第 1 章
The Invisible Hand That Shapes Our World
The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills remains one of the most penetrating analyses of American power ever written. Published in 1956 during the height of post-war prosperity and Cold War tensions, this sociological masterpiece challenged the comforting myths Americans told themselves about their democracy. While most citizens believed power was broadly distributed through a system of checks and balances, Mills revealed a far more concentrated reality. The book became an immediate sensation, influencing generations of activists, scholars, and political figures from the 1960s onward. Even today, it ranks among the most assigned texts in university sociology courses. What made it so revolutionary? Mills dared to suggest that a small, interconnected group of military, corporate, and political leaders made the decisions that shaped American life, while the public remained largely powerless spectators. His unflinching examination of power structures continues to resonate in our age of increasing inequality and concentrated influence, making The Power Elite not just a historical artifact but a lens through which we can better understand our own time.
第 2 章
The Higher Circles: America's Invisible Power Structure
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds they inhabit. They go about their business, raise their families, and follow routines, often feeling powerless in the face of larger forces they neither understand nor control. But not all men are ordinary. Some occupy positions that allow them to profoundly affect the lives of countless others. These elite individuals transcend the limitations that constrain the rest of us. They don't merely respond to demands; they create them.
The truth about these elites isn't some closely guarded secret. Often, the powerful themselves hold varying theories about their roles and may be uncertain about the extent of their influence. Some deny that any consequential elite exists, pointing to what powerful men say about themselves. Others insist that a compact elite must exist, citing major decisions made without public consultation-like dropping the atomic bomb on Japan.
To understand America's elite, we must look beyond both personal awareness and historical events to examine the major institutions that link them: the hierarchies of state, corporation, and military that constitute the means of modern power. These elites aren't defined merely by what they possess-money, power, prestige-but by their institutional positions. True power comes from commanding major institutions; no one can be truly powerful without access to these command structures.
The wealthy elite are closely connected to major corporations, the prime sources of wealth in modern capitalism. Prestige follows institutional position, with publicity machines enhancing status. These values-wealth, power, prestige-are cumulative and translatable: the wealthy gain power more easily, and those with status acquire wealth more readily. If we removed the elite from their institutional positions and resources, they would become powerless, poor, and uncelebrated.
The American elite can be viewed as a top social stratum whose members know each other, interact socially and professionally, and consider each other when making decisions. They form a self-conscious social class with a qualitative separation from non-elites. Unlike European aristocracies, America's elite emerged without opposition from a pre-existing nobility. The absence of a feudal past meant the American bourgeoisie monopolized wealth, prestige, and power without resistance from entrenched aristocrats.
This doesn't mean America lacks upper strata-enormous disparities in wealth and power exist, with upper tiers largely invisible to middle and lower classes, and small groups making consequential decisions affecting the entire population. These elites increasingly operate as corporate entities with managed public images rather than as autonomous individuals. Even celebrities have become synthetic productions of disciplined staffs rather than independent personalities.
The power elite comprises those political, economic, and military circles whose overlapping decisions have national consequences. Their unity stems from three sources: psychological similarity and social intermingling; structural connections between institutional hierarchies; and explicit coordination, especially during crises like wars. They are neither omnipotent nor impotent but form a graded structure of power in America.
As decision-making circles narrow and consequences grow enormous, history increasingly rests on determinate groups' choices. This doesn't mean history is their plot or that decisions are always correct-elites are often trapped by their inadequacies. Yet pivotal moments arise when small circles decide or fail to decide, making them an elite of power whose decisions carry greater consequences for more people than ever before in history.
第 3 章
Local Society: The Declining Importance of Small-Town Elites
In every American town and small city, an upper set of families has traditionally dominated local life. These families possess more than others, control local decisions, own the newspaper and radio station, direct major businesses, and run the banks. Conscious of their status as the leading class, they socialize exclusively with each other. Their children attend college, often after private schools, then marry into similar families. Their sons inherit practices or take executive positions, continuing the pattern of local power that has existed for generations.
The small-city drama revolves around the tension between old and new upper classes. The old upper class derives prestige from family lineage and tradition, emphasizing "blood" and history while downplaying money. The new upper class, entrepreneurial and often war-enriched, possesses wealth but lacks the social standing of old families. Each views the other with mixed disdain and admiration-the old seeing the new as crassly "money-conscious," while the new view the old as provincial "old fogies" blocking progress.
This status competition between established families and parvenus mirrors centuries of Western social history. Regional variations exist, with New England and Southern families particularly conscious of lineage, but the pattern appears across America. The social and economic division between old and new upper classes increasingly manifests as political division. While both typically support the Republican party, the new upper class tends toward more strident politics, often expressing status frustrations similar to those seen in national "Investigators."
Local power structures feature overlapping cliques of businessmen, bankers, and real estate holders at the top, followed by "hustlers" who implement decisions, then civic agency heads, and finally professionals. Key decisions come from informal top-level coordination, not middle-level organizations which merely execute policies and serve as training grounds for ambitious climbers.
However, local society has been fundamentally transformed by its incorporation into national systems of status, power, and wealth. No locality remains truly sovereign. Since the Civil War, merely local prominence has become insufficient for true success, as national figures overshadow local elites. The wealthy increasingly maintain "places in the country" as status symbols, investments, and seasonal residences. This has consolidated rural and small-town upper classes, with wealthy farmers moving to small cities and urban elites purchasing surrounding farmland.
The arrival of national corporations in smaller cities has further disrupted local status hierarchies. Corporate executives from big cities tend to dwarf and ignore local society. The new upper class increasingly seeks prestige through association with these corporate officials rather than through local civic involvement. As the status world of corporate executives centers outside the local city, local society drifts away from civic prestige, dismissing it as "local stuff." The children of ambitious families leave to pursue corporate careers elsewhere.
While every small city maintains its local status hierarchy with local elites at the top, these cannot simply be aggregated to form a national upper class. The national class structure isn't merely the sum of equally important local units. Local systems of class, status and power are not autonomous or equally weighted. Forces not rooted in any single locality directly and indirectly control the local hierarchies that exist in each community. Local society now looks to the cities of the Social Register, the seats of corporate power, and the centers of political and military decision-even if some older members won't admit these powers exist socially.
第 4 章
The Metropolitan 400: America's National Upper Class
America lacks a truly national city that combines social, political, and financial power. Instead, different cities serve different functions: Washington as the political capital, New York as the financial hub. Yet despite this fragmentation, recognizable upper social classes flourish in America's major cities, with cores of older wealthy families surrounded by newer wealthy ones. These metropolitan elites look primarily to one another for social recognition.
Before the Civil War, big-city upper classes were compact and stable, growing from within rather than absorbing outsiders. Family lineage traced back to colonial times, with wealth and status coinciding comfortably. Each locality developed its own industrial hierarchy-Hudson patroons, Virginia planters, New England Puritan shipowners, St. Louis French Creoles, Denver gold miners, and New York coupon-clippers. The richest formed a distinct caste with seemingly permanent fortunes and honorably old families.
After the Civil War, this stability was shattered as new wealth overwhelmed old families. From the 1870s to the 1920s, pre-Civil War wealthy families tried but failed to resist the invasion of post-Civil War rich, whose enormous wealth and national scope couldn't be contained locally. The formula for "old families" became money plus inclination plus time-with money ultimately being the decisive factor.
Various social arbiters attempted to formalize membership in this upper class. Ward McAllister organized the Patriarchs, twenty-five old-family New Yorkers who could invite select others to exclusive balls. In 1892, he published his famous "400" list, combining old families with carefully selected new wealth. The Social Register, established in the 1880s, became the most successful status arbiter, combining old families with new wealth. Starting with 881 New York families, it expanded to twelve cities by 1928.
In each metropolitan area with a Social Register, an upper social class exists whose members were born into long-registered families. These people are set apart by their origin, appearance, and conduct. They live in exclusive neighborhoods in fine old houses or elaborately simple modern ones, furnished with quiet expensive taste. Their clothing, even when casual, is distinctively well-cut. They belong to exclusive clubs and share common educational backgrounds-typically Episcopal boarding schools followed by Harvard, Yale, or Princeton.
Unlike the "merely conceited" who depend on publicity, these "proud" families avoid newspaper gossip columns. Though wealthy enough not to work, their men typically serve as bankers or lawyers, preserving family fortunes while directing major financial institutions. The metropolitan upper classes are predominantly Protestant (especially Episcopalian, Unitarian or Presbyterian) and of longer American origin than the general population.
The gentlemen's club serves dual purposes-as both a business network hub where deals are made over lunch and a social certification center. Leading men in each city belong to such exclusive institutions, visiting counterparts in other cities at establishments like Boston's Somerset, Philadelphia's Racquet, or New York's Knickerbocker.
The upper-class lifestyle is remarkably consistent nationwide. Brooks Brothers suits are recognized status markers in every major city, but the true distinction lies in education. Upper-class children follow predictable educational paths through exclusive private schools to Ivy League universities. These schools serve as the prime unifying institution of the national upper class, selecting and training both old and new wealthy families.
The metropolitan upper class has become a nationally recognized social stratum with homogeneous features and strong unity. Though not a fixed membership society, it maintains exclusivity through wealth, shared educational institutions, and intermarriage. As business becomes truly national, the economic roles of upper classes become similar and interchangeable; as politics nationalizes, their political opinions consolidate. Family connections spread members into commanding institutional positions-government, corporations, military, and academia-creating networks where impersonal problems of large institutions fuse with intimate group sentiments.
第 5 章
The Celebrities: America's Glittering Distraction
America's world of celebrity has been created from above, based on nationwide hierarchies of power and wealth and expressed through mass media. As national economic, military and state hierarchies have developed, their elites have taken the publicity spotlight alongside professional entertainers from the entertainment world. These celebrities are instantly recognizable names who generate excitement and publicity value wherever they go, continuously providing material for media and entertainment.
Cafe society is where institutional elites, metropolitan socialites, and professional entertainers mingle publicly, exchanging prestige claims under the spotlight of publicity. Centered in New York City's restaurants and nightclubs between 50th and 60th streets, this phenomenon emerged around 1919 and flourished during Prohibition when socialites sought livelier companions beyond Newport.
By 1937, professional celebrities of "erotic beauty and transient talent" were established alongside old upper-class members. Cafe society exists primarily for publicity, with social chroniclers and gossip columnists becoming professional celebrators who shape the celebrity world. The hierarchy of publicity has replaced hierarchies of descent and wealth-not the gentleman's club but the night club, not Newport afternoons but Manhattan nights.
Professional celebrities represent the ultimate outcome of America's competitive fetishism, where excellence in any field grants social access to presidents and industrial executives. The celebrity world functions as both prestige pinnacle and big business, with media networks creating and promoting celebrities for profit. Unlike traditional elites celebrated for their positions, these figures occupy positions because they're celebrated, valued for their "Personality"-a combination of appearance and skill. Their prominence has overshadowed the social 400, forcing even serious public figures like politicians to compete for attention through media performance.
The metropolitan 400 hasn't disappeared but has been absorbed into the national prestige system centered on celebrity. Those seeking prestige must either join this celebrity world or fade from national prominence. The evolution of celebrated American women reveals this status shift: from the European-style Salon Lady (never truly established in America) to the debutante (who peaked in the 1930s before being industrialized into mass subscription dances) to today's All-American Girl. This modern glamour queen-thin, expensive-looking, with practiced erotic appeal-sets the standard imitated nationwide.
Washington D.C.'s social structure differs from other cities, as political power doesn't neatly align with social status. The metropolitan 400 exists but is overshadowed by "official Society," particularly Embassy Row along Massachusetts Avenue. Political turnover prevents a stable social hierarchy from forming, as key officials must be invited regardless of social qualifications but frequently change positions.
The power elite increasingly seeks to establish a national system of prestige to buttress their power with authoritative status. Over the last thirty years, signs of a status merger among economic, political, and military elites have emerged as they consolidate new privileges rooted in their corporate way of life. The question remains whether America's celebrated figures will eventually coincide with its most powerful, though the elite may be content to remain uncelebrated behind the cloak of liberal rhetoric and celebrity distractions.
The celebrity landscape includes both trivial and serious figures, all magnified through mass media into a dazzling display of wealth and power. From New York limousines to Texas oil fields, from Senate hearings to luxury estates, these images capture the extreme privileges of America's elite. We see the wealthy at play across continents, commanding seasons through travel and landscapes through multiple residences. These are the somebodies deemed worthy of notice, whose names and faces dominate media, alongside hidden figures who "really run things" but remain unprovable.
第 6 章
The Very Rich: Perpetuating Privilege Through Generations
Contrary to popular belief, America's great fortunes didn't vanish after WWI or the 1929 crash. Instead, American capitalism continued producing millionaires, with new corporate rich joining traditional wealth holders to form an elite rivaling any in world history.
While early views portrayed the wealthy as either "robber barons" or "industrial statesmen," neither criminal behavior nor pure entrepreneurship fully explains great wealth. The truth lies in understanding how individuals exploit objective opportunities within the economic system.
American wealth was modest before the Civil War - George Washington's $530,000 estate made him among the richest of his time. The truly great fortunes emerged during the Civil War's economic transformation, supported by new legal frameworks like the National Banking Act and Fourteenth Amendment.
A study of America's wealthiest across three generations (1900, 1925, 1950) reveals wealth's increasing self-perpetuation. While 39% of the very rich in 1900 came from lower-class origins, by 1950 this dropped to 9%, with 68% coming from upper-class backgrounds. Throughout all periods, most came from entrepreneurial families.
The very rich have remained predominantly active, though rentiers increased from 14% in 1900 to 26% by 1950. By 1950, women comprised 70% of the rentier class, ranging from socialites to philanthropists.
Two key features mark the path to great wealth: the "big jump" - securing a strategic position allowing access to significant money - and the accumulation of advantages, where existing wealth creates more opportunities. Notably, no one has achieved great fortune through corporate advancement alone - even executives who become millionaires do so through finance and speculation rather than management expertise.
The trend is clear: modern wealth increasingly perpetuates itself, with 68% of the very rich coming from upper classes, 23% from middle-class origins, and only 9% from lower classes. America's economic development allowed private individuals to organize industrialization for profit, creating both personal fortunes and powerful corporations that now represent the primary units of wealth.
第 7 章
The Chief Executives: Corporate America's Commanding Heights
Many who celebrate the American economy claim today's corporate executives are distinct from "crude old-fashioned entrepreneurs"-responsible trustees and impartial umpires for various economic interests including stockholders, workers, and consumers. These executives, often portrayed as self-made farm boys or immigrants who've achieved success, are credited with America's material prosperity and praised as potential government leaders. Critics counter that these powerful men aren't property owners yet control corporate affairs, suggesting a "managerial revolution" that transformed property's meaning. Both perspectives miss a crucial fact: chief executives and the very rich aren't two distinct groups but are deeply interconnected in the corporate world of property and privilege.
Corporations are the organized centers of the private property system, with chief executives as their organizers. The corporate revolution has transformed property from a workman's tool into an instrument controlling work and extracting profit. Small entrepreneurs are no longer key to America's economic life, as less than 0.2% of manufacturing and mining companies now employ half of all workers in these industries. The development pattern in major industries typically begins with competition among many small firms, eventually resulting in consolidation into a "Big Five" or "Big Three" that dominates the industry.
The chief executives who command America's largest corporations are not a miscellaneous collection but a uniform social type with exceptional advantages of origin and training. They're predominantly urban, white, Protestant Americans-especially Episcopalians and Presbyterians-born into upper and upper-middle class families. Most striking is their entrepreneurial heritage: 57% are sons of businessmen, 14% of professionals, and only 12% come from wage-worker or lower white-collar families. This pattern has remained consistent throughout the post-Civil War era, with over 60% consistently coming from business and professional classes.
Their family connections to American economic power typically extend at least two generations, with even their grandfathers predominantly (54%) being businessmen or professionals at a time when only 9% of the male population held such positions. The newest crop of executives under 50 shows even less mobility, with merely 2.5% rising from wage-worker families.
The external career paths of top executives fall into several distinct types. Only 6% are true entrepreneurs who started or organized their own businesses-a dramatic decline from 36% two generations ago. Family-managers who inherited positions from relatives account for 11%, down from 32% previously. Professional men, primarily lawyers, comprise 13%-roughly the same as before. The remaining 68%-up dramatically from just 18% in 1870-have risen through corporate hierarchies, often crossing between companies.
Most began in large companies, with about one-third never working elsewhere. Despite myths about rising from the mailroom, only 24% started as clerks or laborers, and many of these were merely going through a ritual "learning the business" before advancing. The modern executive is less a creative entrepreneur than a professional coordinator who approves decisions flowing upward from subordinates. Their advancement depends not on strict bureaucratic qualifications but on being chosen by superiors in the political world of corporate cliques.
Corporate hierarchies typically feature a Number One stratum of top executives who receive reports from a Number Two stratum of operating managers. The Number Two men stand between working hierarchies and the directing top, with their reports focused primarily on profitability. Individual decision-making at the top is increasingly replaced by committee judgments on ideas generated from below.
Successful executives often attribute their rise to "luck"-which translates to being chosen by those already at the top, creating an accumulation of corporate success. This network of connections is exemplified by George Humphrey's career trajectory through advisory committees to cabinet position. The executive career involves political maneuvering, forming alliances, and perpetuating a certain type of indoctrinated person. Modern executive careers are increasingly contained within one company, with almost seven out of ten top executives rising from within by 1950, compared to only four in 1870.
Success depends less on objective criteria than on conforming to the expectations of superiors-"fitting in" socially, politically, and stylistically. The corporate world selects for "sound men" who embody balanced judgment and speak in "rich, round voices" without confusing superiors with details. Today's chief executives worry about developing tomorrow's corporate elite, implementing recruitment programs, psychological assessments, and specialized university curricula to systematically cultivate the managers of tomorrow.
第 8 章
The Corporate Rich: America's True Ruling Class
America's economic reality reflects a managerial reorganization of the propertied classes into a unified stratum of corporate rich. While income distribution has evolved into a diamond shape with a larger middle class, the fundamental dynamics of wealth remain unchanged. At the top are roughly 120 millionaires and 13,700 people earning $100,000+, distinguished by their property-based income-94% for millionaires and two-thirds for the $100,000-999,999 bracket.
The supposed "income revolution" equalizing American wealth proves illusory when examining how the corporate rich manage their finances. They employ sophisticated tax avoidance strategies, including preferential capital gains rates, depletion allowances, tax-free municipal bonds, family trusts, and charitable deductions that preserve lifetime income. These mechanisms effectively create a separate tax system unavailable to ordinary wage earners.
The corporate rich enjoy extensive "fringe benefits" embedded in executive compensation-far beyond the modest benefits of ordinary workers. These include medical care, club memberships, corporate aircraft, private recreation facilities, company cars, and resort conventions. These tax-free perquisites substantially enhance their lifestyle while strengthening loyalty to the corporate system.
This stratum of corporate rich possesses wealth beyond personal spending capacity. For them, money provides both power and absolute freedom from cost constraints. Their institutional powers extend far beyond consumer privileges-the corporate elite constitutes a hierarchy of governing groups with chief executives wielding significant economic sovereignty.
Their economic power translates directly into political influence. The very rich have long been major campaign contributors, with just 2,407 individuals providing 55% of major party committee funding in 1952. Corporate executives, in particular, have converted property power into political control, assuming key government positions, especially during wartime. As Fortune magazine noted, corporations have begun to rival states as frameworks for self-government, with presidents depending on them as medieval kings relied on barons.
第 9 章
The Warlords: Military Power's Resurgence in American Life
The remarkable 18th-19th century trend of civilian dominance over military power has begun to falter in the 20th century. All over the world, the warlord is returning, and in America, generals and admirals have gained increased power alongside corporate executives and politicians to make gravest decisions.
Though all politics is a struggle for power with violence as its ultimate form, military dictatorship hasn't been the normal government form because civilian authority flourished in the 18th-19th centuries. Gaetano Mosca suggests that societies contain a quota of violence-prone men who, when properly channeled into professional military hierarchies, can be controlled by civilians. Peace in modern history stems from the national state's monopolization of violence, yet the existence of 81 such states creates the conditions for modern war.
The American military establishment evolved in unique circumstances. Born in violence yet isolated from major threats, the United States maintained civilian government control over its military. The Constitution deliberately limited military power, making the President commander-in-chief while giving Congress sole authority to declare war and fund military operations. Geographic isolation, with only weak neighbors and protective oceans, meant America didn't need a large standing army. The nation's commercial preoccupations further devalued military careers as economically parasitical.
The typical American general of 1900 came from an old American family of British ancestry, born around 1840 in the northeastern United States. Usually the son of a professional man with political connections, he took about thirty-eight years to reach major-general rank. Only a third of these generals attended West Point, with many commissioned during the Civil War or coming up through state militias. The navy maintained higher prestige, functioning almost like a gentleman's club with more specialized training and greater authority, commanding expensive capital investments in the form of ships.
By the mid-twentieth century, America's peaceful civilian values must contend with an unprecedented national situation: for the first time, Americans face catastrophic attack on their homeland, with estimates suggesting one saturation attack could cause 50 million casualties. The elite have defined this international reality primarily in military terms, replacing traditional diplomacy with calculations of war potential. Modern weapons are now considered the "first line of defense" rather than last resorts. America faces an "emergency without foreseeable end," where war preparedness is the normal condition and no clear concept of "victory" exists.
As America's means of violence have expanded globally, the Pentagon has emerged as their symbolic center-a concrete and limestone maze containing the "organized brain" of American military power. The world's largest office building houses 31,300 "Pentagonians" connected by seventeen miles of corridors and vast communication networks. At its head sits the Joint Chiefs of Staff, below the President and Secretary of Defense, presiding over the elaborate land, sea, and air forces.
The modern general or admiral rarely encounters actual combat-one insurance company reports that officer mortality rates during the Korean War were below average for industry as a whole. Today's military leaders are more professionalized executives than fighting men. Most top generals of 1950 graduated from West Point, with all admirals coming from the Naval Academy. Military life revolves obsessively around rank, affecting everything from social functions (where coffee outranked tea) to housing assignments.
For military leaders, social origins matter less than for any other elite group. The military's total-institution training shapes character deeply, creating commanders who succeed within a closed hierarchy where status is unambiguous. In this military world, debate and persuasion are not valued-one obeys and commands. The warlord often sees economic institutions as means for military production, corporations as ill-run military establishments, and political institutions as inefficient obstacles.
These men with limited imagination have come to occupy positions of great decision in postwar America, not necessarily because they sought these positions, but often through default of civilian political leadership. The modern warlord's crucial career development happens in the Pentagon bureaucracy, where he must become known as a "comer" and learn to navigate the system while catching the attention of superior officers who might advance his career.
第 10 章
The Military Ascendancy: Warlords Enter Civilian Domains
Since Pearl Harbor, military leaders have gained unprecedented influence in American life, extending beyond defense into economic, political, educational, and scientific spheres. The military elite now participate extensively in civilian decision-making while maintaining their martial perspective. Their exceptional competence in coordinated operations and unmatched access to global information has made them influential across domains.
This military ascendancy stems partly from civilian default, with politicians using military expertise to legitimize policies by placing them "above politics." High-ranking officers increasingly engage in policy debates, testify before Congress, and make political statements. Some have aligned with political parties, creating "Republican and Democratic generals," while Congress shows growing deference to military testimony, often approving budgets without thorough scrutiny.
The military's influence is particularly pronounced in foreign policy, coinciding with the decline of civilian diplomacy. With war viewed as permanent and negotiation often labeled "appeasement," military thinking has supplanted diplomatic approaches. This shift reflects both the historical weakness of America's diplomatic service and its further erosion through security investigations and political appointments.
Economically, the military's role has expanded dramatically. Since World War II, military spending has consistently exceeded 30% of the government budget, often reaching over 50%. The military-industrial complex has deepened, with generals joining corporate boards and military demands shaping the corporate economy. Scientific research has also become increasingly militarized, with defense-related projects receiving the lion's share of government funding - by 1954, 85% of federal research money went to "national security."
The military maintains its influence through an extensive public relations apparatus, spending millions to promote its agenda to the public and Congress. This effort focuses on defining international relations in military terms and emphasizing the need for expanded military facilities. With no competing interests having comparable resources, military perspectives dominate public discourse unchallenged.
第 11 章
The Power Elite: America's Triumvirate of Influence
America's power structure has evolved through five epochs, with changes occurring through institutional realignments rather than violent upheavals. From the Revolution through the early 1800s, versatile elites moved freely between political, economic, and military roles, with political institutions holding primacy until 1824.
By the late 19th century, corporate power dominated, exemplified by the Morgan interests controlling 341 directorships across 112 corporations. While the Progressive era and New Deal temporarily balanced power between political and economic interests, post-World War II saw corporate executives ascending to the highest levels of political influence.
The power elite emerges predominantly from America's upper income brackets, typically comprising native-born, Protestant (especially Episcopalian or Presbyterian) urban dwellers with elite education backgrounds. While not hereditary, the higher the position, the stronger the upper-class connections.
Critics who argue that leaders transcend their origins misunderstand how deeply ingrained worldviews shape decision-making. As Mills notes, military officials retain their outlook in civilian roles, just as corporate executives like Charles Wilson genuinely believe corporate and national interests align.
The elite's unity stems not from formal membership but from the similar qualities demanded by top positions across economic, military, and political hierarchies. This creates an interchangeability of leadership roles, with many figures moving between domains. Selection criteria actively favor this cross-pollination, with corporate leaders seeking government experience and vice versa.
The power elite concept isn't based on conspiracy but on corresponding interests and developments among major institutions, reinforced by shared backgrounds and social networks. While they typically work through existing organizations, they create new ones when necessary, like the National Security Council.
This structure emerged from several factors: the diminished role of party politicians, legislative gridlock, lack of a neutral civil service, and increased official secrecy. These changes, combined with the concentration of decision-making power, have transformed American democracy into a mass society governed by professional organizers at the top.
第 12 章
The Higher Immorality: Power Without Accountability
The higher immorality represents a systematic feature of American elite society, not just individual corruption. In the corporate era, economic relations have become impersonal, private conscience has weakened, and institutional immorality has become normalized across business, warfare, and politics.
Today's moral uncertainty stems from traditional values losing their grip without new moral codes replacing them. The public hasn't explicitly rejected these values, but they've become hollow, leaving people morally adrift and politically indifferent. This extends to Washington, where officials maintain political habits without genuine belief in founding principles. The corporate rich exercise power without moral authority, masking their interests behind empty slogans.
In a society where money-making reigns supreme, people easily become morally ruthless in pursuing wealth. When political and economic institutions intertwine, public office becomes a vehicle for private gain. The hierarchies of business, politics, and military are interconnected through self-co-optation, with success depending on alignment with those controlling advancement.
Modern success now emphasizes "effective personality" over character virtues, reducing personal relations to public relations. Despite the elite's self-made narrative, what matters most is who controls the advancement criteria. Today's power elite lacks the cultural sophistication of earlier leaders - congressional debates have devolved, and leaders prioritize briefings over serious reading.
Knowledge has become merely instrumental, with intellectuals serving only as hired technicians. The typical elite member values "weight" and "judgment" over intellectual depth, creating a crisis of understanding. Yet these leaders benefit from their institutions' total power, with status following money and authority in mass society.
Unlike historical figures like Washington or Jefferson, today's leaders are seen as mere politicians, their images carefully manufactured. Professional celebrities and mid-level politicians dominate public attention, diverting focus from the actual power elite. America's leadership presents itself as "a naked and arbitrary power," with second-rate minds commanding through platitudes - products of an "organized irresponsibility" rather than moral or meritorious leadership.
