第4章
The Relativist Zeitgeist in Academia
The misuse of scientific concepts by postmodern thinkers reflects a broader relativist zeitgeist in academia-the belief that truth is merely relative to individuals or social groups. This epistemic relativism (concerning facts rather than morals or aesthetics) stems partly from works by philosophers like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, though their texts are often ambiguously interpreted.
Relativism faces fundamental problems when confronted with scientific practice. How can we attain objective knowledge when we only have direct access to our sensations? While we can't definitively prove the external world exists, it's a reasonable hypothesis-the persistence of our sensations suggests external causes. Similarly, radical skepticism questions whether our sensations accurately reflect reality, but this skepticism applies universally to all knowledge. We reject such skepticism in daily life because the coherence of our experience is best explained by assuming the world roughly corresponds to our sensory perceptions.
Scientific method isn't radically different from rational thinking in everyday life. Historians, detectives, and plumbers use the same basic methods of induction, deduction, and evidence assessment as scientists-science simply conducts these operations more systematically with controls, statistical tests, and precise measurements. The coherence between scientific theories and observations provides compelling evidence for their approximate truth. Quantum electrodynamics predicts the electron's magnetic moment to incredible precision (1.001 159 652 201 0.000 000 000 030), matching experimental results (1.001 159 652 188 0.000 000 000 004)-such agreement would be miraculous if science said nothing true about the world.
The crisis in 20th-century epistemology stems largely from attempts to formalize scientific method, followed by skepticism when these formalizations proved inadequate. Popper's falsificationism-the idea that scientific theories must make falsifiable predictions-provides a useful demarcation criterion but becomes problematic when taken too literally. Two major difficulties arise: First, Popper's rejection of induction contradicts scientific practice, where theories gain credibility through successful predictions. Second, falsification itself is more complex than it appears-scientific propositions can't be tested individually since empirical predictions require numerous additional assumptions about measurement devices and background theories.
The Duhem-Quine thesis states that theories are underdetermined by evidence-since we have only finite data but theories make potentially infinite predictions. This is like having a finite set of points with infinitely many possible curves passing through them. In practice, we face three scenarios: evidence so strong that doubting would be unreasonable, competing theories with none fully convincing, or no plausible theory accounting for all data. What ultimately convinces us we've found the right theory is when new data fit our predictions.
第5章
The Strong Programme and Nature's Role
The "strong programme" in sociology of science faces a fundamental dilemma. When Barnes and Bloor suggest evaluating beliefs "without regard to the sociologist's own standards," they create an ambiguity. If they merely suggest using the same principles to explain all beliefs regardless of truth value, this is unobjectionable. But their apparent claim that only social causes matter-that Nature itself cannot enter explanations-is deeply problematic.
When examining why European scientists accepted Newtonian mechanics between 1700-1750, social factors certainly played a role, but a crucial part of the explanation must be that planets actually do move as Newton predicted. Similarly, if someone runs screaming about elephants in a lecture hall, our explanation depends fundamentally on whether elephants are actually there.
Bruno Latour exemplifies this confusion in his "Science in Action," where he presents the Third Rule of Method: "Since the settlement of a controversy is the cause of Nature's representation, not the consequence, we can never use the outcome-Nature-to explain how and why a controversy has been settled." This formulation slips between "Nature's representation" and "Nature" itself, creating multiple possible interpretations ranging from truism to radical idealism.
When discussing scientific controversies like the solar neutrino problem, Latour mocks the idea that Nature decides outcomes, instead suggesting sociologists can understand "everything there is to understand in technoscience" by analyzing power struggles between researchers. This approach fundamentally confuses facts with our knowledge of them. Scientists do use Nature as an external referee-they design experiments specifically to discover what is happening in Nature.
Relativism's practical consequences extend beyond abstract philosophy, affecting criminal investigations, education, and development in the Third World. When applied to criminal cases, relativism creates absurd confusions, as when an anthropologist claimed both a policeman and judge were telling "their truth" about a file transmission in a Belgian murder case-ignoring that only one factual reality exists. In education, relativist textbooks redefine "facts" as mere consensus interpretations that change with theories, undermining critical thinking. Most harmfully, postmodern relativism damages Third World development, where intellectuals may hypocritically use Western science for themselves while encouraging common people to follow superstitions.
第6章
The Feminist Critique of Science
Luce Irigaray claims scientific knowledge displays choices determined by the sex of scholars involved. Her examples from physics, however, reveal profound misunderstandings of science. She makes bizarre connections between psychoanalytic concepts and nuclear fission, falsely claims Nietzsche perceived his ego as an atomic nucleus (impossible given the timeline), invents meaningless physics terminology like "accelerations without electromagnetic reequilibrations," confuses general relativity with special relativity, and misrepresents quantum mechanics as being "interested in the disappearance of the world." Most absurdly, she proposes that E=mc2 might be a "sexed equation" because it "privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us."
Irigaray argues fluid mechanics is underdeveloped compared to solid mechanics because of gender bias-solidity being associated with masculinity and fluidity with femininity. She claims science's inability to fully model turbulent flow stems from this gendered bias. Her American interpreter Hayles explains that Irigaray sees the privileging of solid mechanics as reflecting male anatomy (rigid organs) over female (fluid-producing openings).
This reasoning fundamentally misunderstands scientific practice. Solid mechanics remains incomplete (fracture mechanics), while fluid mechanics has well-established equations (Navier-Stokes) whose difficulty solving turbulent flows stems from mathematical complexity, not any "powerlessness of logic" or failure of "adequate symbolization."
Irigaray extends her critique to mathematical logic, claiming scientific concepts "refer only to an intra-theoretical object" creating a "fictional universe incomprehensible" to outsiders. The authors counter that scientific theories must connect to reality to have empirical consequences, and many concepts are accessible to non-experts through popularizations.
Irigaray's attempt to analyze mathematical notation proves both pedantic and comically inaccurate-she misidentifies basic symbols, confuses logical operators, and fundamentally misunderstands quantifiers in logic. She falsely claims mathematics lacks signs for "difference other than quantitative," "reciprocity," "exchange," and "fluidity," revealing her profound ignorance of basic mathematical concepts.
Her scientific confusions support her broader philosophical claim that science is "masculine," leading her to reject "truth independent of the subject" and discourage women from pursuing "universal science." The authors condemn her mystical appeals to women's "cosmic rhythms" as reinforcing the sexist stereotypes feminism has fought against.
第7章
The Myth of Postmodern Science
Claims that recent scientific developments have fundamentally changed the nature of science itself rest on similar confusions. Lyotard's attempt to establish a "postmodern science" fails through conceptual misunderstanding. He incorrectly suggests that scale-dependent measurements create "absolutely incompatible statements" rather than recognizing this as a standard feature of macroscopic quantities. For example, measuring temperature at different scales (atomic vs. planetary) yields different but complementary insights, not contradictions. When addressing fractal geometry and catastrophe theory, Lyotard provides no evidence that these mathematical advances challenge traditional scientific epistemology. Rather, they extend and enrich existing mathematical frameworks.
Chaos theory examines deterministic systems that exhibit extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. In chaotic systems, prediction errors grow exponentially rather than linearly, severely limiting predictability. For instance, in weather forecasting, tiny measurement uncertainties double approximately every three days, making accurate long-term predictions impossible. Even with vastly improved measurement precision, the prediction window extends only marginally - doubling precision adds just one doubling time to predictability. Surprisingly, even simple systems with few variables can exhibit chaotic behavior, such as the famous three-body problem in celestial mechanics or the logistic equation modeling population growth.
However, this doesn't represent a "limit of science" - many natural systems are non-chaotic, and statistical methods can still yield understanding of chaotic systems. Planetary orbits, chemical reactions, and numerous physical phenomena remain highly predictable. The crucial distinction between determinism and predictability is often overlooked: determinism concerns what nature does independently of us, while predictability depends partly on our knowledge. A chaotic system follows strict deterministic laws even when we cannot predict its behavior precisely.
Many confusions arise from misunderstanding "linear" and "nonlinear" terms. Newton's supposedly "linear" thought actually uses nonlinear equations in gravitational theory and mechanics, while quantum mechanics (often labeled "postmodern") uses a linear fundamental equation - the Schrodinger equation. Applications of chaos theory to fields like business management or literary analysis often border on absurd, particularly when confusing mathematical chaos with the colloquial meaning of disorder. For example, claims that organizational behavior can be understood through chaos theory typically ignore the precise mathematical meaning of chaos in favor of vague analogies about unpredictability. Similarly, attempts to apply fractal mathematics to literary texts often mistake superficial pattern recognition for meaningful analysis.
The real significance of chaos theory lies not in undermining scientific rationality but in expanding our understanding of complex systems while remaining firmly within the traditional scientific method. It demonstrates both the power and limitations of scientific prediction while reinforcing the importance of mathematical rigor in understanding natural phenomena.
第8章
Godel's Theorem and Intellectual Abuse
Godel's theorem has become an inexhaustible source of intellectual abuse across various disciplines, serving as a prime example of how mathematical concepts can be misappropriated and distorted when taken out of their original context. The theorem, which specifically addresses the limitations of formal mathematical systems, has been stretched far beyond its legitimate scope to make sweeping claims about politics, society, and human nature.
Social critic Regis Debray provides a particularly striking example in his "Critique of Political Reason," where he dramatically claims that "collective madness finds its ultimate foundation" in the "logical axiom" of incompleteness. Debray presents this as the "secret of our collective miseries" and the "a priori condition of any political history," framing it as an "extension of Godel's theorem" that states "no organized system can be closed by elements internal to that system alone." This interpretation fundamentally misunderstands both the technical content and the proper scope of Godel's work, which deals specifically with formal systems in mathematical logic and their ability to prove their own consistency.
The misappropriation becomes even more problematic when Debray uses this flawed understanding to draw spectacular but unfounded conclusions about political systems. He argues that "government of the people by the people" is "logically contradictory" and that a "demystified society would be a pulverized society." These assertions represent a double error: first in misinterpreting Godel's theorem, and then in applying this misinterpretation to social and political phenomena that bear no meaningful relationship to formal mathematical systems.
The intellectual abuse spreads further as other thinkers build upon these misappropriations. Philosopher Michel Serres compounds the error by elevating Debray's misuse to a "Godel-Debray principle," claiming it "frees us from ancient models" - though it's unclear what models these might be or how Godel's theorem could possibly relate to them. Similarly, philosopher Alain Badiou makes an even more perplexing leap, attempting to connect the continuum hypothesis in set theory to immigrant workers and "trade-union realism," creating a bizarre and logically incoherent bridge between abstract mathematics and concrete social issues.
These examples reveal a troubling pattern in contemporary intellectual discourse: the tendency to appropriate complex mathematical concepts with precise technical meanings and apply them arbitrarily to social and political domains where they have no legitimate application. This practice often involves multiple layers of misunderstanding: first, a fundamental misinterpretation of the mathematical concept itself; second, an unjustified extension of this concept beyond its proper domain; and finally, the drawing of sweeping conclusions based on these compounded errors.
The result isn't the kind of genuine interdisciplinary insight that can emerge from careful analysis and legitimate analogies. Instead, it produces intellectual confusion masquerading as profound analysis, often clothed in the authoritative language of mathematics but lacking any real mathematical or logical foundation. This pattern of abuse not only misleads readers but also undermines the potential for genuine cross-disciplinary understanding and application of mathematical concepts.
第9章
Towards a Rational Dialogue Between Cultures
Rather than inhibiting interaction between mathematical-physical sciences and human sciences, we should emphasize necessary preconditions for meaningful dialogue. The fears on both sides can be alleviated by distinguishing between grandiose claims and modest accomplishments.
Seven principles can guide productive cross-disciplinary engagement: First, know what you're talking about when discussing natural sciences. Second, recognize that obscurity doesn't equal profundity. Third, science isn't just a "text" providing metaphors. Fourth, social sciences shouldn't ape natural sciences-they have their own methods. Fifth, be wary of argument from authority-evaluate propositions based on facts and reasoning, not the status of advocates. Sixth, distinguish between specific skepticism (about particular theories) and radical skepticism (about all knowledge). Finally, beware of ambiguity as subterfuge-texts that can be interpreted as either banal truths or radical falsehoods, allowing authors to retreat to innocuous interpretations when challenged.
The intellectual sources of postmodernism and relativism are complex. Several key factors include: First, the neglect of empirical evidence-while pure "empiricism" is rightly criticized, theories must still be justified through observation and experiment, not merely through coherent language or mathematical formalism. Second, scientism in social sciences-the illusion that simplistic "objective" methods can solve complex problems-has paradoxically led to anti-scientific reactions when these methods inevitably fail. Third, natural sciences' prestige leads some scientists to make unjustified claims, while giving the public a distorted view of scientific activity. Fourth, methodological relativism in anthropology (studying customs without judgment) has been confused with radical cognitive relativism (claiming all belief systems are equally "true"). Finally, traditional philosophical and literary training can be a handicap when approaching scientific texts, as it emphasizes authorship and textual analysis over factual arguments.
第10章
The Political Stakes of Intellectual Clarity
The paradoxical relationship between postmodernism and the political left reveals deeper issues. Historically, the left championed science against obscurantism, but recently many leftist academics have embraced epistemic relativism. This shift stems from several sources: First, new social movements (black liberation, feminism, gay rights) reacting against traditional leftist orthodoxies sometimes mistakenly rejected rationality along with narrow economic determinism. Second, political discouragement in the face of triumphant capitalism has led some intellectuals to retreat into academic cults divorced from reality rather than confront difficult problems. Third, science became an easy target-sufficiently linked to power structures to seem unsympathetic, yet accessible enough to attack.
We must distinguish between legitimate critiques of science (as institution, technology, or fallible knowledge) and misguided attacks on rationality itself. By abandoning reason, the postmodern left deprives itself of tools for criticizing social order while delighting those in power who monopolize these instruments.
Postmodernism has three principal negative effects: wasting time in the human sciences, creating cultural confusion that favors obscurantism, and weakening the political left. While postmodernism poses no immediate threat to natural sciences, it seriously harms social sciences when "fashionable nonsense and word games displace the critical and rigorous analysis of social realities." The deliberately obscure discourses poison intellectual life and strengthen anti-intellectualism.
For the left, postmodernism isolates intellectuals in sterile debates, discredits progressive politics through association with confused ideas, and makes social critique logically impossible due to subjectivist presuppositions. If all discourses are merely "stories" with equal validity, there's no foundation for criticizing existing social orders or opposing prejudice.
Having begun as a challenge to orthodoxies in the 1960s, postmodernism has now become institutionalized, with revolutionary ideas degenerating into "a vulgate that mixes bizarre confusions with overblown banalities." Our hope lies in the emergence of "an intellectual culture that would be rationalist but not dogmatic, scientifically minded but not scientistic, open-minded but not frivolous, and politically progressive but not sectarian."
In a world increasingly dominated by science and technology, intellectual clarity isn't merely an academic virtue-it's a political necessity. When we surrender rational discourse to those in power, we abandon our most powerful tool for social critique. The defense of reason isn't conservative nostalgia but the precondition for meaningful progressive politics. As Sokal and Bricmont remind us, there is nothing truthful, wise, humane, or strategic about confusing hostility to injustice with hostility to science and rationality.
