortem analysis" to anticipate failures before decisions are finalized.

How does *You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!* differ from other behavioral economics books?

Unlike books focused on individual biases (e.g., *Thinking, Fast and Slow*), Sibony emphasizes institutional "decision hygiene"—systemic processes to reduce errors. He shifts the lens from personal improvement to organizational redesign, offering concrete methods for teams to leverage collective intelligence.

What is "decision hygiene" in the book?

Decision hygiene refers to structured processes that minimize bias, such as devil’s advocacy, diverse input channels, and scenario planning. Sibony argues these systems are more reliable than training individuals to spot their own cognitive errors.

What real-world case studies does the book include?

Examples span industries: failed mergers due to overoptimism, flawed investment decisions from anchoring bias, and product launches derailed by groupthink. These cases demonstrate how biases operate in high-stakes business environments and how to counteract them.

How does Olivier Sibony’s background influence the book?

A former McKinsey strategist and HEC Paris professor, Sibony combines 25+ years of consulting experience with academic research. His expertise in behavioral strategy and collaboration with Daniel Kahneman (*Noise*) informs the book’s rigor and practicality.

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約

バイアスがいかに意思決定を歪めるか、そしてそれに対抗するために何ができるか

オリヴィエ・シボニー

4.06(684 Reviews)

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の概要

なぜ重要な局面で脳があなたを裏切るのか、その理由を解き明かしましょう。ダニエル・カーネマンも推奨する、評価4.7を誇るこのガイドでは、認知バイアスを克服するための40の手法を紹介しています。「ビジネスにおける認知バイアスに関する、最高かつ最も面白いガイド」— サフィ・バーコール。ウォーレン・バフェットの意思決定の秘訣も収録されています。

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第1章

The Blind Spots That Lead to Terrible Decisions

Have you ever watched a brilliant leader make an astonishingly bad decision and wondered how it happened? In Olivier Sibony's "You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake," we discover that even the smartest executives consistently fall into predictable decision traps. This isn't just another business book-it's a mind-altering journey through the hidden biases that sabotage our judgment. Since its 2020 publication, it has become required reading in MBA programs worldwide and earned praise from Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, who called it "essential reading for anyone who makes strategic decisions." What makes this work particularly valuable is that Sibony isn't just a theorist-he spent 25 years as a McKinsey senior partner witnessing firsthand how cognitive biases derail even the most sophisticated corporate strategies. The book offers something rare: practical techniques to overcome these biases that have been implemented by companies like Amazon, Google, and Netflix to maintain their competitive edge.

第2章

When Smart People Make Dumb Decisions

Why do competent, experienced executives make terrible strategic decisions? Consider the CEO who dismissed McKinsey's analysis showing an acquisition made no financial sense, instead betting on currency fluctuations against basic financial principles. Surprisingly, this gamble succeeded, and he became one of his country's most respected business leaders. But such success stories are rare exceptions. In a survey of 2,000 executives, only 28% believed their companies generally made good strategic decisions. Despite warnings from consultants, executives repeatedly make identical mistakes-overpaying for acquisitions, creating wildly optimistic budgets, ignoring disruption signals, and doubling down on failing ventures. The standard explanation blames incompetent leaders with character flaws-essentially the "Bad Man Theory of Failure." But this explanation fails on three counts: it circularly defines good decisions by their outcomes; it illogically blames different decision-makers for identical mistakes; and most importantly, it ignores that CEOs of large corporations have demonstrated exceptional skills throughout their careers. The real puzzle is that bad decisions come from extremely successful, carefully selected individuals with good advice, ample information, and proper incentives. These aren't bad leaders-they're good, even great leaders making predictable bad decisions. Behavioral science offers the solution. Humans make systematic, predictable mistakes called cognitive biases. This explains why even successful CEOs repeat the same errors others made before them. While behavioral science has become popular through unconscious-bias training and consumer "nudging," neither addresses leaders' own strategic decision-making biases. This gap is what behavioral strategy aims to fill-helping executives recognize how their own biases produce strategic errors. The approach to overcoming decision biases rests on three fundamental ideas: First, our biases create predictable patterns of strategic error-nine specific decision traps. Second, individuals cannot overcome their own biases, but organizations can compensate through collaboration and process. Third, organizations don't naturally overcome biases-in fact, they often amplify them. Leaders must become "decision architects" who deliberately design decision processes to counteract these predictable errors.

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『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の一語一語が音声に合わせてリアルタイムでハイライトされ、自然に読み進められます。

第3章

When Stories Trump Facts: The Storytelling Trap

The Storytelling Trap ensnares even sophisticated decision-makers when compelling narratives override critical thinking. When presented with isolated facts, we instinctively construct coherent stories rather than considering that they might mean nothing at all. Take a sales executive who hears one rep's story about aggressive competitor pricing. You gather confirming evidence-two salespeople left for a competitor, some clients mention competitive pricing-but your interpretation is shaped by the initial narrative. Instead of truly checking the story by asking broader questions about market share trends or comparable pricing, you're already contemplating price cuts based on minimal evidence. This same trap caught sophisticated investors like Goldman Sachs with Terralliance and Elf Aquitaine with the "oil-sniffing airplane" technology. Intelligence offers little protection against confirmation bias-studies show even highly intelligent people fall prey to "myside bias" when interpreting identical facts. Forensic scientists examining fingerprints can be influenced by contextual information, sometimes contradicting their own previous conclusions when given biasing information like "the suspect confessed." For confirmation bias to activate, we need a plausible hypothesis from a credible source. When we trust the messenger more than we scrutinize the message-the "champion bias"-we're especially vulnerable. J.C. Penney's board fell victim to this when hiring Ron Johnson, the executive credited with Apple Stores' success. His reputation as a retail revolutionary overshadowed critical evaluation of his strategy. Johnson then succumbed to "experience bias," applying Apple's playbook to J.C. Penney without testing. He dismissed skepticism, saying "negativity takes the oxygen out of innovation." The results were catastrophic: sales plummeted 25%, losses approached $1 billion, and Johnson was fired after just 17 months. Many executives believe they're immune to storytelling traps by relying solely on "facts and figures." Yet even when we think we're making data-driven decisions, we're unconsciously constructing narratives to make sense of information. Even scientists face a "replication crisis" where published findings can't be reproduced because researchers make countless small decisions during studies that unconsciously bias results toward desired outcomes.

第4章

The Dangerous Allure of Business Genius

Our admiration of business leaders like Steve Jobs leads to flawed decision-making through three key mistakes: attributing a company's entire success to one individual, viewing all aspects of that person's behavior as reasons for their success, and hastily imitating their methods without proper context. We instinctively create heroic narratives that attribute Apple's enormous success solely to Steve Jobs, ignoring the contributions of thousands of employees and other factors. Even Apple's continued success after Jobs's death confirms this oversimplification. Similarly, Ron Johnson was credited as the genius behind Apple Stores' success, with industry experts claiming "anything Ron Johnson touches just turns to gold." Yet this attribution ignores crucial context: the stores' growth coincided perfectly with three revolutionary product launches (iPod, iPhone, iPad). Customers lined up not for the stores' innovative design but for products they couldn't find elsewhere. This attribution error-our tendency to credit individuals rather than circumstances-is so natural we barely notice it. The halo effect, identified by psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike in 1920, occurs when our positive impression of someone colors our judgment of all their other characteristics. We judge tall men as better leaders and politicians partly on appearance. Phil Rosenzweig showed this effect applies to companies too, with brand familiarity and financial performance creating halos. When we try to imitate business geniuses like Steve Jobs, we're making a logical fallacy-assuming we're geniuses too. Just as we wouldn't try to drive like a Formula One champion, we shouldn't expect to replicate exceptional business performance. Warren Buffett illustrates this perfectly-despite thousands of investors studying his methods, he himself advises average investors to buy index funds instead of trying to beat the market. Our eagerness to emulate geniuses stems from overestimating our abilities. The fundamental error is survivorship bias-we study only those who succeeded while ignoring the countless others who took similar risks and failed. This creates a distorted view of what leads to success.

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

毎日の新しい気づきを10万件以上のレッスンから
言葉をハイライトして音声と同期
ライブラリを保存して、どの端末からでも利用

第5章

When Gut Feelings Lead You Astray

In this chapter on the intuition trap, we examine how executives often rely on gut feelings for strategic decisions. The 1994 Quaker Oats acquisition of Snapple for $1.7 billion illustrates this danger-CEO William Smithburg trusted his intuition based on his previous success with Gatorade, but the deal became a notorious disaster, costing him his job and leading to Quaker's eventual acquisition by PepsiCo. Two competing research traditions offer different views on intuition. Gary Klein's "naturalistic decision-making" studies professionals making real-time decisions, while Kahneman and Tversky's "heuristics and biases" tradition reaches opposite conclusions through laboratory experiments. Despite these seemingly contradictory viewpoints, Klein and Kahneman eventually collaborated and agreed intuition can be trusted when two conditions are met: we must be in a "high-validity" environment where causes produce consistent effects, and we must have had "adequate opportunities for learning" through prolonged practice with rapid, unequivocal feedback. Intuition is reliable only in environments providing valid cues about situations-like firefighting or emergency nursing where feedback is quick and unambiguous. In contrast, psychiatrists, judges, and investors work in unpredictable environments with ambiguous, delayed feedback, making true expertise impossible. The most extreme example is political and economic forecasting, where expert predictions perform worse than random guesses. Strategic decisions are precisely the wrong environment for intuitive expertise. They're rare, so executives rarely have extensive experience with similar situations. Their effects are difficult to isolate from other factors like economic cycles or competitive moves, making feedback ambiguous and delayed. Despite being the textbook example of conditions where expert intuition cannot develop, most executives still trust their "gut feeling" on strategic decisions. William Smithburg's Snapple acquisition illustrates this danger-his intuition was based on a single experience with Gatorade, causing him to see superficial similarities while ignoring crucial differences in market share, distribution models, and brand positioning that outside observers readily identified.

第6章

The Confidence Paradox: How Overconfidence Leads to Failure

In the early 2000s, Blockbuster dominated the video rental market with 9,100 stores generating $3 billion in revenue. Meanwhile, Netflix, founded in 1997, was disrupting the industry with a subscription-based DVD-by-mail service. When Netflix CEO Reed Hastings offered to sell 49% of his company to Blockbuster for $50 million, Blockbuster's leadership "laughed them out of their office." They failed to see Netflix as a threat, believing they could easily replicate the subscription model if needed. By 2020, Netflix had 167 million subscribers and a $150 billion market cap, while Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy in 2010. This reflects our tendency to overestimate ourselves relative to others-88% of Americans believe they drive more safely than 50% of drivers, and 95% of MBA students think they're in the top half of their class. We're consistently overconfident about future outcomes. Economic forecasts typically skew too optimistic, especially for medium-term projections. The "planning fallacy" leads us to underestimate time and budget requirements for projects-from kitchen renovations to massive infrastructure. The Sydney Opera House, initially budgeted at 7 million Australian dollars, ultimately cost 102 million and took sixteen years. Beyond optimism lies "overprecision"-expressing predictions with excessive certainty. When asked to provide ranges with 90% confidence intervals, most people create ranges that are far too narrow. In business settings, executives face pressure to appear confident by making specific predictions, even when acknowledging uncertainty would be more accurate. Most business plans predict gains without considering competitors' reactions. We treat competition as a static "landscape" rather than active opponents who will defend their territory. This happens because plans primarily aim to secure internal resources, competitor analysis introduces unwelcome uncertainty, and realistic competitor assessment might reveal fatal flaws in the plan. Despite its dangers, optimism drives action while excessive realism can cause "paralysis by analysis." Organizations intentionally foster optimism, creating a useful tension between ambition and realism, goals and predictions. Evolution likely selected for optimistic biases as survival advantages, and organizational meritocracy similarly favors risk-takers who occasionally get spectacular results. The key distinction for productive optimism versus dangerous overconfidence lies in separating what we can control from what we cannot. Optimism is essential for aspects we can influence-like production costs or pricing strategy-as it defines ambitions and motivates teams. However, being optimistic about uncontrollable factors-market size, competitor reactions, exchange rates-is mere self-deception.

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『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の一語一語が音声に合わせてリアルタイムでハイライトされ、自然に読み進められます。

第7章

When Organizations Resist Necessary Change

This chapter examines how organizations resist change even when leaders recognize the need for it, illustrated by Polaroid's bankruptcy despite its awareness of digital disruption. Unlike companies that fail to see change coming, Polaroid's leadership understood the digital threat but couldn't overcome organizational inertia. Despite elaborate strategic planning and budgeting processes, companies rarely allocate resources differently from year to year. A McKinsey study of 1,600 American corporations found a 92% correlation between a business unit's capital allocation one year and the next, with some companies showing a staggering 99% correlation. This reveals a profound disconnect between stated strategic priorities and actual resource allocation. The paradox of resource allocation is that the same corporations that emphasize agility and adaptability maintain nearly identical resource allocations year after year. "High reallocators" outperformed "low reallocators" by 30% in total shareholder returns over fifteen years and were less likely to go bankrupt or be acquired. Resource allocation inertia stems primarily from anchoring bias-our tendency to use available figures as reference points and insufficiently adjust from them. Experiments show anchors influence us even when they're clearly irrelevant or absurd. With budgets containing numbers we previously approved, the power of anchoring makes corporate inertia in resource allocation almost inevitable. The effects of anchoring are amplified by organizational dynamics in budget negotiations. Previous allocations serve as starting points that implicitly establish negotiating boundaries. Executives' personal credibility depends on defending their resources, as peers and subordinates treat last year's budget as the reference point. Sometimes organizations do worse than maintain inertia-they increase resources committed to failing courses of action. This "escalation of commitment" is exemplified by America's involvement in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, where leaders justified continued investment by claiming past sacrifices "must not be in vain." In business, GM's Saturn division consumed over $15 billion across twenty years without profit, yet management recommitted another $3 billion before finally shutting it down in 2010. When facing technological disruption, incumbents typically fail to reallocate resources quickly enough. Companies like Polaroid face a dilemma: embrace new technology that competes with their profitable core business, or risk obsolescence. Though the long-term outcome seems obvious in hindsight, leaders hesitate with reasonable questions about timing and profitability. Another factor driving corporate inertia is status quo bias-our tendency to avoid making decisions. In a seminal experiment, people who inherited pre-allocated investment portfolios typically kept them as-is rather than reallocating according to their own preferences. This bias appears whenever there's a "default choice," from car colors to retirement plans.

第8章

The Paradox of Corporate Risk-Taking

Risk aversion in corporate decision-making creates a paradox: companies want innovation but reject risky projects. When offered an investment requiring $100 million with potential $400 million profits, executives demand over 80% chance of success-far more cautious than rational analysis would suggest. This extreme risk aversion persists even with smaller amounts, contradicting executives' own belief that their companies should take more risks. A profound contradiction exists between corporations' theoretical appetite for risk and their managers' extreme risk aversion. This explains why American companies hoard $1.7 trillion in cash rather than investing in innovation-with Apple alone sitting on $245 billion while buying back its own stock. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs without such resources create transformative businesses that established companies later acquire. Loss aversion-our tendency to feel losses more intensely than equivalent gains-fundamentally drives corporate risk aversion. Most people need the prospect of winning $200 to accept risking $100 on a coin flip, reflecting a "loss aversion coefficient" of 2. This coefficient increases with larger stakes, explaining why sales techniques focus on avoiding losses rather than gaining benefits. Unlike our simplified investment scenario, real business decisions involve unquantifiable uncertainty rather than known probabilities. We never precisely know a project's chances of success, potential returns, or even how long it will take to determine outcomes. This uncertainty-risks we cannot quantify-triggers what economists call "uncertainty aversion" or "ambiguity aversion." We'll pay premiums to avoid the unknown, preferring quantified risks to ambiguous ones. Our tendency to see events as predictable after they occur-hindsight bias-further discourages risk-taking. When risky investments fail, nobody remembers that taking the risk made sense initially-instead, failure seems inevitable in retrospect. Managers know their initiatives will be judged with hindsight, making them reluctant to champion risky projects despite their potential value. The paradox of corporate risk-taking is easily resolved: even risk-averse managers make risky decisions when they don't realize they're risky. Companies rarely consciously bet on high-risk projects; instead, they proceed with 100% confidence in exaggeratedly optimistic outlooks. This explains how corporations can be both overconfident and risk-averse-what Kahneman and Lovallo called "timid choices and bold forecasts." Ironically, the boldest, riskiest projects are often the largest ones championed by senior executives facing minimal scrutiny, while smaller entrepreneurial initiatives get killed by multiple layers of review.

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

毎日の新しい気づきを10万件以上のレッスンから
言葉をハイライトして音声と同期
ライブラリを保存して、どの端末からでも利用

第9章

The Dangerous Allure of Short-Term Thinking

The Time Horizon Trap explores how companies sacrifice long-term value for short-term gains. Even Larry Fink, CEO of investment giant BlackRock, has criticized companies for boosting dividends and share buybacks at the expense of investing in future growth. Short-termism encompasses two distinct critiques. The first argues for moving beyond shareholder primacy to consider customers, employees, suppliers and communities. The second is more surprising: even when maximizing shareholder value is the goal, companies make serious errors prioritizing immediate gains over future profits. Studies show 80% of managers would sacrifice long-term value to meet short-term targets, and public companies invest only half as much as comparable private companies, demonstrating how market pressures constrain investment. It's tempting to blame short-termism entirely on fickle financial markets and greedy executives with stock-based compensation. But this explanation overlooks a fundamental truth: the stock market actually isn't short-term focused. Seventy to 80 percent of most companies' market value reflects expected cash flows more than five years in the future. What appears as short-termism is actually market volatility-the continuous adjustment of long-term forecasts based on new information. When stocks drop after disappointing quarterly results, it's because investors are revising their long-term outlook, not simply punishing short-term performance. Amazon's years of unprofitability while growing and the existence of unprofitable "unicorns" at IPO prove investors can understand and support long-term strategies. Many companies are reconsidering practices like earnings guidance to avoid excessive short-term focus. Companies like Coca-Cola, Google, and Unilever have abandoned quarterly guidance or reporting without negative consequences. As Unilever CEO Paul Polman noted, their share price initially dropped 8% but recovered as long-term performance became evident. Our inconsistent time preferences reveal our inherent short-term bias. Given a choice between $100 today or $102 tomorrow, most people take the immediate reward. Yet when offered $100 in a year versus $102 in a year and a day, most choose the larger delayed amount. This paradox demonstrates present bias-we're less patient when immediate gratification is possible. When present bias combines with loss aversion, short-termism becomes nearly irresistible. Accepting a loss today for a gain tomorrow feels unbearable, making it difficult to miss short-term goals even for long-term benefit. Short-termism isn't just corporate evil or CEO moral failing-it's fundamental to human nature.

第10章

When Groups Make Bad Decisions Together

The Bay of Pigs fiasco under President Kennedy demonstrates how even brilliant teams can make disastrous decisions when groupthink takes hold. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Kennedy's special assistant, later admitted that despite recognizing the plan's flaws, he raised only "timid questions" because the "circumstances of the discussion" prevented him from speaking up forcefully. Groupthink affects even the most independent minds. Warren Buffett's experience on Coca-Cola's board demonstrates this perfectly-despite publicly criticizing the proposed equity compensation plan and owning 9% of the company, he merely abstained rather than voting against it, explaining that opposing such plans is "a little bit like belching at the dinner table." Even the Oracle of Omaha feared social ostracism. Groupthink operates through two intertwined mechanisms. First is social pressure-the fear of retaliation or ostracism that keeps people silent. But there's also rational adjustment-the logical assumption that when many colleagues share a view, they likely have good reasons. What makes groupthink so powerful is how these mechanisms blend. Few consciously silence themselves out of cowardice. Most genuinely change their minds, becoming convinced by the majority view. Information cascades occur when people speak sequentially, each adjusting their position based on what they've heard. This gives early speakers disproportionate influence and can lead groups to make errors individuals would have avoided. As each person suppresses their private doubts to align with the emerging consensus, critical information is lost. Even worse, groups often reach more extreme conclusions than individual members initially would have, while simultaneously becoming more confident in these positions-a phenomenon called group polarization. Research on corporate compensation committees demonstrates this: when board members with histories of paying CEOs above market rates deliberate together, they end up setting even higher compensation than their individual histories would predict. Cultural homogeneity intensifies groupthink by strengthening both identification with peers and social pressure to conform. When group members share a strong organizational identity, they're more likely to suppress doubts, adopt extreme positions, and persist with failing strategies. The Wells Fargo scandal exemplifies how toxic culture emerges: employees opened 3.5 million fraudulent accounts, resulting in thousands of terminations and billions in fines. Beyond perverse incentives, the problem was normalization of deviance-when respected colleagues and supervisors engage in or tolerate misconduct, the abnormal becomes normal.

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『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の一語一語が音声に合わせてリアルタイムでハイライトされ、自然に読み進められます。

第11章

Designing Better Decision Processes

Is a good decision maker simply one who makes good decisions? During the 2010 World Cup, Paul the Psychic Octopus correctly predicted eight match outcomes in a row-a statistically improbable (0.4%) feat. Similarly, fund manager Bill Miller was celebrated for beating the S&P 500 for fifteen consecutive years, but this too was largely chance. As Miller himself admitted, "Maybe 95 percent luck." When evaluating decisions, we wrongly focus on outcomes, forgetting the roles of chance, risk levels, and implementation quality. As Jacob Bernoulli noted in 1681: "One must not decide about the value of human actions from their outcomes." Yet the managerial axiom persists: "It's the results that count!" To determine whether "collaboration plus process" truly improves decisions, we need statistical analysis rather than isolated examples. A 2010 study of 1,048 investment decisions examined both analytical factors (financial models, sensitivity analyses) and process factors (team composition, discussion of uncertainties). The stunning conclusion: "How" factors-collaboration and process quality-explained 53% of variance in investment returns, while "what" factors-analytical quality-explained only 8%. The remaining 39% came from uncontrollable sector or company variables. In controllable factors, the decision-making process is six times more important than analysis! Most organizations invest heavily in analytical work-sales forecasts, cost projections, ROI calculations-with teams of professionals applying standardized methods. Yet they spend comparatively little time discussing these analyses or designing the decision-making process itself. Questions about meeting structure, participants, and timing are rarely addressed systematically. We focus intensely on the "what" (content) while neglecting the "how" (process), despite evidence showing the latter is far more decisive. Four specific practices make the biggest difference: explicitly discussing risks and uncertainties, airing viewpoints that contradict senior leaders, deliberately seeking contradictory information, and using predefined approval criteria. The key takeaway: if you have an hour to spare before making a big decision, don't spend it on more analysis-invest it in quality discussion. Many leaders resist the term "process," associating it with bureaucracy and red tape. But the collaboration advocated here isn't about seeking consensus-it's about ensuring diverse, conflicting viewpoints are expressed and heard, while maintaining clear leadership. The term "decision architecture" better captures this approach-like physical architecture, it's an art form reserved for important structures, designed before construction begins. Good decision architecture rests on three pillars: dialogue (authentic exchange of viewpoints), divergence (bringing original content to discussions), and dynamics (organizational conditions that promote rather than suppress the first two elements). The practical techniques that follow aren't exhaustive but meant to inspire your own decision architecture.

★★★★★

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約を最後まで読み終えました

“23日間、毎日使い続けています。今では日課の一部です。”

jayallen

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の主要テーマ

cognitive bias mitigation
strategic decision architecture
behavioral strategy
corporate storytelling traps
organizational process design

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の名言集

Individuals cannot overcome their own biases, but organizations can.
We trust the messenger more than we scrutinize the message.
Negativity takes the oxygen out of innovation.
Anything Ron Johnson touches just turns to gold.
Organizations don't naturally overcome biases-in fact, they often amplify them.

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の登場人物

Olivier SibonyAuthor and former McKinsey senior partner
Ron JohnsonFormer J.C. Penney CEO and case study subject

著者について

『You’re About to Make a Terrible Mistake!（邦題：勘違いの論理）』のベストセラー著者であるオリビエ・シボニーは、著名な行動戦略の専門家であり、HECパリ（パリ高等商業学校）の教授です。彼は意思決定の心理学を専門とし、ビジネス戦略と認知科学の橋渡しをしています。彼の研究は、重大な選択におけるバイアスや組織内の「ノイズ」を軽減することに焦点を当てています。

マッキンゼー・アンド・カンパニーの元シニア・パートナーであるシボニーは、25年にわたるグローバルな企業戦略の経験を自身の活動に活かしています。ノーベル賞受賞者のダニエル・カーネマン、およびキャス・R・サンスティーンとの共著である『ニューヨーク・タイムズ』ベストセラー『Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment（邦題：NOISE 上・下）』により、行動経済学における第一人者としての地位を確固たるものにしました。

シボニーの知見は、パリ・ドーフィン大学で取得した博士号による学術的な厳密さと、様々な業界における取締役会のアドバイザリー業務という実務経験の両方によって形成されています。彼のフレームワークはオックスフォード大学サイード・ビジネス・スクールで教えられているほか、『ハーバード・ビジネス・レビュー』にも掲載されています。また、ベルニメン賞を受賞した彼の講義は、実社会への応用を重視しています。

2019年のマンパワー財団大賞を受賞した『You’re About to Make a Terrible Mistake!』は21言語に翻訳されており、経営幹部や政策立案者の間で世界的な共呼を呼んでいます。

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This plan is essential for athletes who struggle with performance anxiety or the tendency to dwell on errors. It provides the mental tools needed to transition from self-doubt to instinctive, high-stakes execution.

1 h 30 m•3 セクション

学習プラン

The Management Shadow: Taleb/Kahneman/Greene

In an era of radical uncertainty, traditional management frameworks often fail because they ignore human irrationality and the impact of rare events. This plan is designed for leaders and strategists who want to master the hidden psychological and systemic forces that govern success and power.

4 h 43 m•4 セクション

学習プラン

The Architecture of Human Irrationality

This learning plan is essential for professionals and decision-makers who want to understand the hidden psychological forces that drive human behavior. By decoding the mechanics of cognitive bias and adaptive logic, it offers a competitive edge to anyone working in fields like economics, leadership, or behavioral science.

2 h•4 セクション

学習プラン

Master self-deception

In a world full of cognitive shortcuts, understanding how we lie to ourselves is the ultimate competitive advantage. This plan is essential for leaders, decision-makers, and individuals seeking personal growth who want to strip away mental illusions and see reality clearly.

5 h 24 m•4 セクション

学習プラン

The Science of High-Stakes Decisions

In high-pressure environments, biological stress responses often override rational thought, leading to costly errors. This course is essential for leaders and professionals who need to maintain peak performance and logical consistency when the stakes are highest.

1 h 30 m•3 セクション

コロンビア大学卒業生が開発 | サンフランシスコ発

BeFreedは好奇心旺盛な仲間が集うグローバルコミュニティ

4.7

平均評価

7,840件以上のアプリ評価

BeFreedコミュニティ

正直、まだアプリを使いこなせていませんが、この数日使っただけで本当に感動しました… BeFreed は、今まで使ったどの学習アプリともレベルが違います。夢中になれるうえに集中力も実際に上がるので、スマホをだらだら見てしまう人にぴったりです！

@ladyInfinity

ちょうど 23 日前に BeFreed を購入して、それから毎日欠かさず使っています。仕事の流れと学習習慣に完全に溶け込みました。

@jayallen

正直なところ、このアプリは期待をすべて超えてきました。どんなテーマでも音声を生成してもらえて、その結果には驚かされます。私の専門は心理療法で、多分野にまたがる領域ですが、それでも回答はとても正確です。

@Raguipa

何よりありがたいのは、スマホをだらだら見る時間が減ったことです。探す時間が減って、吸収する時間が増えました。オーディオブック、ポッドキャスト、学習プランの組み合わせが素晴らしいです。

@colonyofcreatorsNGO

私は 24 年間、PhotoReading 加速学習のインストラクターをしています… 本と読書と学びが私の専門ですが、BeFreed は情報を消化しやすい形で届ける革新的なアプローチを見事に実現しています。

@BeFreed user

ただの本の要約アプリではありません。「ファン」スタイルを使ってみたら、従来のやり方よりずっと良い要約で、アイデアもつかみやすいです。これだけでも十分元が取れます。

@austinakon

このアプリが大好きです。数日使っただけで、聞くのが止まらなくなりました。始め方として最高です。

@jcrules328

本当に気に入っています。約 1 か月試していますが、まさに掘り出し物だと感じます。BeFreed で自分だけのテーマを作れるのが便利で、声も素晴らしく、ナレーションの選択肢は無限です。

@DanielCZ

正直、まだアプリを使いこなせていませんが、この数日使っただけで本当に感動しました… BeFreed は、今まで使ったどの学習アプリともレベルが違います。夢中になれるうえに集中力も実際に上がるので、スマホをだらだら見てしまう人にぴったりです！

@ladyInfinity

ちょうど 23 日前に BeFreed を購入して、それから毎日欠かさず使っています。仕事の流れと学習習慣に完全に溶け込みました。

@jayallen

正直なところ、このアプリは期待をすべて超えてきました。どんなテーマでも音声を生成してもらえて、その結果には驚かされます。私の専門は心理療法で、多分野にまたがる領域ですが、それでも回答はとても正確です。

@Raguipa

何よりありがたいのは、スマホをだらだら見る時間が減ったことです。探す時間が減って、吸収する時間が増えました。オーディオブック、ポッドキャスト、学習プランの組み合わせが素晴らしいです。

@colonyofcreatorsNGO

私は 24 年間、PhotoReading 加速学習のインストラクターをしています… 本と読書と学びが私の専門ですが、BeFreed は情報を消化しやすい形で届ける革新的なアプローチを見事に実現しています。

@BeFreed user

ただの本の要約アプリではありません。「ファン」スタイルを使ってみたら、従来のやり方よりずっと良い要約で、アイデアもつかみやすいです。これだけでも十分元が取れます。

@austinakon

このアプリが大好きです。数日使っただけで、聞くのが止まらなくなりました。始め方として最高です。

@jcrules328

本当に気に入っています。約 1 か月試していますが、まさに掘り出し物だと感じます。BeFreed で自分だけのテーマを作れるのが便利で、声も素晴らしく、ナレーションの選択肢は無限です。

@DanielCZ

役立つ情報やアイデアを 8〜15 分のポッドキャスト風音声にぎゅっとまとめて聞けるのが最高です。ポッドキャストは余計な話が多くて苦手でしたが、これは無駄を全部そぎ落としてくれます。

@BeFreed user

博士課程の仕上げの段階で、なじみのない資料を大量に読む必要があります… BeFreed ならプロンプトを入力するだけで、アプリが資料を探して音声ポッドキャストを作ってくれます。BeFreed のほうが NotebookLM よりも流れがスムーズだと感じます。

@Brad

朝食を作りながら、散歩しながら、通勤しながら聞くものを YouTube でよく探していましたが、BeFreed は広告も余計な話もなしで、もっと的を絞った聞き方をさせてくれます！

@BeFreed user

このプラットフォームの一番の魅力は、その万能さです。扱えないテーマは文字どおりひとつもありません。何を投げても応えてくれます… 制限がまったくないのに約束をきちんと果たしてくれる学習ツールには、なかなか出会えません。

@jayallen

BeFreed は素晴らしいです。使いやすいデザインのおかげで、操作に迷う時間が減り、学ぶ時間が増えました。オーディオブック、ポッドキャスト、学習プランの組み合わせは天才的で、毎日の習慣がすっかり変わりました。

@BeFreed user

最初はイタリア語でポッドキャストを作る方法を理解するのに少し時間がかかりましたが、わかった瞬間、最高でした！どんなテーマでも説明してもらえて、しかもとても賢く、うまく話してくれます！

@matteo77

BeFreed は毎日使うオーディオブックアプリになりました… 一番気に入っているのは、自分のテキストを入れると、外出先でも聞ける音声にしてくれるところです。

@kotanzu1

役立つ情報やアイデアを 8〜15 分のポッドキャスト風音声にぎゅっとまとめて聞けるのが最高です。ポッドキャストは余計な話が多くて苦手でしたが、これは無駄を全部そぎ落としてくれます。

@BeFreed user

博士課程の仕上げの段階で、なじみのない資料を大量に読む必要があります… BeFreed ならプロンプトを入力するだけで、アプリが資料を探して音声ポッドキャストを作ってくれます。BeFreed のほうが NotebookLM よりも流れがスムーズだと感じます。

@Brad

朝食を作りながら、散歩しながら、通勤しながら聞くものを YouTube でよく探していましたが、BeFreed は広告も余計な話もなしで、もっと的を絞った聞き方をさせてくれます！

@BeFreed user

このプラットフォームの一番の魅力は、その万能さです。扱えないテーマは文字どおりひとつもありません。何を投げても応えてくれます… 制限がまったくないのに約束をきちんと果たしてくれる学習ツールには、なかなか出会えません。

@jayallen

BeFreed は素晴らしいです。使いやすいデザインのおかげで、操作に迷う時間が減り、学ぶ時間が増えました。オーディオブック、ポッドキャスト、学習プランの組み合わせは天才的で、毎日の習慣がすっかり変わりました。

@BeFreed user

最初はイタリア語でポッドキャストを作る方法を理解するのに少し時間がかかりましたが、わかった瞬間、最高でした！どんなテーマでも説明してもらえて、しかもとても賢く、うまく話してくれます！

@matteo77

BeFreed は毎日使うオーディオブックアプリになりました… 一番気に入っているのは、自分のテキストを入れると、外出先でも聞ける音声にしてくれるところです。

@kotanzu1

BeFreedがウェブ上でどのように話題になっているかをもっと見る

今すぐ学習の旅を始めよう

第11章

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の概要

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をさまざまな学習スタイルで探る

The Blind Spots That Lead to Terrible Decisions

When Smart People Make Dumb Decisions

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

When Stories Trump Facts: The Storytelling Trap

The Dangerous Allure of Business Genius

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

When Gut Feelings Lead You Astray

The Confidence Paradox: How Overconfidence Leads to Failure

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

When Organizations Resist Necessary Change

The Paradox of Corporate Risk-Taking

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

The Dangerous Allure of Short-Term Thinking

When Groups Make Bad Decisions Together

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

Designing Better Decision Processes

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約を最後まで読み終えました

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の主要テーマ

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の名言集

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約の登場人物

著者について

賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?の要約をダウンロード

他のユーザーのお気に入り

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約についてのよくある質問

What is You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake! about?

Who should read You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake!?

Is You're About to Make a Terrible Mistake! worth reading?

What are the key decision-making traps identified in the book?

もっと見る

BeFreedは好奇心旺盛な仲間が集うグローバルコミュニティ

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をさまざまな学習スタイルで探る

The Blind Spots That Lead to Terrible Decisions

When Smart People Make Dumb Decisions

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

When Stories Trump Facts: The Storytelling Trap

The Dangerous Allure of Business Genius

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

When Gut Feelings Lead You Astray

The Confidence Paradox: How Overconfidence Leads to Failure

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

When Organizations Resist Necessary Change

The Paradox of Corporate Risk-Taking

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約をもっと深く楽しむ

The Dangerous Allure of Short-Term Thinking

When Groups Make Bad Decisions Together

聴きながら、すべての言葉を目で追えます

Designing Better Decision Processes

『賢い人がなぜ決断を誤るのか?』の要約を最後まで読み終えました

他のユーザーのお気に入り

もっと見る