第 1 章
The Dark Diplomat: Unmasking Power's Brutal Pragmatist
Henry Kissinger remains one of the most polarizing figures in American political history. While regularly appearing on television as an elder statesman dispensing wisdom about global affairs, he simultaneously lives in perpetual anxiety about revelations from declassified documents, news from Indonesia, or arrests of former dictators. The contradiction is striking - the pudgy man in black tie at elite Manhattan gatherings is the same figure who orchestrated bombing campaigns that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. This paradox reflects America's complicated relationship with power and accountability. Kissinger's memoir sales have topped $5 million, and celebrities from Princess Diana to Barbara Walters have sought his company. Yet behind the celebrity facade lies a man whose actions, according to multiple legal experts, constitute prosecutable war crimes. As the world increasingly embraces international justice, Kissinger's immunity erodes - explaining why, despite his prestigious appointments and lucrative consulting business, he remains perpetually vigilant about which countries he can safely visit.
第 2 章
The Secret Sabotage of Peace
In fall 1968, as Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon battled for the presidency, peace negotiations in Paris offered hope for ending the Vietnam War. What few Americans knew then - but what historians now confirm - was that Nixon's campaign actively sabotaged these negotiations through secret back-channel communications with South Vietnam's government. The Nixon team promised South Vietnamese leaders a better deal under Republican leadership, encouraging them to withdraw from peace talks just days before the election. This deliberate undermining of peace negotiations destroyed Humphrey's "peace plank" and likely cost him the extremely close election.
The FBI had documented this scheme perfectly. On November 2, 1968, Nixon's emissary Anna Chennault contacted Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem with a message to "hold on, we are gonna win" and "he understands all of it." This message came from New Mexico, where Nixon's running mate Spiro Agnew was campaigning. The sabotage worked - South Vietnam withdrew from negotiations, Nixon narrowly won the election, and the war continued for four more years before ending on essentially the same terms available in 1968. During those intervening years, approximately 20,000 more Americans and countless Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians died.
The chief beneficiary of this scheme was Henry Kissinger, who played both sides masterfully. While offering Nelson Rockefeller's research files on Nixon to Humphrey's campaign, he simultaneously leaked critical intelligence about Johnson's peace initiatives to Nixon. When Nixon won, his very first appointment was Kissinger as National Security Advisor - despite having met him only once briefly. Nixon later wrote revealingly, "One factor that had most convinced me of Kissinger's credibility was the length to which he went to protect his secrecy."
This foundation of Kissinger's rise to power - duplicity, power worship, and complete absence of scruple - would define his entire career in government. As chairman of the secretive 40 Committee, which supervised all U.S. covert operations abroad, Kissinger maintained ultimate responsibility for every major covert action between 1969-1976. His later denials of knowledge about specific operations effectively claim he wasn't performing the job he tenaciously held.
第 3 章
Indochina: Expanding a War While Negotiating Peace
Upon joining Nixon's administration, Kissinger embraced a dual strategy: publicly pursuing peace negotiations while privately expanding the war into neighboring countries. This "two-track" approach - promiscuous violence abroad and flagrant illegality at home - defined his position from the start. Having helped prolong the war through the 1968 election sabotage, Kissinger now needed to manufacture justifications for continuing it.
The human cost was staggering. Between Nixon's inauguration and the eventual 1973 Paris Peace Accords (which accepted terms available in 1968), 20,492 American servicemembers died. The civilian death toll in Indochina reached into the millions. Pentagon figures show that between March 1968-1972, while 31,205 Americans and 86,101 South Vietnamese regulars died, an astonishing 475,609 "enemy" were killed, alongside an estimated three million civilians killed, injured or displaced. Nearly 4.5 million tons of explosives were dropped on Indochina - more than twice the tonnage used in all of World War II.
Kissinger's involvement in the bombing campaigns was direct and intimate. Colonel Sitton noted that by late 1969, Kissinger was "carefully screening the raids," "reading the raw intelligence," and personally adjusting mission patterns and bombing runs. As chair of multiple critical committees - the Forty Committee, WSAG, Verification Panel, Vietnam Special Studies Group, and Defense Program Review Committee - Kissinger had unparalleled knowledge of operations and their consequences.
Operation Speedy Express exemplifies the approach. Launched in early 1969 to "pacify" Kien Hoa province in the Mekong Delta - an area Defense Secretary McNamara had confirmed contained no North Vietnamese regular units - the operation killed approximately 5,000 noncombatant civilians. The operation's statistics revealed the truth: 10,899 "enemy" killed but only 748 weapons captured - an impossible disparity unless most victims were unarmed civilians. A U.S. official admitted these actions were "worse than My Lai" but spread out "in dribbles" over time, mostly "from the air and at night," and crucially, were "sanctioned by the command's insistence on high body-counts."
Even after the inevitable collapse in 1975, Kissinger's face-saving impulses continued. When Cambodian forces detained the American merchant ship Mayaguez, Kissinger pushed President Ford into a needless military strike resulting in 41 American deaths (18 Marines, 23 Air Force) plus uncounted Cambodian casualties - despite intelligence indicating the crew had already been released.
第 4 章
Bangladesh: Enabling Genocide for Diplomatic Convenience
In December 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Bengali-based Awami League won Pakistan's first open elections in a decade, threatening West Pakistan's political and military dominance. When General Yahya Khan postponed the National Assembly, mass protests erupted across East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani army arrested Rahman and began a systematic massacre of his supporters.
The American consulate in Dacca witnessed these atrocities firsthand. Consul General Archer Blood and twenty colleagues sent an unprecedented cable - later known as the "Blood Telegram" - denouncing not just the genocide but American complicity in it. The diplomats declared that "our government has failed to denounce atrocities" and was displaying "moral bankruptcy" by placating Pakistan's military government while ignoring the slaughter of civilians.
The circumstances warranted such protest. Pakistani soldiers burned women's dormitories and machine-gunned fleeing students using American-supplied weapons. In the first three days alone, at least 10,000 civilians were murdered. The eventual civilian death toll has never been placed at less than half a million and has been estimated as high as three million. Up to ten million refugees fled to India.
Ambassador Kenneth Keating urged Washington to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore this brutality." Instead, Nixon and Kissinger recalled Archer Blood and dismissed Keating as having been "taken over by the Indians." In late April 1971, at the height of the mass murder, Kissinger sent a message to General Yahya Khan, thanking him for his "delicacy and tact."
The reason for this favor toward genocide was diplomatic convenience: Yahya Khan was serving as intermediary with China. In April 1971, Chinese authorities used the Pakistani ambassador to invite Nixon to send an envoy. This diplomatic channel became the justification for complicity in mass murder, though alternative routes to China already existed through Romania. Yahya Khan himself told associates that his "private understanding with Washington and Beijing would protect him."
Beyond the China rationale, evidence suggests Kissinger's Bangladesh policy was driven by Nixon's longstanding animus against India. Nixon detested Indira Gandhi (always calling her "that bitch") and had loathed her father Nehru for his leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. When State Department and CIA analysts wouldn't support his paranoid theories about Soviet-Indian plots, Kissinger exploded: "The President always says to tilt toward Pakistan, but every proposal I get is in the opposite direction."
After becoming Secretary of State in 1973, Kissinger downgraded all diplomats who had signed the genocide protest. When Bangladesh's leader Sheikh Mujib visited America in 1974, Kissinger boycotted his brief meeting with President Ford and opposed emergency grain shipments and debt relief for the devastated country. Within weeks of Kissinger's brief visit to Bangladesh in November 1974, embassy officials began covertly meeting with Bangladeshi officers planning a coup. On August 14, 1975, Mujib and forty family members were murdered in a military takeover.
第 5 章
Chile: Assassination and Coup as Foreign Policy Tools
Kissinger's contempt for democracy was evident in his remark that Chile shouldn't "go Marxist" just because "its people are irresponsible." When Salvador Allende won a plurality in Chile's 1970 election, Nixon ordered immediate action: "Not concerned risks involved... $10,000,000 available... Make the economy scream."
Kissinger established a "two track" Chile policy: one diplomatic, the other a covert strategy of destabilization and assassination to provoke a military coup. The CIA's efforts faced two obstacles: Chile's tradition of military non-interference in politics and the principled opposition of General Rene Schneider, Chile's military chief. At a September 18, 1970 meeting, Kissinger's group decided Schneider had to be kidnapped to create chaos and prevent Allende's confirmation.
What was unfolding was state-supported terrorism: unelected US officials planning the kidnapping of a constitutional military officer in a democratic allied country. Ambassador Korry was deliberately kept in the dark about military attaches contacting the fascist group Patria y Libertad. When Chile's outgoing president Frei opposed US intervention, Kissinger turned to extremist General Roberto Viaux, authorizing the supply of machine guns and tear gas for the operation against General Schneider.
Despite supposed last-minute discouragement of Viaux, the pressure continued as Nixon demanded Allende's election "be thwarted." After two failed kidnapping attempts on October 19-20, the CIA delivered "sterile" machine guns to another group. On October 22, Viaux's gang murdered General Schneider. Though Kissinger later claimed to have "turned off" the Viaux plot, the documentary evidence shows he merely encouraged Viaux to coordinate with others rather than act alone, while maintaining support and contact.
Kissinger's direct responsibility for Schneider's murder is demonstrated through multiple lines of evidence: CIA agent Brian MacMaster delivered "hush money" to jailed Viaux group members after the assassination; Colonel Wimert hastily retrieved the $100,000 payments and threw the three machine guns into the ocean; Kissinger's October 15 memo didn't "turn off" Viaux but actually encouraged him to "amplify his planning" and "join forces with other coup planners." Ambassador Korry later confirmed Kissinger was building a paper alibi while still wanting Schneider's removal "by any means."
After Allende's confirmation as president, Kissinger authored NSC Decision Memorandum 93 on November 9, 1970, proposing economic harassment measures and advocating "close relations" with military leaders in neighboring countries to coordinate pressure against Chile - prefiguring what would later be revealed as Operation Condor, a cross-border assassination and torture network coordinated between the secret police forces of Chile, Paraguay, Argentina and other regional dictatorships.
When Allende was overthrown in September 1973, Kissinger falsely assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation as Secretary of State that the US played no part, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary including Naval Attache Patrick Ryan's report hailing the coup as "our D-Day" and describing it as "close to perfect." A declassified 1976 memorandum reveals Kissinger privately reassuring Pinochet about his pro forma human rights remarks, telling him "you are a victim of all left-wing groups" and "your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist."
第 6 章
Cyprus: Enabling Invasion and Ethnic Cleansing
In his memoirs, Kissinger awkwardly postponed discussing the 1974 Cyprus catastrophe, claiming Watergate distracted him from taking informed interest in this crucial geopolitical region. This excuse rings hollow given that the implosion of Nixon's authority actually bestowed extraordinary powers on Kissinger, who simultaneously served as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor.
Evidence overwhelmingly proves Kissinger had advance knowledge of the plot against Cyprus's President Makarios. Two months before the coup, Thomas Boyatt, head of the State Department's Cyprus desk, sent Kissinger a memorandum detailing persuasive reasons to believe a Greek junta attack was imminent and warning that without a US demarche to Athens, the junta might assume American indifference. Boyatt explicitly stated such a coup would trigger Turkish invasion. Kissinger admits seeing this document but issued no warning to Athens.
Further confirmation came from a June 1974 National Intelligence Daily report quoting the Greek dictator Ioannides boasting about removing Makarios "in twenty-four hours." Senator Fulbright also personally warned Kissinger after being briefed by a Greek dissident journalist, but Kissinger declined to intervene, bizarrely claiming he couldn't interfere in Greek "internal affairs."
Kissinger's actions after the July 15th coup reveal his tacit approval. While the rest of the world recognized the coup as an illegal intervention by Athens, Kissinger instructed the US envoy in Nicosia to receive Sampson's "foreign minister" as legitimate - making America the only government extending de facto recognition to the regime. When meeting with Cyprus's ambassador, Kissinger failed to offer customary condolences on Makarios's reported death and refused to confirm whether he still recognized the elected government.
Having anticipated that violence in Cyprus would trigger Turkish military intervention, Kissinger showed little concern when it occurred. While the Greek junta remained in power, he focused on shielding it from retaliation, opposing Makarios's return and resisting any British or Turkish use of force to reverse the Greek coup. After the junta collapsed and democracy returned to Athens, Kissinger's position shifted dramatically - he "vetoed" British military actions to prevent Turkish landings and, after Turkey conducted two brutal invasions occupying nearly 40% of Cyprus, strongly protected Ankara from congressional reprisal.
第 7 章
East Timor: Facilitating Genocide for Geopolitical Gain
East Timor stands conspicuously absent from Kissinger's memoirs - deliberately airbrushed from his historical record. Following Portugal's 1974 fascist collapse, its colonial empire rapidly disintegrated. In East Timor, the leftist FRETILIN movement initially filled the post-colonial vacuum, forming a government with support ranging from the Catholic Church to westernized students. Indonesia's dictator General Suharto immediately began subverting this new government through infiltration and attrition before launching a full invasion on December 7, 1975 - precisely as President Ford and Secretary Kissinger concluded their official Jakarta visit.
When questioned about the East Timor invasion, Kissinger initially claimed the matter was "accidental" and "never discussed" during their official visit. However, declassified State Department transcripts reveal Kissinger and Ford did discuss and approve the invasion with Suharto before it happened. Kissinger later berated his staff for documenting that the invasion violated international law and US treaty obligations by using American weapons.
A declassified transcript reveals Kissinger's fury when confronted with legal concerns about Indonesian weapons use. "The Department is falling apart and has reached the point where it disobeys clear-cut orders," he raged. When staff claimed they needed his attention on the issue, Kissinger retorted, "No one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on Timor." He worried the Indonesians would "go up in smoke" if they learned about legal concerns and admitted breaking the law, insisting national interest trumped legality: "What do we say to Congress if we're asked?" His solution: "We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January." Heavy weapons shipments indeed resumed in January 1976 after Congress was briefly misled.
While Timorese resistance faced massacre, Kissinger doubled US military aid to Indonesia and instructed UN Ambassador Moynihan to ensure the United Nations remained "utterly ineffective" in responding - actions that facilitated what became a genocide claiming a third of East Timor's population. Former CIA officer Philip Liechty confirmed "Suharto was given the green light" and that "without continued heavy US military support the Indonesians might not have been able to pull it off."
第 8 章
The Profit Margin: Power's Lucrative Afterlife
In his December 1975 State Department meeting about East Timor, Kissinger oddly declared "I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it, I get no rakeoff" - denying an allegation nobody had made. This unprompted denial would prove particularly ironic given his later business ventures. Six years after leaving office, Kissinger established Kissinger Associates, a secretive consulting firm facilitating connections between multinational corporations and foreign governments, effectively monetizing the international relationships he had cultivated while in public service.
The client list remained confidential, with ironclad contracts prohibiting any mention of the consulting arrangement, but included major corporations like American Express, Lockheed Martin, Coca-Cola, Volvo, and numerous others paying annual fees reportedly ranging from $250,000 to $1 million. His initial associates were strategically chosen former government colleagues General Brent Scowcroft (former National Security Advisor) and Lawrence Eagleburger (former Deputy Secretary of State), creating a perfect alignment between his foreign policy counsel and business connections. This "revolving door" approach became a template for future government officials entering the private sector.
Kissinger's role in opening China proved especially profitable. He assisted corporations like H.J. Heinz gain access to Chinese markets, where he was viewed "with particular respect" according to Heinz's CEO Anthony O'Reilly. Despite his previous anti-communist rhetoric, Kissinger consistently defended China's interests, most notably after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, arguing "China remains too important for America's national security to risk the relationship on the emotions of the moment." His influence helped maintain U.S.-China business relations despite growing human rights concerns.
Through ventures like China Ventures (which he personally chaired), he facilitated business with authoritarian regimes that guaranteed "safe investment" through repression. His firm represented an array of controversial clients: Yugoslavia's state-owned interests before Milosevic's wars, Saddam Hussein's Iraq during its chemical weapons use against Iran and the Kurds, and Burma's repressive SLORC regime which was widely condemned for human rights violations. Most notably, Kissinger helped Freeport McMoRan secure and maintain lucrative mining rights in Irian Jaya, Indonesia - creating what the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) later called an "environmental and social catastrophe" affecting indigenous Amungme people. The mining operation resulted in widespread displacement, environmental degradation, and social upheaval. This relationship began shortly after Kissinger helped unlock weapons flows to Indonesia's Suharto regime during the East Timor bloodbath, highlighting how his public policy decisions often aligned with future private sector opportunities.
The firm's success demonstrated how former government officials could leverage their connections and influence for immense private gain, raising serious questions about the intersection of public service and private profit. Kissinger Associates became a model for similar consulting firms, fundamentally changing how former government officials could monetize their experience and relationships.
第 9 章
Justice Delayed: The Case for Accountability
As Kissinger's diplomatic immunity gradually erodes, his legal vulnerability increases under four distinct but interconnected legal frameworks: International Human Rights Law, which provides fundamental protections for individuals against state violations; the Law of Armed Conflict, which establishes strict parameters for wartime conduct and civilian protection; International Criminal Law, addressing severe violations like genocide and crimes against humanity; and Domestic Law/Civil Remedies, which provide mechanisms for individual compensation and accountability.
US federal courts have established significant precedents regarding jurisdiction over international crimes, even when perpetrators claim sovereign immunity protection. The landmark 1980 Letelier murder case ruling definitively rejected immunity claims for acts of political assassination and terrorism. The Alien Tort Claims Act, dating back to 1789, has emerged as a powerful tool, allowing non-US citizens to pursue civil litigation in American courts for violations of international law. This mechanism potentially enables Kissinger's victims and their families to seek substantial damages and legal recognition of their suffering.
The international legal landscape has evolved dramatically, with numerous countries asserting universal jurisdiction over serious international crimes. Nations like Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and Germany have actively prosecuted international criminals regardless of where their crimes occurred. This development has created a complex web of legal accountability, significantly limiting certain individuals' ability to travel or avoid extradition. The watershed Pinochet case in 1998-1999 established the crucial precedent that "sovereign immunity" no longer provides blanket protection for government officials accused of serious international crimes.
General Telford Taylor's 1971 assessment carries particular weight given his role as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg. His comparison between American conduct in Vietnam and the charges brought against Japanese General Yamashita was particularly pointed, noting that under Nuremberg standards, American officials would face similar consequences - potentially including execution. Taylor emphasized America's unique moral and legal obligation to uphold the Nuremberg principles, which the United States had not only championed during the trials but also enshrined through subsequent UN resolutions.
The catalogue of identifiable crimes for which Kissinger might face indictment is extensive and well-documented: the systematic mass killing of civilians throughout Indochina; direct collusion in mass murder during Bangladesh's independence struggle; orchestrating the assassination of Chile's General Rene Schneider; involvement in plotting against Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus; enabling Indonesia's genocidal occupation of East Timor; and the planned kidnapping and murder of journalist Jack Anderson in Washington D.C.
The Pinochet verdict and the establishment of the International Tribunal at The Hague have effectively nullified traditional concepts of "sovereign immunity" for state crimes. This development means Kissinger could potentially face legal proceedings in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. The failure to prosecute such high-profile cases undermines the fundamental principle that no one stands above the law and suggests that war crimes prosecutions are selectively applied only to defeated enemies or minor despots. While many of Kissinger's former associates and collaborators increasingly face justice in various forums, his continued impunity represents a glaring contradiction in international justice. Meanwhile, victims and their families persist in their dignified pursuit of justice and accountability, often at considerable personal expense, highlighting America's failure to address these serious allegations against one of its most prominent former officials.
