Capitolo 1
The Financial Fraud That Shook Europe's Tech Darling
When the Financial Times' Dan McCrum first began investigating Wirecard in 2014, few could have predicted the German payments processor would become Europe's greatest corporate scandal since Enron. Valued at 24 billion at its peak and a member of Germany's prestigious DAX 30 index, Wirecard represented the country's rare tech success story. Celebrities and politicians alike praised CEO Markus Braun, often compared to Steve Jobs with his signature black turtleneck. Yet beneath the sleek facade lurked a massive fraud orchestrated by executives who fabricated billions in revenue and manipulated auditors for years. "Money Men" chronicles McCrum's five-year investigation that ultimately exposed how a small pornography payment processor transformed into Germany's financial crown jewel through elaborate deception, intimidation, and criminal connections.
Capitolo 2
From Porn Payments to Financial Powerhouse
In December 2003, Denis Wagner arrived for a job interview at Wirecard's modern office building near Munich airport. Despite openly admitting he knew nothing about payment processing, Wagner was called back to meet company owner Paul Bauer-Schlichtegroll - a tanned, trendy man obsessed with money who offered Wagner a generous salary without discussing qualifications. When Wagner finally joined in January 2004, he encountered a bizarre workplace: women dressed for stage performances rather than office work, and colleagues casually discussing hardcore pornography during business calls.
Bauer's journey into online payments began serendipitously when he met a photographer for Larry Flynt on a Munich-Berlin flight in 1997. After briefly publishing a German Hustler edition, Bauer pivoted to online payments, founding Electronic Billing Systems with rudimentary software for processing adult content payments. When rival payment processor Wirecard collapsed in 2001, Bauer acquired its assets for just 500,000, shifting from chasing blue-chip clients to servicing adult websites.
Wagner considered quitting but stayed to work on Click2Pay, an online wallet product, alongside Jan Marsalek - a 24-year-old Viennese tech prodigy who managed twenty people despite claiming to have never finished high school. Marsalek impressed with his intelligence but showed signs of recklessness, like habitually riding public transit without paying. When a key London client who ran online casinos visited, Marsalek orchestrated an extravagant night of fine dining and VIP clubs, boasting about his admiration for Red Bull founder Dietrich Mateschitz, particularly how he built a billion-dollar empire on "nothing but air."
Click2Pay solved a critical problem for online gambling operators: many banks blocked transactions coded as gambling, but Click2Pay offered a workaround where gamblers transferred money to an innocent-looking e-wallet first. Wagner grew uncomfortable with the millions flowing through this system, but Marsalek dismissed his concerns. Meanwhile, Bauer executed a reverse takeover of InfoGenie, a nearly defunct but publicly listed call center operator, allowing Wirecard to go public without the scrutiny of a traditional IPO.
Another key player was Oliver Bellenhaus, Bauer's "card whisperer" - a pale, baby-faced banking technology specialist who cultivated relationships with financial institutions worldwide. Rarely seen in the office, Bellenhaus collected prepaid cards obsessively and displayed moral flexibility, enthusiastically helping onboard webcam sites. By 2005, Wagner's time at Wirecard ended after tensions with Bellenhaus boiled over, resulting in an unfair dismissal case that Wagner won.
Capitolo 3
The Gambling Workaround and Legal Troubles
By 2006, Wirecard celebrated joining the TecDAX index with CEO Markus Braun delivering a stilted speech about "going the extra mile." The company had grown significantly, with sales rising from 40 million in 2004 to 49 million in 2005. At the celebration, Braun boldly claimed Wirecard would one day join the DAX 30, prompting stifled laughter from employees who knew their company was barely recognized by the general public.
That September, the US passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, making online betting illegal. While some companies retreated, Wirecard saw opportunity. In 2007, they acquired G2Pay, a payment processor specializing in poker payments, and implemented questionable accounting practices.
When Wirecard's 2008 AGM revealed questions about Gibraltar profits and BVI operations, the share price crashed 42%. Braun blamed "short sellers" and targeted two critics: newsletter writer Tobias Bosler and SdK's deputy chairman Markus Straub. The confrontation escalated when Turkish boxers physically threatened Bosler, punching walls and warning "In Turkey, people die." Wirecard's lawyer prompted police raids on the critics, and years later, Bosler and Straub were convicted on technicalities unrelated to their Wirecard concerns - conveniently discrediting their questions about the company's accounts.
By 2009, Wirecard experienced a leadership exodus. COO Rudiger Trautmann departed after expressing concerns about signing off on financial accounts. Paul Bauer stormed out of a board meeting, rejecting Wirecard's impossible growth projections. With both men gone, Braun promoted 29-year-old Jan Marsalek to COO, despite his lack of experience and industry connections.
Desperate to replace lost business, Marsalek embraced a partnership with Jesse Willms, a 21-year-old Canadian fraudster who ran subscription scams offering "risk-free" trials of acai berry supplements that trapped consumers with hidden recurring charges. Despite warnings that the deal was suspicious, Marsalek was enamored with the jet-setting Willms and the promised 120 million monthly processing volume. When Visa began aggressively shutting down merchant accounts with high chargebacks, Marsalek tried spreading transactions across multiple IDs and creating fake transactions to mask the complaint ratio.
By December 2009, while Wirecard celebrated at its Christmas party with announcements of Marsalek's promotion and a Singapore acquisition, the company faced mounting crises. Marsalek sent Simon Smaul to Israel to investigate problems with ICC-Cal, where a temporary employee had stolen millions from Wirecard's trustee accounts. When Marsalek and CFO Burkhard Ley arrived to negotiate, they discovered ICC-Cal was losing its license to process international credit card payments due to Visa's crackdown on miscoding.
Capitolo 4
The Asian Expansion and Phantom Profits
At the turn of the decade, Wirecard focused on Asia. Martin Osterloh, a German salesman specializing in gambling, visited the company's cramped Manila office before it relocated to Singapore. Inside a chaotic building that housed multiple businesses including a live casino, about 20 locals worked elbow-to-elbow in a small room with a makeshift mezzanine.
At the Asian Internet Gaming conference, the cost-conscious Wirecard team tried sharing a single $500 admission badge among multiple staff, passing it over the fence until caught. While negotiating for more badges, they discovered a dozen people in Wirecard Asia polo shirts raiding the buffet, including a middle-aged European whose business card read "PayEasy Solutions." This German expat claimed to be partnering with Wirecard but remained vague about the details.
Back in Munich in early 2010, Osterloh noticed all his new high-risk clients were being blocked by compliance. Visa had sent investigators to examine Wirecard's processes, and staff were instructed to ensure the stock market remained unaware of Visa's blockade. In March 2010, Wirecard shares crashed when news leaked about a Secret Service investigation into Michael Schutt, who had paid out over $70 million from Wirecard Bank accounts to US gamblers.
In Dublin, G2Pay was barely surviving. Simon Smaul struggled to keep his staff paid while Wirecard demanded cost cuts. Marsalek proposed that Smaul establish an independent company to handle high-risk payments Wirecard couldn't process, sending "license fees" back to Wirecard. As Sunsont launched in July 2010, Marsalek visited monthly, obsessing over recapturing poker business from competitor Inatec. Most client introductions were dubious merchants - acai berry sellers, pyramid schemes, and questionable forex traders.
Marsalek's judgment grew increasingly erratic. After the 2011 "Black Friday" US poker industry crackdown, he suggested hiring Nelson Burtnick - a man under federal indictment. By 2012, Sunsont was struggling with Wirecard's referrals following a predictable pattern: get-rich-quick schemes generating brief processing volume before collapsing under chargebacks. When Marsalek proposed processing for Japanese websites "blind" - without knowing what they actually sold - Smaul finally drew the line.
Capitolo 5
The First Signs of Fraud
In September 2014, hedge fund manager Leo Perry handed Financial Times journalist Dan McCrum densely typed notes explaining why Wirecard's financials were too good to be true, with evidence scattered across Asia. McCrum traveled to Bahrain to investigate Ashazi Services, a company supposedly paying Wirecard 4 million annually in software license fees. After days tracking Ashazi through Manama's chaotic streets, McCrum found only empty rooms and dead ends. When he finally reached founder Nasreen Sururi, a local actress and TV presenter, she claimed to remember nothing about the multi-million euro contract with Wirecard. Her business partner Christopher Bauer similarly denied knowledge of the contract details.
After persistent requests, McCrum secured a December call with CEO Markus Braun, who launched into a fifteen-minute business-jargon monologue about Wirecard's success as "an internet company with a bank as a daughter." When pressed about suspicious Asian acquisitions, Braun became defensive, dismissing concerns as "all bullshit" and suggesting McCrum was listening to jealous competitors. He oddly mentioned they'd done "background checks" on McCrum before casually claiming Ashazi had paid its bills, despite overwhelming evidence of its phantom nature.
When McCrum summarized the hallmarks of fraud he'd observed - reverse takeover listing, long-term unchanging management, opaque origins, unusual acquisitions, accounting anomalies - Braun laughed, suggesting these were actually "success factors" showing management continuity. Their conversation ended with Braun's bizarre hope: "I would very much like to win you as a fan of Wirecard."
In July 2015, Jan Marsalek secretly flew to Chennai to meet his key business partner Henry O'Sullivan - an extravagant Englishman known for flaunting wealth in Monaco with yachts and stacks of cash. Together, they orchestrated Wirecard's largest acquisition: buying Hermes i-Tickets, a chain of "Smart Shops" that helped Indians book travel tickets. Their scheme involved O'Sullivan purchasing Hermes for 36 million through a Mauritius investment vehicle called "Emerging Markets Investment Fund 1A" with Indian frontmen, then flipping it to Wirecard at a massive markup of 326 million.
Despite planning to spend hundreds of millions, none of them had actually seen a Smart Shop until a German tourism expert insisted they check. They found simple operations - men with ancient laptops offering money transfers and bus ticket printing. Undeterred, they celebrated with vintage champagne. The deal closed on October 27th with Wirecard announcing a 340 million purchase.
Capitolo 6
The Whistleblowers and Short Sellers
In late 2015, mathematician-turned-financial analyst Matt Earl, hedge fund manager "Roddy," and former social worker Fraser Perring formed an unlikely alliance to investigate Wirecard. Their investigation became obsessive, with late-night Skype sessions and weekend brainstorming. They uncovered connections to Simon Dowson's paperwork factory in Consett, which had used the same British Virgin Island entity as corporate secretary for 738 different companies. They also developed a theory that Wirecard facilitated suspect payments for online gambling in the US.
Their 300-page dossier grew increasingly comprehensive, with Roddy insisting on detailed footnotes while removing Perring's wilder speculations. As publication approached, Perring claimed to be advising mysterious "Wise Men" investors and handling legal review through a Harvard professor.
On December 1, 2015, Bavarian police quietly raided Wirecard's Aschheim office, taking digital archives of emails from Jan Marsalek, Rudiger Trautmann, and other key employees dating back to 2007. The investigation stemmed from a criminal money laundering probe by Federal prosecutors in New York's Eastern District, who had found evidence of over 1,000 instances of "transaction laundering" - resubmitting declined gambling payments with different codes to bypass US banking restrictions. Prosecutors alleged Wirecard processed $1.5 billion in illegal transactions between 2007 and 2010.
When the Zatarra Report was published in February 2016, it accused Wirecard of money laundering and fraud, declaring their shares worthless. The market reaction was immediate - Wirecard's stock crashed, wiping over 1 billion off its value. Wirecard's lawyers threatened litigation, claiming the FT was complicit in market manipulation. Meanwhile, Wirecard COO Jan Marsalek called an FT reporter claiming Ingenico was about to acquire Wirecard at nearly double the current share price - information that would have crushed short sellers if published. When checked with Ingenico, they emphatically denied any discussions.
Capitolo 7
The Counterattack and Surveillance
Jan Marsalek's response to the Zatarra Report was multifaceted and aggressive. He established a luxurious operational base at P61, an elegant villa on Munich's grand Prinzregentenstrasse, ostensibly as European headquarters for travel business Goomo at 680,000 annual rent. This private space allowed him to blend his Wirecard responsibilities with personal ventures, including Libyan payment card and cement plant investments.
By March 8th, Marsalek had engaged Vienna security specialists who offered sophisticated surveillance options: 4G IMSI Catchers to track mobile phones, backpack hacking kits, and a "conspiratorial car" for UK operations. Simultaneously, Markus Braun hired corporate intelligence firm Kroll to investigate the FT's Dan McCrum, Zatarra, and suspected short-sellers.
The counterattack included fake emails purporting to be from remorseful Zatarra employees, merger talks with Ingenico (codenamed "Project Elysium"), attempts to recruit American short-seller Carson Block to support Wirecard, and leveraging connections with porn baron Hamid "Ray" Akhavan, who offered introductions to ex-CIA officers and Mastercard compliance officials.
By November 2016, the pressure was taking its toll on everyone involved. Dan McCrum discovered an email containing photographs of his private communications with sources - evidence someone had been hacked. The email threatened to expose his alleged "criminal dealings" with hedge funds. Meanwhile, Matt Earl was horrified when the "Zatarra RIP" email circulated through trading floors, damaging his reputation. His paranoia intensified when he spotted a black Mercedes coupe with large men watching his house.
Increasingly terrified, Earl kept a baseball bat by his bed, couldn't sleep or eat properly, and constantly felt watched. His fears were justified when two large men suddenly appeared at his door - Ben Hamilton from Kroll and an associate, delivering a threatening legal letter from Wirecard's lawyers. In subsequent weeks, Earl lost weight, avoided going out, and discovered his home alarm line had been mysteriously cut. He endured relentless online attacks - phishing attempts, fake subscriptions, and emails containing personal information about his family.
Capitolo 8
The Singapore Connection and Lavish Lifestyle
Singapore's gleaming financial district provided the perfect backdrop for Henry O'Sullivan's extravagant lifestyle. At the Marina Bay Sands' exclusive Spago restaurant, O'Sullivan hosted lavish dinners featuring black truffles, thick steaks, and premium wines like Opus One. When asked if they were celebrating something special during one particularly opulent Tuesday evening feast attended by Wolfgang Puck himself, Jan Marsalek simply laughed: "Because it's Tuesday."
O'Sullivan lived ostentatiously in Singapore with hammerhead sharks in his home aquarium, a white Rolls-Royce despite Singapore's punitive car duties, and frequent private jet travel. His office at Senjo on the fifty-sixth floor of One Raffles Place featured designer furnishings and spectacular bay views. He maintained similarly lavish offices for Goomo and Epsilon Investments, the latter controlled by the woman whose name appeared as the largest investor in the Mauritius fund 1A.
R. Shanmugaratnam ("Shan"), a trusted associate who managed official filings, was a frequent presence in O'Sullivan's business web. He incorporated companies and supplied directors for ventures serving O'Sullivan and Marsalek's interests. The bromance between Marsalek and O'Sullivan involved continuous mutual back-scratching. They both grew bushy beards, claimed stakes in Libyan cement factories, and supported each other financially - Goomo funded Marsalek's Munich villa while Marsalek arranged a 7 million credit line for O'Sullivan at Wirecard Bank.
However, trouble emerged in May 2016 when an Ernst & Young employee whistleblew to headquarters, alleging Wirecard senior management held stakes in the 1A fund - essentially profiting by selling assets to their own company. The whistleblower also claimed someone at Hermes in Chennai attempted to bribe EY to approve manipulated sales figures. This prompted EY to assign their fraud team (codenamed "Project Ring") to investigate.
Marsalek's only hope lay with Edo Kurniawan, a thirty-year-old Indonesian bookkeeper eager to please and solve problems. When EY's fraud specialists began demanding documents in early 2017, Kurniawan used his frantic travel schedule as an excuse for delays. As the audit deadline approached, Kurniawan worked around the clock, barely pausing for his son's birth. Despite his efforts, EY continued demanding documentation about suspicious transactions. Ultimately, EY accepted statements from senior executives promising payment, taking them at their word.
Capitolo 9
The Reluctant Whistleblower Emerges
Pav Gill was shaped by his mother's determination. Born to Sikh immigrants in Singapore, his mother left her alcoholic husband and raised him alone while working as a banker. She prioritized his education through Singapore's best schools and elite law college, instilling in him her hardworking spirit. Gill built a successful career as a financial services expert at prestigious law firms before being headhunted as Wirecard's first legal counsel for Asia Pacific.
Initially impressed by the company, Gill soon discovered troubling practices when a whistleblower revealed that finance head Edo Kurniawan was teaching staff how to "round trip" money to deceive regulators and cover up problems in India. With fellow lawyer Royston Ng, Gill quietly investigated and reported findings to Munich, leading to "Project Tiger" investigation. Despite damning evidence of fraud, Wirecard executives, including Jan Marsalek, protected Kurniawan. Gill was forced to resign but took copies of evidence as insurance.
Unemployed and suspecting he was being followed, Gill's mother eventually contacted journalists to expose Wirecard's corruption. The Furama City Centre hotel in Singapore's Chinatown was where Gill first met with FT journalist Dan McCrum. Nervous but determined, Gill spent ten hours detailing Wirecard's inner workings, drawing org charts and transaction diagrams. Eventually, Gill handed over a massive data dump - Edo Kurniawan's entire email archive from 2014-2018, revealing contracts without customers and forged invoices.
McCrum spent six weeks analyzing the documents, printing evidence on a secure printer while tracking Jan Marsalek's shadowy involvement. With time running short due to Gill's mother's illness, McCrum sent document packets to regulators and business partners worldwide, but faced a setback when the FT's legal team blocked publication due to injunction risks, frustrating both Gill and his ailing mother.
Capitolo 10
The Beginning of the End
By January 2019, McCrum had spent two months working in isolation within a secure area of the Financial Times newsroom, using an air-gapped computer and locking materials in a safe each night. When the FT finally published their investigation, Wirecard's stock immediately dropped by a quarter, wiping 5 billion off its market capitalization.
Wirecard responded aggressively, calling the article "false, inaccurate, misleading and defamatory." Twitter bots attacked McCrum personally. Commerzbank analyst Heike Pauls released research calling the story "fake news" and suggesting McCrum was a "serial offender" participating in market manipulation. Even BaFin, the German regulator, announced it was investigating whether the share price crash involved market manipulation - targeting the journalists rather than Wirecard.
The FT published more details about the law firm's investigation into Edo Kurniawan, sending Wirecard's stock below 100 and wiping 8 billion off its market value. Braun and new CFO von Knoop held a damage control conference call, claiming only 13 million of "problematic contracts" and "perfect compliance." Singapore authorities raided Wirecard's offices, carting away evidence including Kurniawan's locked desk drawers. Despite Wirecard's attempts to frame this as a "prearranged chat," their share price crashed to 86.
German media seemed content to portray this as merely a fight between Wirecard and the FT rather than investigating the substance of the reporting. German prosecutors saw "insufficient evidence" while BaFin ultimately protected Wirecard with a two-month ban on short selling, citing the company's "importance for the economy." McCrum found himself under criminal investigation for market manipulation based on a "specific criminal complaint from an investor."
Capitolo 11
The Final Collapse
Ernst & Young demanded proof that Wirecard could access its supposed 1.9 billion by requesting four transfers totaling 440 million from the Philippine accounts to Germany. While Marsalek calmly assured everyone the money was coming, EY executives contacted the Philippine banks directly. BPI responded that the documents were "spurious," followed by BDO confirming the accounts weren't real and signatures were forged.
As panic spread through Wirecard headquarters, Braun maintained it was "a big misunderstanding," even as the company missed its results announcement deadline. James Freis, who had just been hired as compliance officer, was suddenly called in during the crisis and quickly determined the money had never existed. The supervisory board finally suspended Marsalek, who strolled around whistling before leaving, claiming he would go to Manila to "kick ass" and find the money.
Braun recorded a video claiming Wirecard was the "aggrieved party in a case of fraud," but was forced to resign the next day. By Monday, June 22, Wirecard admitted the 1.9 billion didn't exist, Marsalek disappeared, and Braun was arrested on suspicion of false accounting and market manipulation. Three days later, Wirecard filed for insolvency.
When Wirecard finally collapsed, McCrum celebrated like he'd "scored the winning goal in an FA Cup Final," telling his confused children "the bad guys are going to jail." Jan Marsalek fled to Belarus on a private jet arranged by a far-right politician, leaving behind his girlfriend and significant assets. Thousands of Wirecard employees lost their jobs, shocked to learn the core business was real but unprofitable.
The financial damage was enormous - Wirecard failed with 3.5 billion in debt, with Commerzbank alone writing off 175 million. BaFin's leadership resigned amid scandal, and EY faced massive litigation over its failed audits. After testifying to the German parliamentary inquiry, McCrum advocated for whistleblower protection and corporate transparency. Meanwhile, key Wirecard figures faced various fates: Christopher Bauer reportedly died suddenly in Manila; Markus Braun was arrested but maintained his innocence; Oliver Bellenhaus surrendered and cooperated with prosecutors; and Martin Weiss was arrested in Austria for allegedly helping Marsalek flee.
"Money Men" stands as a testament to the power of investigative journalism and the courage of whistleblowers who risk everything to expose corruption. It reveals how a company built on deception managed to fool regulators, investors, and auditors for years, and how a determined journalist withstood intimidation, surveillance, and legal threats to ultimately bring down one of Europe's most celebrated corporate frauds.
